Corporate governance: five years later by Begovic, Boris et al.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FIVE YEARS LATER
Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies
Boško Mijatović (editor)
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FIVE YEARS LATER
Copyright © 2008 by Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies
All rights reserved
Printed by
Službeni glasnik, Belgrade
Circulation 
500 copies
ISBN  978-86-83557-52-3
2008
CIP – Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд
005 . 21 : 334 . 72 . 021
CORPORATE governance : five years later / 
Boris Begović . . . [et al.] . -Belgrade : 
Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies, 2008 
(Belgrade : Glasnik). - 198 str. : ilustr. ; 
24 cm
Tiraž 500. - Str. 7: Foreword / Boško 
Mijatović. - Napomene i bibliografske 
reference uz tekst.
ISBN  978-86-83557-52-3
1. Begović, Boris [аутор] 
а) Корпоративно управљање 
COBISS.SR-ID 153729804
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
FIVE YEARS LATER
Boris Begović
Milica Bisić
Katarina Đulić
Boško Živković
Ana Jolović
Boško Mijatović
Support of the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) 
is gratefully acknowledged.
Contents
Foreword ..............................................................................................................7
I Introduction ........................................................................................................9
II  Empirical data: results of survey 
on corporate governance ................................................................................ 29
III  Concentration of ownership 
and the problem of investor protection ....................................................... 53
IV  Financial markets regulation: 
Main flaws and possible improvements ........................................................99
V  Legal regulations of corporate governance: 
overview, analysis and suggested chagnes ................................................. 121
VI  Corruption and corporate governance ...................................................... 183
VII  Concluding remarks..................................................................................... 193

Foreword
The study is a continuation of corporate governance research in Serbia 
conducted by the Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies. The previous one, 
written in 2003, marked a commencement and set the foundations not only for the 
CLDS, but Serbia in general. The purpose of the new one is to investigate what 
has happened in the meantime, what are the effects and what else could be 
done in this important area of economic life. 
Analysis of corporate governance relies on two pillars. The first is composed 
of empirical data collected on the basis of a special survey designed for this 
study, and data on change of ownership structure through trading on the 
market. The second pillar comprises analysis of legislation, primarily solutions 
of the Company Law, Law on Trade in Securities and Takeover Law. Analysis 
of the actual state of corporate governance and pertinent legislation have led 
to suggestions for changes in the legislative framework, which was the main 
purpose of this study. 
Boško Mijatović wrote chapters I, II and VII, Boško Živković and Ana 
Jolović wrote chaper III, Boško Živković and Katarina Đulić chapter  IV, Milica 
Bisić chapter V while  Boris Begović is the author of chapter VI.
25 October 2008 Boško Mijatović
’

Introduction in corporate governance
DEFINITION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In order to clearly specify the field of research, it would be useful at the 
beginning to define the main concept of this research – the corporate gover-
nance. A well-known definition is the one from Cadbury Report which reads: 
‘corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and con-
trolled’. In this way, corporate governance is defined as a set of mechanisms 
through which a company operates when the ownership is separate from the 
governance. 
There certainly are many different definitions in the literature but they 
mostly fall within the two groups. The first is focused on actual behaviour of 
companies – their performance, growth, efficiency, financial structure, status 
of shareholders and other stakeholders, etc. Therefore, these definitions cover 
the issues from the field of corporate governance within the company, such as 
how the board of directors works, what is role of managers’ remuneration for 
the company’s performance, in what way the company’s policy towards em-
ployees influences its business, what is the role of different actors, and similar.
The second group deals with normative issues of corporate governance, 
namely the rules according to which the companies operate. These rules stem 
from different sources, such as the legal system, judiciary, financial markets, 
and similar. Surely, in this set the observation focuses on the influence of nor-
mative environment on the companies’ business. A narrower approach focuses 
on the rules of capital market on the investment in listed companies’ shares, 
such as the listing requirements, regulation of insider trading, accounting and 
information disclosure rules, protection of minority shareholders, and similar. 
Falling in this category is also the definition that focuses on the question how 
the outside investors can protect themselves from the insiders’ expropriation. 
The famous Andrea Shleifer and Robert Vishny definition: ‘Corporate gover-
nance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations as-
sure themselves of getting a return on their investment’ belongs to this type. 
This definition may be extended to include both the finding of solution for the 
problem of the dispersed proprietors’ common action and the settlement of 
different stakeholders’ conflict of interest.
 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report), 99
 A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny – A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance 5, 997, pp. 737-83
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A broader definition builds on the goal of good governance being the 
maximisation of the company’s contribution to the overall economy and there-
fore considers that corporate governance includes the relationship between the 
shareholders, creditors, employees, and corporations, between the financial 
markets, institutions and corporations, and between the employees and cor-
porations. A broad definition may also include the so-called corporate social 
responsibility with regard to wider social interests (the environment, labour 
force, charity, etc).
THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The most important goal of all interested parties in the field of economy 
is the efficient functioning of the economy, that is, companies, since it is a pre-
condition for maximisation of incomes, employment, and general wellbeing. 
For this to be achievable it is necessary that companies are well run, i.e. that 
corporate business decisions made in them are the best possible in the given 
circumstances. And the main precondition for taking sound business deci-
sions is a well-structured system of corporate governance. This means that the 
problem of corporate governance does not only involve the issue of the qual-
ity of corporate business decisions, that is, the company’s management, but, 
as mentioned above, the system of corporate direction and control. In other 
words, it is about the set of the most important rules for the functioning of the 
company’s internal organisational structure (the competences and procedures 
of the shareholders’ meeting, board of directors, management, etc). 
The commonly perceived problems of corporate governance, which we 
will address hereafter, do not arise in all types of companies but only in those 
with many owners where the ownership is separated from governance. In 
modern economies, all companies may be divided in two groups. The first 
group includes the companies run by one or few owners. These are small, usu-
ally family businesses. The second group involves large companies with a large 
number of owners, let us call them corporations, which are not governed by 
their owners directly but rather by professional managers on their behalf. That 
is how the main reason for the corporate governance problem arises: separa-
tion of ownership from governance. Therefore, it is only in large companies 
with a large number of owners that corporate governance problems arise, 
while the companies from the first group boast favourable configuration – the 
owners run the company and the difficulties of corporate governance, as it is 
generally defined, are not seen here.
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There are two central issues with regard to corporate governance and both 
their presence and solution depend on the corporate ownership structure. On 
the one hand, it is difficult for outside shareholders in public companies with 
dispersed ownership to control the managers’ performance since they do not 
have sufficient power to influence them. On the other hand, in the companies 
with a small number of owners, the managers are usually controlled by the 
majority owner(s) so the main issue of good corporate governance is how to 
ensure that minority owners are able to prevent the controlling owner(s) to 
avail excessive benefits through the machinations and at the expense of minor-
ity owners. Let us see this in more detail.
The first question is the following: how to ensure that professional man-
agement in companies with dispersed ownership acts in the interest of the 
owners and not in their own (principal-agent problem)?3 The reason for this is 
that the owners are usually not capable (they are not professionals, do not have 
sufficient information) or do not have sufficient interest (they own only a small 
number of company’s shares) to properly supervise the management. How to 
ensure in those circumstances –ownership separated from professional gov-
ernance, dispersion of ownership over modern corporations –that the owner 
does not only lose the principal amount of his investment but also earn a re-
turn? Therefore, this is about the investors’ trust in the corporate sector, which 
proves to be most dynamic in developed countries but also potentially risky 
for the small investor.
The solution for the above problem is most commonly sought through 
different mechanisms which can reduce it. These include: 
 Relying on the managers’ aspirations to acquire and maintain good busi-
ness reputation of their own, 
 Aligning the management’s interest with that of the corporation and its 
owners through incentive schemes for managerial remuneration; 
 Delegating the control over the management to the board of directors as 
the owners’ representative that should make strategic decisions and con-
trol the management; 
3  The above problem usually appears in the economic theory as the so-called agency problem: there 
are two persons – the principal (owner) and the agent (his employee) – and the question is can the 
principle ensure that his agent acts for the principal’s and not for his own benefit. The problem is of 
general nature, so it also appears, for instance, in the form of the question; how can the government 
ensure that a policeman, customs officer, or a minister act in the general interest and not in their 
own. In the case of corporate governance, the company owners are the principal and the manager 
(or the entrepreneur) is the agent who directly runs the company. Hence, the question is what are 
the methods to ensure that managers indeed act for the benefit of the owners and not for their own 
benefit.
•
•
•
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 Clearly defining the manager’s fiduciary duty to the corporation, accom-
panied with filing court actions if the manager violates it; 
 Partial concentration of ownership and control in the hands of a single or 
a couple of major investors, which alleviates the problem arising from the 
dispersion of ownership; 
Capital market as a signal instrument for poor management performance; 
 Takeover by third party when the value of the company falls below its real 
value because of the poor management performance; 
 Fighting for proxy votes at the shareholders’ meeting, which produces 
temporary concentration of ownership or votes when necessary; 
Different forms of minority shareholders protection. 
None of the above mechanisms is perfect but their combination usually 
produces the desired effect, even though not always and not everywhere. The 
likelihood of the presence of a poor system of corporate governance is higher 
in the countries with weaker institutions than in the countries with efficient 
judiciary and other institutions.
The second question is the following: how to ensure in the enterprises 
with concentrated ownership that the controlling owner does not abuse his 
control over the company so as to pull out of it more than what is due to him 
(principal-principal problem)? Namely, what we have here is a conflict between 
one, perhaps majority owner, who has full control over the company (includ-
ing the management) and a larger number of small shareholders who are not 
able and do not have any interest to engage in attempting to contest the action 
taken by the majority owner or the management appointed by him. 
Classic ways of abusing the control over a company at the expense of mi-
nority owners include:
Excessive earnings of the manager/controlling owner, 
 The business deals of the controlling owner, parties related to him, or his 
other firm with the company which are unfavourable for the company, 
Use of insider information for personal gain, and 
Dilution of minority share packages through merger of companies. 
This danger is particularly great in the countries such as Serbia, where 
legal and extralegal (capital market, banks) restrictions for the actions taken 
by the company’s management are modest. 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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There are different systems and methods for minority shareholder protection: 
Strengthening of the minority owners’ status through:
a.  'one share one vote' rule, i.e. absence of special voting privileges to be 
available to individual owners,
b.  Possibility of convening the shareholders’ meeting, which should en-
able the initiation of action in emergencies,
c.  The use of the cumulative voting for the board of directors to facilitate 
the election of a representative of the minority,
d.  Pre-emptive right to buy shares of new issue, which should enable the 
minority owner to maintain his share of ownership, etc;
Strengthening of internal governance:
a. Strengthening the efficiency of the board of directors,5
b. Stricter regulation of the transaction between related parties; 
Precise regulation of the conflict of interest;
Precise regulation of the managerial compensation; 
 Possibility to file suit against the control owner for abuse in the name of 
the company before the judiciary capable of rendering a just decision, 
including the principle of the equality of all shareholders; 
 Detailed and timely information of the public and the shareholders about 
the company’s business;
 A developed system of the independent auditing of public companies’ 
books, including the possibility of extraordinary audits; 
 A possibility to fight for votes at the shareholders’ meeting (the necessary 
assumption being that the controlling owner is not at the same time the 
majority owner), and similar.
The problem with many methods of minority owners protection is the 
following: the greater the minority protection the more affected the majority 
owners’ right of management, which is not always good because it compro-
mises the equality of shareholders’ rights, namely the democratic principle: 
one share one vote. 
  In cumulative voting, the number of votes available to each individual shareholder is multiplied with 
the number of board members; the shareholder has the right to allocate the total number of votes 
increased in this way to a single candidate or distribute to several candidates. 
5  In Italy, a radical innovation was introduced with the amendments to the 005 Company Law: in all 
public public companies, at least one seat on the board of directors must be reserved for the minority 
lists, i.e. the lists which are not related to the controlling shareholder. 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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That is why the main choice the corporations, and particularly the regula-
tors have to make, is the following: how to regulate large active shareholders 
and, at the same time, attain the best balance between the managerial discre-
tion and the minority shareholders protection, considering that the most di-
rect way for resolving the principal-agent problem is to encourage the creation 
of large active owners who could control the management in their own and in 
the interest of other, smaller shareholders. However, this creates the possibility 
for a couple of large shareholders to make agreement with the management 
behind the scene and adversely affect the rights and interests of the owners 
with a small block of shares. That is why the latter need to be protected, which 
means that the role of large shareholders needs to be restricted, which, in turn, 
leads to unwanted broadening of managerial discretion. Different countries 
have resolved this dilemma in different ways. One group of countries places 
emphasis on the protection of small shareholders by restricting the role of the 
large ones, and the other favours stricter control of the management by large 
shareholders.
TRANSITION IN SERBIA
In this section we will outline the developments during the transition in 
Serbia, i.e. since the end of 000, when the country’s leadership was assumed 
by the reform coalition, to this date, so as to describe the circumstances in 
which the corporate governance has been changing and, accordingly, indicate 
at least part of the reasons for those changes.
Situation before the year 2000
A transition from socialism to a liberal-democratic society is surely a very 
complex phenomenon and, usually, the goals desired to be attained are numer-
ous and varied. In the economic field, there are two main goals: firstly, to create 
a competitive market which would much more efficiently resolve the allocation 
problem of the society, and, secondly, to replace the dominance of state and/or 
social ownership in (or over) the companies with the dominance of private 
ownership, and thus facilitate market competition based on sound commercial 
motives. Attainment of these goals requires both the all-encompassing liber-
alisation of the economic life and the building of institutions which should 
protect private ownership and allow normal market operation.
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In Serbia, as in a few other socialist countries, the main goal was the latter 
one, i.e. to change the motivation of corporate operations by replacing the so-
cial ownership with private one. Namely, before the beginning of true transi-
tion, i.e. the year 000, Serbia nominally boasted many common market econ-
omy institutions, such as laws on property and its protection, on companies, 
on foreign investments, anti-monopoly laws, laws on accounting and auditing, 
etc. Some notable exemptions included the lack of formal foreign exchange 
and labour markets because trading in foreign exchange was forbidden so as to 
enable state distribution, and, in the case of labour, to protect the workers. 
Before the year 0007 Serbia had in place the institutions which were 
seemingly and nominally identical to those in standard market economies 
– self-standing companies, usually free prices, the issuing bank (with infla-
tion), commercial banks, exchanges, customs-free zones, courts, arbitrations, 
chambers, trade unions, etc. One was mostly free to start a business, but it 
was complicated. The freedom of possession existed, and so did competition. 
However, Serbian economic system was by no means a market system in the 
standard sense of the word. The laws were often bad or were not applied, and 
the state and socialist party had, in an informal and illegal manner, assumed 
a role of all-powerful governor who has a decisive influence on all economic 
developments. 
Therefore, Serbia was left with a legacy of many unfavourable economic 
mechanisms from the earlier period and some new ones were added: domi-
nance of inefficient social and state ownership; discrimination against the pri-
vate sector; predominance of politics over the economy; conversion of com-
panies into social welfare institutions; reducing of the market to a commodity 
market while the money, foreign exchange, capital, and labour markets were 
semi-legal and their prices were usually fixed administratively; non implemen-
tation of bankruptcy legislation; low rate of tax payment; administrative dis-
tribution of foreign exchange and primary issue loans to the favourites under 
privileged conditions; dominance of the concept of closed economy (import 
substitutes); financial relationships ruled by debtors rather than creditors, etc. 
Nominal market institutions were obviously not functioning. However, both 
the business community and the general public were used to the market and its 
  We mention ‘true’ transition because earlier, in 990, a transition started in Serbia, and in the en-
tire Yugoslavia of that time, but in Serbia it was concluded with self-management socialism’s being 
transformed into a degenerated market/administrative system, under the burden of UN sanctions 
and disintegration of the legal system. 
7  For more detail see: Unapređenje korporativnog upravljanja (Improving Corporate Governance), 
CLDS, 003
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complexities. Consequently, in 000 Serbia was more prepared for transition 
than many Eastern-European countries had been a decade earlier.
A part of the above weaknesses came as a consequence of the ruling par-
ty’s socialist -administrative ideology. However, a part came as a response of 
the inherently weak social ownership and the irrational behaviour of social-
istic enterprises which maximised employees’ earnings rather than the profit. 
That is why the main problem was not to establish the market but rather to 
improve it through institutional reform and, even more, through the funda-
mental change of the motivational system for main economic operators – en-
terprises. The reason for this is that the liberation of companies from being 
administrated by the state/party took place and has been taking place relatively 
easy in Serbia after the year 000 but the transformation of property relations 
was a much harder job.
Therefore, the main goal of transition in Serbia was to improve corporate 
governance through the transformation of property relations and building of 
market institutions. It was because the inefficacy of business operation which 
led to the inefficacy of the overall economic system that socialism failed. 
The main features of transition 2000-2008
There is no doubt that political circumstances in which economic transi-
tion has been taking place during this decade are unfavourable. Serious dif-
ficulties hampered the work of Serbian governments both locally and in the 
international context. The problem of Serbia’s cooperation with the Hague Tri-
bunal, namely unpopular extradition of the indicted to the ICTY, adversely af-
fected the stability of not only the governments and the ruling coalitions in all 
these years, but also the relations with the so-called international community. 
Partly connected with this, but partly as a completely internal issue, severe 
political battles have been waged in Serbia all this time – at first the battle was 
waged between two leading democratic parties and their respective leaders, 
and then an opposition party that had grown in the meantime (SRS) got in-
volved. Thirdly, Serbia came out of the war for Yugoslav heritage with two un-
resolved state problems: the first was the relationship with Montenegro within 
the new Yugoslav union, and the second was the issue of the future status of 
Kosovo and Metohija which, after the confrontations in 998/999, nominally 
remained under Serbia’s sovereignty but also under provisional protectorate of 
the United Nations. These three political issues diverted the political energy 
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from the transition and slowed it down, namely rendered it less effective than 
what it could have been.
There were two positive factors for the success of transition. First, there 
existed a considerable experience acquired during the transition process that 
had already took place in Eastern European countries which could have been, 
and in part was, used in developing the concept and carrying out transition. 
Secondly, some international institutions, especially the World Bank, now 
wished to show themselves in a better light than before and, therefore, Serbia 
was afforded much better technical and much larger financial support. 
Before coming to power in 000, the opposition alliance DOS did not 
have an elaborated transition strategy. Rather, after 00 it was developed in 
a somewhat haphazard manner, although not without the basic ideas. That is 
how the classic dilemma of the transition strategy ‘shock therapy or gradual-
ism’ was resolved in favour of the latter, but unintentionally. Namely, the Zoran 
Đinđić Government sought to reform the Serbian economy as quickly as pos-
sible but, after the jump-start in 00/00, things got severely slowed down, 
both because of the limited capacity of the public administration and the up-
surge of political tensions and shifting the focus on party ratings.
Generally, transition dynamics moved in a zigzag fashion. We mentioned 
before the excellent start in 00/00 which was a result of the reform fer-
vour, and the slow-down in 00/003 caused by the political sphere. This was 
followed by a new acceleration in 00/005 as a result of the pressure com-
ing from the IMF and the World Bank,8 and, in 00/007 the process slowed 
down again for the pressure from the IMF ceased and the issues of state further 
complicated the situation. 
The other great dilemma ‘to take the liberal or the social-democratic road’ 
was resolved by a compromise. The economy was reformed in a prevailingly 
liberal manner, while the social policy was expressly used as a way to com-
pensate the main transition losers, primarily those who lost their jobs. These 
generous expenditures were for the most part financed from the privatisation 
proceeds. 
Let us now take a look at the developments in several major fields. The 
macro-economic policy has also followed a zigzag path, for the phases of ex-
pansive and restrictive monetary and fiscal policies interchanged. The dinar 
exchange rate has been used as a nominal anchor but dinar appreciated in 
real terms at the times of greater capital inflows from abroad. The balance of 
8  The IMF’s positive opinion was a precondition for the write-off of Serbia’s debt with the Paris Club, 
which was abundantly used by the IMF to exert pressure on the Government towards reforms.
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payments and foreign trade has been very negative, to be compensated by the 
inflow from privatisation, new loans, etc. Prices have been rising all the time, 
at an annual rate exceeding 0 percent. Interest rates were rather high, which 
was primarily a consequence of a greater risk (slow judiciary system) than in 
the European countries. 
The economic growth in this period was -8%, and this was a conse-
quence of both the low baseline from 999 (NATO bombing campaign) and 
the successful restructuring of one part of the economy and the growth of au-
tochthonous private sector. Employment and unemployment have stagnated 
all this time; therefore, productivity growth rate is high. 
In 00 labour legislation was liberated and essentially rendered comple-
mentary with the market economy. It is now possible to dismiss employees, 
although the procedure is very complex. Collective bargaining is no longer 
mandatory. Trade unions are weak, although in a number of privatised com-
panies they are strong and negotiate hard. Compensations for the unemployed 
are decent and are paid out over a long period of time, and active employment 
policy is practically non-existent, with the exception of a number of training 
programmes. 
The tax system has been radically reformed compared to the old one 
which had about 30 different charges. The value added tax was introduced in 
a particularly successful manner. The tax and social contribution burden on 
salaries has been eased to a great extent so as to encourage employment. Cus-
toms duties have also decreased and the basic corporate tax rate is now 0%. 
Tax administration has greatly improved.
The results have been less good with regard to public expenditure. Its 
share in GDP is still about 5%, salaries in the public sector have been rapidly 
rising all the time, public enterprises have neither been restructured nor priva-
tised, the pension system is only partly reformed. Budgeting procedures have 
improved much and the treasury operation introduced to a large degree.
The financial system has also been restructured and revitalised. The bank-
ing system was given a solid base by the liquidation of old state-owned banks 
and modern legislation, as well as by the entry of foreign banks. Deposits are 
growing and interest rates are gradually falling. Foreign banks bring in capital 
from their parent companies.
The securities market in Serbia is primarily a mechanism for redistribu-
tion of property rights and to a lesser extent or not at all a mechanism for 
financing corporate and public sectors. The trade predominantly takes place 
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with the shares acquired in the privatisation process implemented pursuant to 
the 997 law. In this process of ownership transformation, namely of owner-
ship concentration, an important role is played by takeovers. A large number 
of issues are not well or are not at all regulated in the Law on Takeover (pub-
lication of public offer, binding public offer, competitive public offer, supervi-
sion, etc). 
One of the most important laws in the economic field is the Company 
Law, which was adopted in the Parliament in November 00. This Law is 
absolutely modern and appropriate to market economy, as opposed to the pre-
vious Law on Enterprises (from 99) which was semi-socialistic and fraught 
with poor or imprecise solutions. The main characteristics of this Law include 
the harmonisation with the EU legislation, comprehensiveness of regulations, 
flexibility and freedom of choice, improvement of corporate governance, im-
provement of minority shareholders’ rights, transparency of public companies 
(open public companies), transition status of socially-owned and public enter-
prises, consistency with other laws, modernity and liberality. 
Privatisation
In the beginning of this decade, privatisation in Serbia was considered a 
critical reform process, which it indeed was. The first reason was that the social 
and state sectors were using considerable resources although their value was 
much lesser than what was generally assumed. These resources should have 
been employed in a productive manner, to the largest extent possible. Sec-
ondly, the socially- (and state-) owned sector was an important social welfare 
factor or, more precisely, problem, the solving of which was unavoidable if 
creation of a functional market economy in Serbia was wanted. Namely, with a 
prevailing self-management state of mind and habitual reliance on state subsi-
dies, the rusty socially owned sector was the greatest obstacle to the reforms in 
the political and social sphere. 
The reform government was faced with a choice of the privatisation mod-
el: whether to continue with the thus far applied model of workers’ sharehold-
ing as it satisfied many workers’ perception that they have created the national 
wealth (without incurring any debts?); or to opt for a voucher model, which 
was very popular in some transition countries in the mid 990s; or to go for the 
model of classic sale used in the developed countries
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A somewhat modified model of classic sale was chosen. The main reasons 
for deciding on this model included the previous experience of other Eastern 
European countries and the circumstances prevailing in Serbia.
The main characteristics of the chosen model were the following:9 
Sale, rather than free distribution. The distribution of the socially- or 
state-owned capital to all citizens through vouchers was a popular option in 
Eastern Europe in the mid 990s but with time this method proved bad in 
terms of corporate governance. Serbia’s experience with workers’ sharehold-
ing, which is another method of giving away shares, was also negative. 
The method of the sale of socially- and state-owned capital was chosen 
with the intention to try to find true buyers, i.e. those who will be able to make 
the most of the privatised companies (economic resources). The starting point 
was the normal economic reasoning that the one who pays knows why he is 
paying so much and that the one paying the most is the most likely to be best 
able to utilise the resources. And that is what brings the efficiency. Certainly, 
every transition government is in dire need of money for different purposes 
and the motive of obtaining budget revenues from privatisation is not a neg-
ligible one. 
However, the sale as a privatisation method has a weak point: it is usually 
slower than the alternative systems since it requires that each and every com-
pany be individually prepared and this, particularly in the circumstances will 
the limited capacity of government administration, is a very time-consuming 
process.
Sale to strategic investors. Here the dilemma was: to sell the shares through 
public subscription or to a strategic, majority investor. In deciding about this 
dilemma, it was taken into account that, in a transition country with weak 
institutions, it does matter whether the ownership is dispersed or concentrat-
ed, namely that for a long time still Serbia will not have in place those fine 
mechanisms which ensure good corporate governance in the companies with 
dispersed ownership. Therefore, the advantage was given to concentrated own-
ership. Also, when choosing the privatisation model, the government right-
fully attached much weight to corporate governance in the post-privatisation 
period and opted for the sale of the majority package (70%) of socially- state-
owned capital to a single investor. This enabled a single majority owner to as-
sume full control over the privatised company and govern the company, in his 
own interest, without any particular complications. The additional idea was to 
9  For more details, see: Četiri godine tranzicije u Srbiji (Four Years of Transition in Serbia), CLDS, 005
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facilitate the complex process of corporate restructuring in the post-privatisa-
tion period.
The experience of both transition and developed countries has shown that 
the principal-agent problem is always very unpleasant and that there is not a 
simple remedy. The problem of preventing the management or owners with 
only a relative majority to make illegal moves in their interest is particularly 
complex in transition countries, in which the necessary institutions (judiciary, 
registers, stock exchange, etc) are not yet perfected. In those countries it is bet-
ter to rely on the majority owner since that would eliminate at least a part of 
the principal-agent problem – that which concerns the dispersed ownership.
A small part is given away to employees and citizens. However, here the 
political motives also caused the inclusion of the gifts for the employees and 
citizens of Serbia in the form of socially owned capital amounting to 30% of 
the capital privatised. Then again, this gift did not change the basic idea of the 
privatisation model – to sell the majority package to a strategic investor so as 
to ensure good corporate governance.
Competitive sale methods. Namely, the Law on Privatisation envisaged 
two methods of sale, both of them competitive: the auction, for smaller and 
weaker enterprises, and the tender, for larger and better ones, which were in-
tended for foreign investors. Also, in both cases it was 70% of the non-priva-
tised capital that is on sale and the remaining is given away to the employees 
and citizens. A good thing is that the sale methods did not include the direct 
negotiation between the government and the buyer since this method, although 
principally suitable and seemingly necessary in the case of bad enterprises for 
which there is no demand, is, nevertheless, too risky from the perspective of 
the government for it allows room for, or even encourages, corruptive prac-
tices. For bad enterprises, this model envisages a regulated restructuring or 
bankruptcy.
Privatisation results. In the period 00-007, the tender and auction 
privatisation resulted in selling the capital of ,3 companies, earning pro-
ceeds of EUR . billion, providing EUR . billion for investments and EUR 
7.7 million for the social program. At the same time, about ,0 share pack-
ages were sold from the Share Fund and the proceeds amounted to EUR 3 
million.
The above mentioned shares from the Share Fund portfolio originate from 
the privatisation pursuant to the 997 Law which belonged to the workers’ 
shareholding model. Pursuant to this Law, about 500 enterprises were privatised 
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in the spring of 00 and some of these enterprises were among the best in 
Serbia. Therefore, privatisation in Serbia was partially carried out under this 
model.
These two models of privatisation had different effects on corporate gov-
ernance and the securities market. Under the 00 model, the dominant per-
sonality was the majority owner with 70% of the capital held. After the privati-
sation, there was practically no trading in these shares, unless there was a small 
quantity of shares from earlier privatisations (the laws from 990 or 99) after 
the model of workers’ shareholding. Contrary to this, the privatisations under 
the 997 model have resulted in the dispersed ownership of the employees and 
the state pension fund, which gave rise to quite substantial trading. In fact, the 
shares traded on the Belgrade Stock Exchange are almost exclusively the shares 
of the companies privatised under the 997 Law.
Situation in the year 2008
In the past seven or eight years of transition, the Serbian legislation has 
been completely reformed in the direction that is customary for market econo-
mies. All the laws that regulate business operations and the overall economic 
activity have been adopted. A certain delay in the adoption of some of these 
laws was caused by the unfavourable political situation in the country as well 
as by the fact that the economic legislation in the earlier period (in the 990s) 
was to some extent reformed and could serve the purpose, at least for a while.
Thus, Serbia today boasts new economic legislation: beginning with the 
financial regulations, through the laws governing registration of companies 
and bankruptcy, to the laws governing all other fields (taxes, customs duties, 
banking, insurance, accounting, auditing, etc), as well as a new constitution 
which provides a modern framework for main economic relations.
The quality of economic legislation is inconsistent. Some laws are very 
well written (such as the Company Law), but there are some laws that are not at 
that level (e.g. some laws in the field of finance). Some of them were produced 
in haste and have been subsequently improved through amendments. 
Regardless of the weaknesses, the laws in the economic field are not 
the main problem: more important are the flaws in their implementation. 
The weaknesses in the executive power and the judiciary are particularly 
conspicuous.0 
0  For more details, see Reforme u Srbiji: dostignuća i izazovi (Reforms in Serbia: Achievements and 
Challenges), CLDS, 008
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The executive power does not demonstrate adequate capability to perform 
this job in a satisfactory manner, primarily with regard to the discharge of its 
legal authority. Sometimes these weaknesses are manifested in the ineptness 
of civil servants and entire public institutions to execute the procedures pre-
scribed by the law, and at other times in intentionally erroneous or neglectful 
implementation of the law. Or, the development of laws is poor, for instance, 
no attempt is made to calculate their potential effect and all faith is placed in 
the minister’s intuition. 
The cause of this is twofold. Firstly, executive authorities are weak in 
terms of human resources, caused by many reasons: a great deal of good civil 
servants left after 000; politicisation of the administration with the creation of 
unstable coalition governments where no party feels responsible for the state 
and all try to use their power to pursue their own interest; remuneration of 
civil servants is poor, which discourages younger generations and direct them 
towards the private sector. Secondly, the abuse of government has a substantial 
impact on everyday life. At a higher level, it is the result of the actions taken by 
interest groups and, at a lower level, plain corruption.
Neither is judiciary at a required level. It should protect the rights of in-
dividuals and their companies, not only in private transactions but also from 
threats coming from the executive power. However, it does not do so to a re-
quired extent. The main weakness of the judiciary is its slowness. Cases build 
up and drag on for years, and persons whose rights are infringed lose hope of 
a favourable and just outcome. Moreover, the judges’ knowledge is not at an 
adequate level, which is most likely a consequence of fast legislative changes 
with which some judges cannot keep up. Corruptive practices are present as 
well, to the extent that cannot be qualified as negligible. 
This unfavourable situation in the judiciary is a consequence of both the 
weakening of the human resource base seen the 990s when, because of low 
salaries, many good judges left for the bar, and the threats to judicial indepen-
dence and politicisation in appointment of new judges. 
THE STATE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The situation with corporate governance in Serbia is not commendable 
and Serbian economy still lags behind other countries, particularly the devel-
oped ones. There are several reasons for this.
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Firstly, a considerable number of enterprises are not yet privatised, includ-
ing large state-owned enterprises and those socially-owned or companies with 
mixed ownership which are suffering massive losses. Regardless of normative 
innovations, the old socialistic/self-management mechanisms of governance 
that are based on social/state ownership and strong political interference are 
still prevailing in their operation: despite the normative arrangements on the 
dominance of boards of directors and shareholders’ meetings, the CEO is the 
most important factor and all major decision depend on him; political factors 
outside the company are still interfering with strategic decisions or at least 
with the appointment of the CEO; a soft budget limitation is still in place, lean-
ing on state subsidies, absence of bankruptcy proceedings, etc; the transpar-
ency of procedure is poor and the violations of procedures are frequent (often 
at somebody’s expense) and they are usually not sanctioned; just like the times 
of self-management, disbursement of salaries to the employees is still the main 
motive for doing business (however, something is always left for the manage-
ment, the same as it once was) and similar.
Secondly, the privatised/or private companies are not free from the prob-
lem of corporate governance either. Namely, major improvements were ex-
pected, and rightly so, from the privatisation and the companies’ passing from 
the hands of political party officials to the hands of private owners who are 
surely much more motivated to perform well and to improve the operations 
of their company. However, privatisation per se is not a cure-all. It does bring 
governance improvement, which is clearly demonstrated by the post-privatisa-
tion experience in Serbia, but the weaknesses restricting the quality of corpo-
rate governance may and do appear even in privately owned companies, and 
not only in Serbia but also in other countries. Let us mention the principal-
agent and principal-principal problems. However, there is also a clear cultural 
problem, which is mostly a consequence of the tradition, namely the earlier 
dominance of one method of governance and the people’s habits and difficulty 
of getting rid of such habits.
The obvious problem of privatised companies is the expropriation of mi-
nority shareholders by the majority one(s), either through pulling out money 
from the company or through share dilution. 
Thirdly, the economic legislation is not entirely well-reformed, which 
sometimes puts bad incentives into the legislative framework for corporate 
operation. The Company Law was adopted towards the end of 00 and it reg-
ulates corporate governance in a modern way. However, despite praises, not all 
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solutions provided in this Law are the best possible ones and there is room for 
further improvement. Moreover, it was not possible for its provisions to com-
pletely change the corporate governance system in Serbia in such a short time 
- it takes longer. Also, some other laws are not good enough, such as the Law 
on Securities Market in some of its provisions, and it is necessary to improve 
stock-exchange rules (listing requirements) and similar. In other words, fur-
ther legislative enhancement is required, as well as more time for the current 
legislation to produce the necessary improvement in corporate governance. 
Fourthly, there are weaknesses in the functioning of competent govern-
ment authorities and the judiciary. The institutions in Serbia, even the most 
important ones, are not sufficiently strong and efficient to perform their part 
of the tasks and provide a stimulating, well-regulated environment and, above 
all, to ensure execution of proper rules of conduct, which will be discussed in 
further detail below.
However, things are gradually moving forward. The end of privatisation 
in Serbia is drawing near and, consequently, the inefficient social ownership 
will soon completely disappear. And the privatisation process has commenced 
in a few large state-owned enterprises. The general orientation towards selling 
the socially- and state-owned capital to a strategic owner was a determining 
factor, and this will be further discussed below, for the type of post-privati-
sation ownership structure to be, for a long time, in favour of the majority 
ownership. Arising from this is the main problem of corporate governance in 
Serbia in the ensuing period: it is not the Anglo-Saxon principal-agent prob-
lem, but rather the principal-principal problem, with all pertaining regulatory 
and functional consequences.
The main regulatory solutions for corporate governance are always pro-
vided by laws on business entities (companies, enterprises, etc). Serbian Com-
pany Law, passed by the National Assembly in November 00, brings a mate-
rial improvement compared to the 99 Law on Enterprises in force until then. 
It is more modern, more precise, and offers better solutions. Its particular quality is 
the flexibility, so many provisions are applied on the default principle, i.e. un-
less otherwise provided for by the company’s instrument of incorporation. 
Its main solutions in the field of corporate governance are the following:
 The competences of the shareholders’ meeting are much broader than 
what is customary: in addition to standard ones, such as appointment of 
the board of directors, amendments to the instrument of incorporation, 
decisions on share issue, etc, these include the selection of auditors and 
•
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adoption of auditor’s financial report, adoption of all financial reports, 
remuneration of the CEO and directors, etc; this approach was intended 
to strengthen the owner’s role at the expense of the role of professional 
managers, although it is uncertain to what extent it will actually succeed,
 The board of directors, as a body representing the owners, is intended as 
the main authority in the company – it strategically governs the company 
and appoints and dismisses the management, which should allow it to 
control the management; the dilemma between two-tier boards (man-
agement and supervisory) or one-tier board (board of directors) was 
resolved in favour of the latter solution, which is the advanced, Anglo-
Saxon principle;
 In order to strengthen the board of director’s independence from the man-
agement and large shareholders, the Law stipulates the mandatory elec-
tion of a majority of non-executive members and at least two indepen-
dent members in the managing board of listed public companies 
 The supervision over (financial) operations of the management, and even 
the board, is conceived as a duty shared by an external auditor and the 
shareholders’ meeting, considering that external audits are mandatory; 
auditor’s reports are to be approved or not approved at the annual general 
shareholders’ meeting,
 Setting the managers’ remuneration is deregulated, i.e. the company can, 
as it is a common practice globally, bind the managers’ remuneration to 
the company’s performance (share price growth, profit , etc) and, accord-
ingly, encourage the managers to act in the company’s best interest, 
 The management is bound by the provisions on fiduciary duty to act loy-
ally towards the company, i.e. to act diligently in the company’s interest, 
which, in the case of non-compliance may result in unpleasant lawsuits 
and disputes before courts,
 Minority shareholders protection is also developed. This is very impor-
tant in Serbia where privatised enterprises feature an accentuated and, for 
small shareholders, risky dominance of a single owner; namely:
◉  A possibility of cumulative voting for the members of the board of 
directors, which increases the chances of minority shareholders to have 
their own representative on the board,
 Those who are not members of the executive board, i.e. the management.
  This criterion has been diluted by the provision on minimum requirement, which provides that an 
independent member is deemed to be a person who holds, together with affiliated persons, less than the 
high 0% of the company’s shares. 
•
•
•
•
•
•
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◉  Imposing the ‘one share one vote’ principle at the shareholders’ meeting, 
which precludes some shareholders’ special benefits manifested in super- 
proportional voting rights, 
◉  The right of minority shareholders (at least 0% of shares) to convene 
the shareholders’ meeting,
◉  A special decision-making procedure with regard to large transactions, 
to be decided by the shareholders’ meeting, 
◉  Special procedure with regard to the conflict of interest of responsible 
persons (their business with the company), through exclusion of such 
persons from the decision-making process,
◉  The shareholder’s right to sell their shares at the market value to the 
company, when such shareholder has formally expressed his dissent 
with any major decisions; with this right, minority shareholders who 
are owners of poorly liquid shares (preference or not listed) are given 
the opportunity to leave the company.
A very important method for restricting the managers’ arbitrariness in 
public companies with dispersed ownership, which is available only in a small 
number of Serbian companies, is pooling of shares. The reason for this is that 
concentrated ownership creates a possibility of resolving the principal-agent 
problem through direct control of the management. Concentration may be 
permanent or temporary, full or partial, and it may be achieved in several 
ways:
 By purchasing shares on the stock-exchange; however, public takeover 
bid is mandatory when the threshold of 5% of the total number of the 
company’s shares is exceeded,3
 By pooling proxy votes at the shareholders’ meetings, i.e. the right to en-
trust one’s own votes to somebody else and the resulting possibility to 
acquire a larger or a large pool of votes by adding up the votes of small 
shareholders,,
 By taking over the controlling interest in the company through fast pur-
chase of shares, using the public takeover bid; this is a convenient way to 
remove poor management when neither the board of directors nor the 
shareholders’ meeting perform well.
3 Under the Law on Takeover of Public Companies
 Takeover of companies is regulated by the Law on Takeover of Public Companies.
•
•
•

Empirical data: results of survey 
on corporate governance
In order to enable evaluation of the state of corporate governance, inves-
tigate operation of its key mechanisms and identify changes from the previous 
period, some empirical data are needed that can be provided only by a survey 
of companies in Serbia. Therefore, to meet the needs of the project, a survey of 
corporate governance was conducted in Serbia. 
Let us review the main features of the survey. The sample comprised 214 
public companies. Only public companies were selected since they primarily 
encounter corporate governance problems, based on separation of ownership 
from the management, and also since they account for the predominant part 
of Serbian economy not only in turnover, but in absolute number, as well. The 
latter results from the fact that all privatized companies in Serbia have been trans-
formed from socially owned companies to public companies.  
Among 214 surveyed companies 91 belong to the industry sector, 68 to 
trade, 33 to construction and 22 to finances. Among them, 62 have up to 25 
employees, 56 between 26 and 100 employees, 43 between 101 and 250 em-
ployees, while 53 employ over 250 staff. Territory-wise, 60 public companies 
are seated in Vojvodina, 77 in Belgrade, and 77 in Central Serbia.
It is a quota sample, constructed on the basis of three important features 
of companies: size, line of business and location of the seat by the Serbian 
regions. 
Responses were collected by direct interviews of surveyors with a member 
of the management of participating public companies.  The survey was conducted 
in April 2008 by SMMRI agency.
ABOUT COMPANIES
Let us see how our public companies have been established in the first 
place. Most of surveyed companies have become public companies through the 
privatization process (68%), 17% were re-organized from another legal form, 
and only 15% were set up as public companies from the very beginning. This 
illustrates that this status form is intentionally selected for only about a third 
of public companies while for a vast majority (over two thirds) privatization 
was the decisive factor. Over the years in which privatization has taken place, 
and this will continue in the future, as well, contrary to the process of develop-
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ment of new public companies through privatization, another, reverse process 
goes on in parallel:  closing of public companies, i.e. change of status of public 
public companies into the private ones or into limited liability companies. The 
process is only natural, since a large number of public companies is small in 
terms of turnover, capital and staff, so that they do not need to preserve this 
status form, but opt for a simpler one. Namely, as it is well known, the form of 
an open/public public company is associated with substantial cost, in the light 
of complexity of organization and operational procedures. It is, therefore, con-
venient for large companies and ambitious owners, while smaller enterprises 
and companies find limited liability company or even partnerships or shops 
more convenient. Therefore, the process of small and medium enterprises 
turning private may only be approved, as useful for many companies that have 
become public companies by the force of law, instead of economic rationale. 
As a consequence of their turning private, the sample covered three quarters 
(75%) of public public companies and one quarter of private ones.
Who are the owners of public companies, domestic or foreign investors? 
How concentrated is the ownership?
On the level of Serbia, the ratio of private and social/state capital is 84:15, 
suggesting a large predominance of private ownership. The predominance re-
sults from privatization and development of autochthonous private sector in 
the previous years. The social/state capital holds majority capital in 10% of 
public companies, meaning that these are companies not yet in the privatiza-
tion process or not having completed it, or these are public companies that 
will not be privatized at all. The 62% of public companies have private capital 
only. 
Concentration of ownership of public companies in Serbia is an interest-
ing issue, since it is an important determinant of both problems and methods 
pertinent to corporate governance.
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As we can see, 13% of companies have up to 8 owners, and additional 18% 
have up to 50 owners. Most public companies belong to the category with mul-
tiple owners, 51 to 500 (28%) and over 500 (31%), i.e. 69% in all. This suggests 
fairly dispersed ownership.
Nevertheless, an alternatively formulated question throws a proper light. 
When asked whether they have owners of ordinary shares with over 66.7% of 
the shares they gave the following answer:
не
4 0 %
да
5 2 %
одбија /
не зна
8 %
Accordingly, at least 52% have owners with over two thirds of shares, i.e. 
ownership. Naturally, this is a consequence of the privatization mode resorted 
to in 2001, where one investor purchased 70% of socially owned capital in a 
competitive manner. When asked if they have any owners with between 50 and 
66.7% of ordinary shares, 11% of companies confirmed, meaning that 63% of 
public companies in Serbia have a majority owner.15 Besides, 19% of compa-
nies have owners with 25 to 50% of shares, and 29% companies have owners 
with 10 to 25% of shares.
This concentration of ownership may be described as high even in com-
parison with conventionally understood European shareholding model. Cer-
tain dispersion, particularly in larger companies, also resulted from privatiza-
tion, but the previously applied model, based on distribution of shares among 
employees. These shares slowly pass from employees to investors, but the pro-
cess has not yet been completed.
For corporate governance it is important whether the managers own 
shares or not. If they do, they are probably interested in the company fate. If 
the stake is substantial, however, the management may expropriate the minor-
ity shareholders for its own benefit. In Serbia, managers of 28% companies 
15 Do not overlook the remaining 8% of the answers formulated as ‘do not know’ or ‘refuse to answer’.
Do not know/ 
refuse to respond
Yes
No
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in our sample do not own any ordinary shares, and even if they do, the total 
number of shares usually does not exceed one quarter of the total (in 15% of 
companies, the management owns up to 25% shares). Only in 14% of public 
companies, the management owns majority shares, meaning that the ma-
jority owners have taken over operational management of the company. Inter-
estingly enough, in as much as 42% of the cases the responders did not know 
or did not want to talk about the percentage of ordinary shares owned by the 
management.  
Employees and retired staff lose their ownership status, although they 
used to be predominant owners. Thus, they own majority of shares in only 
10% of public companies, minority in 45%, none whatsoever in 9%, while in 
36% we did not get any answer. Foreign persons are majority owners in only 
5% of public companies, minority in 15%; they have no shares in 30%, and in 
50% we could not obtain an answer. 
Let us review the types of securities issued by Serbian public compa-
nies. In addition to ordinary shares, as standard ownership securities, priority 
shares have been issued by 8% of surveyed companies. They were issued in 
Serbia following the same rationale as elsewhere worldwide – aspiration of 
a person controlling the company to provide a more favorable position for 
himself. Thus, in Serbia several companies have issued priority shares before 
privatization and distributed them among the staff, pursuant to the previous 
laws, providing them privileged position in comparison with ordinary shares. 
Company shares were issued by 3% of the companies only, substantiating high 
restraint resulting from lack of practice in raising capital on the financial mar-
ket through either shares or bonds.
RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS
In order to make shareholders able to exercise their ownership right, it 
has to be transparent and undisputable. In Serbia, pursuant to the Law on the 
Market of Securities, this is a task of the Central Depository. Former Books of 
Shareholders, kept by the public companies themselves, are no longer proofs of 
ownership, neither can they secure the rights relating to the securities in question. 
Accordingly, for a share to be a proper share, it is necessary to be registered in 
the Central Depository.
Results of the survey show that shares of 85% public companies are en-
tered into the Central Depository, and that the procedure is in progress for 
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12%. Shares of only 2% of companies have not been entered, which may result 
in serious problems and loss to their owners, as was the case in the notorious 
case of share manipulations by the C market management. 
Freedom of owners to dispose of the shares, i.e. free trade in shares, is an 
important feature of ownership right, but the feature contributes to increase 
of the share price in comparison with the situation in which the trade is not 
quite free. In Serbia, 69% of the surveyed companies have completely free 
trade in their shares, while in 17% it is not, due to provisions of the Articles 
of Association stipulating preference of the current shares; in 12% the trade 
is not free since they are either not listed on the stock exchange (31%) or they 
are closed/private public company (23%), etc. Belgrade leads in the percent-
age of companies whose shares may be freely traded (83%); the percentage is 
lower in Vojvodina (50%). On the other hand, the current shareholders have 
the pre-emptive right for purchase of shares in 55% companies covered by 
our sample. 
Shares of 65% of the companies in the survey have their shares listed at 
the Belgrade Stock Exchange; only 3% have their shares listed on an interna-
tional stock market; shares of almost a quarter of the companies are not listed 
on any market, while in 6% of companies the shares are not listed, but are free 
to trade. The issue of listing on the Belgrade Stock Exchange highlights an old 
problem: The A-Listing, which is the place of trading, includes shares of only 
two public companies, while the remaining ones are on the so-called B-list-
ing, i.e. over-the-counter trade on the stock exchange. Therefore, the status of 
many shares remains unclear, particularly since they are not traded continu-
ously, but only occasionally.
It is interesting to see how members of the managerial structure of Serbi-
an public companies evaluate the prices of own shares. Thus, representatives of 
companies whose shares are listed on the Belgrade Stock Exchange very rarely 
believe that the achieved price exceeds the fair one (6%); 45% find the price 
fair, and 44% find their shares underpriced. This widely spread belief that the 
value of shares is underpriced does not match opinion of market analysts who 
suggest that the value of shares on the  Belgrade Stock Exchange is still over-
priced, in spite of the fall registered in 2007-2008. They interpret the mainte-
nance of the current prices by speculative reasons, while the fundamental one 
(i.e. absence of pertinent profit) suggests that the prices should be lower. The 
current shareholders are usually the main buyers at the Exchange. (27%); they 
are followed by other investors (22%) and managers (8%). The 43% respondents 
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do not know or do not want to reveal the main buyers of shares at the Stock 
Exchange in recent months.
Protection of minority shareholders’ rights is a subject of concern of leg-
islators worldwide, including the Company Law in Serbia. The Law suggests 
mechanisms for protection thereof using the imperative (rarely) and disposi-
tive (frequently) provisions. Minority shareholders do not enjoy special pro-
tection in 36% of the cases, and do enjoy it in almost  60%, by being given the 
right to convene the company Meeting (40% of the whole sample) or by re-
sorting to the cumulative vote for election of the Board of Directors members 
(16% of the sample).
A dissatisfied shareholder is entitled to file an action against the company 
for violation of his rights. In Serbia, the practice is not widespread, so that in 
the last two years only in 13% of companies cases of lawsuits against the com-
pany management or company itself have been reported.
It goes without saying that the interests of shareholders are or should be 
prioritized through respect for the company interests in order to increase its 
value. In addition to the company interests, important business decisions are 
usually governed by the interests of employees (60%), clients (35%), banks 
(22%), state (20%), creditors (18%) and suppliers (16%).
COMPANY MANAGEMENT
Let us review the institutional structure of Serbian public companies. 
Following provisions of the Company Law, they all have Shareholders’ Meet-
ing, Board of Directors and Director General. The other associated bodies 
include 
9 6 %
6 8 %
4 7 %
2 8 %
1 5 %
4 %
Управни одбор
Надзорни одбор
Извршни одбор директора
Cталне комисије и одбори управног
одбора
Савет запослених
непоменуто
Board of Directors
Supervisory Board
Executive Board
standing committees and commissions 
of the Board of Directors
Employees’ Council
Other
35Empirical data: results of survey
Board of Directors is almost a universal body, but it is not present in all 
public companies, since pursuant to the Company Law closed/private public 
companies may have its role played by the Director.
Supervisory Board is present in two thirds of companies, although the 
Company Law stipulates it as a mandatory body, except in special situations. 
Obviously, the habit to set up boards, developed pursuant to previous enter-
prise laws, has remained and the idea of having such body has been accepted 
in Serbia. Executive Board of Directors is present in a half of these companies, 
where its presence is usually dependent on the company size: less common in 
small companied (24% in companies with up to 25 employees) than in big ones 
(74% in companies with over 250 employees). Interestingly enough, one in 
seven companies has an Employees’ Council although we do not know wheth-
er it is prescribed by the Memorandum of Association or institutionalized, or 
practically informal.
Competences of company bodies
Meeting Board of Directors 
Manage-
ment
Do not know/ 
refuse to respond
Adoption of rulebooks and simi-
lar general documents
36 68 18 4
Formulation of business policy 29 63 28 4
Decisions on major transactions 45 53 20 5
Investment decisions 32 65 22 5
Decisions on company develop-
ment strategy
33 58 25 8
Issue of new shares 60 28 7 16
Issue of other securities 46 27 9 26
Selection of auditor 40 38 23 11
Contract with auditor and remu-
neration setting 
22 39 41 13
Approval of annual report and 
financial statements
58 44 16 8
Initiation of extraordinary audit 31 42 16 27
Decisions on dividend 57 31 8 18
Establishment and maintenance 
of internal control system
22 45 31 17
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As we can see, adoption of rulebooks and similar general instruments 
such as formulation of business policy, investment decisions, decisions on 
development strategy are all within the field of competence of the Board of 
Directors (about two thirds of our sample); decisions on large transactions 
are entrusted to the Board of Directors (53%) or company Meeting (45%); 
issue of new shares is usually entrusted to the company Meeting (60%), and 
so is the issue of any other securities (46%). Responsibility for selection of 
auditors and contracts with them is equally distributed by the Meeting and 
Board of Directors (approximately 40% each). Approval of the annual re-
port is usually accomplished by the Meeting (58%) and Board of Directors 
(44%); extraordinary audit is initiated by the Board of Directors (42%) and 
Meeting (31%), while decisions on dividends are usually made by the Meet-
ing (57%), and establishment and maintenance of internal control system 
is entrusted to the Board of Directors (45%).
Distribution of competences among the bodies of public companies in 
Serbia generally follows not only the legislation in place, but the one com-
mon in countries with mature shareholding systems:  predominance of the 
Board of Directors over the management is quite salient. Nevertheless, such 
distribution of competences does not illustrate sufficiently the true, i.e. infor-
mal impact of one body on another, such as, e.g. frequently strong or decisive 
influence of the General Manager on the Board of Directors. The purpose of 
these surveys is to establish the true influence, even the one exerted behind 
the scene, if needed. In order to precisely define such influence the following 
question was asked:
‘Who of the parties listed below effectively controls the company, where 
such control implies actual decision making relating to most important com-
pany matters?’ 
The responses were distributed as follows:16
4 4 %
3 6 %
1 6 %
4 %
3 %
2 %
8 %
3 %
4 %
Управни одбор
Приватни власник/власници
Генерални директор
Запослени
Држава или државна агенција
Банка
Друго
Нико посебно
Одбија/не зна
16  The sum exceeds 100% since multiple responses were acceptable.
Board of Directors
Private owner(s)
Director General
Employees
State or state agency
Bank
Other
Nobody in particular
Do not know/refuse to respond
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As we can see, in 44% companies covered by the survey effective control 
of the company is in the hands of the Board of Directors, in 36% of the private 
owners, and in 16% of the Director General. Such distribution of responses 
may, generally, fail to identify “the boss” in the companies, since in countries 
with dispersed ownership structure it is not quite sure who controls the Board 
of Directors: shareholders or the management. Nevertheless, in Serbia these 
dilemmas are not present since, obviously, at least to the extent to which we 
rely on the survey, owners have no major problems with the management. 
They dominate the public companies either directly or through the Board of 
Directors, and make key decisions in their own interest. Board of Directors, at 
least in companies privatized pursuant to the 2001 Law (majority) were elected 
by at the only majority owner and he, undoubtedly operates promoting the 
interests of the majority owner.
Only in 4% of companies the employees have the true control of the com-
pany, suggesting that the era of self-management has definitely been left be-
hind, in the history. It is present only in the companies privatized pursuant to 
previous laws where shares were distributed to employees, i.e. where employ-
ees are the main owners, and accordingly company managers. 
Let us now focus on how the main company bodies operate.
Meeting, composed of shareholders and supposed to enact main deci-
sions, the most important one, apparently being the Board of Directors elec-
tion. Regular Meeting is convened once a year to discuss operational results 
in the previous year and possibly elect Board of Directors and issue guidelines 
for the following operational period. Extraordinary Meeting may also be con-
vened to discuss pertinent issues.
The initial question is whether shareholders may directly participate in 
the Meeting proceedings. It appears that in 72% of the companies all share-
holders may directly participate in the Meeting proceedings, while in 20% of 
the surveyed companies this is not possible. They require no less than 1% of 
the shares (31% of the companies), 6-10% (19%) or over 10% (26%). No doubt 
is it quite convenient to have a single person Meeting, since it simplifies delib-
erations substantially, but it is still unfair to have Memorandum of Association 
requiring as much as 5 or even 10% of the total number of shares. The idea 
suggests an intention to prevent participation of minority shareholders in the 
Meeting proceedings, and their eventual expropriation. 
Quality of corporate governance is affected by the organization of the 
shareholders’ Meeting, since each of them could exercise their ownership 
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rights. Influence of shareholders usually ends with the Meeting, i.e. decision 
on election of the Board of Directors and, possibly, some formal decisions that 
are important, but not for the operational management. Let us start with the 
summons. Members of the Meeting are usually summoned by a written invita-
tion sent to each individual Meeting member (63%), newspaper announce-
ment (47%), internal notification in the company premises (21%) and e-mail 
(8%). The terms are also important for shareholders to be able to plan their 
commitments and get prepared for the Meeting. In 53% of the companies the 
Meeting members are notified no less than 30 days in advance, in 35% com-
panies 10-30 days in advance, while 9% companies require less than 10 days. 
It is also important to know what the summons contain: most commonly the 
proposed agenda is attached (74%), description of each item on the agenda 
(35%), substantiating documentation for each item on the agenda (35%), an-
nual report (31%) and financial statements (27%). In distribution of the mate-
rial, a balance is required between completeness of information and cost of 
sending large packages to a large number of addressees. Manipulations are also 
possible by scheduling the Meeting far from the company seat, assuming that 
many shareholders will not attend. However, in Serbia, shareholders’ Meetings 
are by far most commonly (92%) held in the town in which the seat is, then 
elsewhere (4%).
The quorum for the Meeting is usually defined as representation of over 
50% of shares with voting right (90% of sampled companies). The quorum for 
the operation of repeated Meeting to deliberate a specific issue is usually set 
at one third of the shares with voting right for that particular issue (65% of 
sampled companies). Interestingly, in a certain number of public companies 
the quorum for both the first and second attempt to hold the Meeting is set at 
over 50% of shares, substantiating the wish to have a large number of share-
holders participating at deliberations of the Meeting.
Let us now review the voting techniques. At the Meeting, most common 
is a public vote, by raising of hand or a card (59%); in 29% of the sampled com-
panies the voting method depends on the issue at stake. In 22% one may not 
vote in absentia, but if this is an option, in most companies a proxy is required 
(61% of the sample) or voting in writing (23%). Most commonly other share-
holders act as proxies for the absent ones (44%).
In 60% of the cases the principle that the number of votes a shareholder 
has at the Meeting is proportional to the number of shares is strictly applied. In 
companies with exceptions to this principle, the most common reason is set-
ting the upper limit of the number of votes that a shareholder may have (25% 
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of the whole sample), or degression, i.e. slower rise of the number of votes with 
increasing number of shares (8% of the whole sample).
In most companies, a qualified majority is needed to execute decisions 
such as status changes, change of form and company dissolution (70%), in-
crease of decrease of registered capital (60%), distribution of annual profit and 
coverage of loss (59%), election for some managerial positions (30%).
In 52% of the sampled companies election of the Board of Directors 
members is accomplished by non-cumulative vote, as opposed to 43% compa-
nies that resort to cumulative vote. The non-cumulative principle is somewhat 
more common in Belgrade than elsewhere (70%).
Minority shareholders may convene a Meeting in 56% of the sampled 
companies; in 35% they may not (9% of the surveyed do not know or do not 
want to answer). In most of the companies where minority shareholders may 
convene the Meeting, 10% of shareholders are sufficient to make a decision to 
convene the Meeting (53%).
Presence of shareholders at the Meeting is usually high, which is custom-
ary for companies with fewer shareholders. The last regular Meetings of 31% 
of the sampled companies were attended by over 85% of the shareholders, the 
attendance of  29% companies was 66-80% while in 19% the attendance was 
51-65%. Accordingly, at four fifths of the Meetings over a half of the sharehold-
ers were present, again substantiating high concentration of ownership. Meet-
ings of public companies with dispersion of ownership are characterized with 
attendance of owners of very low percentage of shares.  
In most companies the latest Meeting was uneventful and all proposals 
were adopted almost unanimously (74%). In others, opposing fractions (3%) 
and open discussion expressing dissatisfaction (18%) were present.
In 46% of the sampled companies, Extraordinary Meetings were held in 
the last two years. Most common reasons for convening them were the change 
of Articles of Association (38%), replacement/election of the Board of Direc-
tors or management (31%), issue of new shares (16%), approval of special con-
tract (10%). Most commonly the Board of Directors initiated convening of an 
extraordinary Meeting (63% of companies who had an extraordinary Meeting 
in the last two years); they were followed by majority owners (16%) and man-
agement (14%). Obviously, the extraordinary Meetings were not convened for 
corporate governance issues, but reasons relating to normal operations.
Board of Directors. This is a body of any public company that should 
manage the company affairs. It is elected by shareholders at the Meeting to 
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manage the company in their stead. The body decides on strategic affairs of 
the company when the Meeting does not do that.  The body also elects and 
oversees the management that should take care of operational business affairs, 
i.e. implement the Board of Directors decisions.
Let us now review the data on the Board of Directors composition. In 
about two thirds of public companies (62%) the Boards of Directors are com-
posed of five or less members, while in one third (30%) they have more than 
five members. The number of Board of Directors members rises with the size 
of a public company. 
On the average, members of the Boards of Directors are 41-50 years old 
(55% of the companies), which is a relatively young age for people who are not 
operational staff, but manage the company strategically. They are followed by 
the 20 to 40 age group (22%) and +50 (11%). 
Boards of Directors have fewer women than men: 22% of companies with 
Board of Directors have no female members; 31% have one and 26% have 2 or 
more. On the average two women take seats on the Boards of Directors, where 
the average number of seats is 5.7. It means that female members account for 
35% of the main managing bodies, which is not bad and is only an unattain-
able goal for many other professions.
In recent years a trend has been identified in the corporate world, and 
increasingly in the regulatory one, to include people not even employed at the 
company, not its shareholders, in the Boards of Directors assuming that they 
will be impartial and conduct business effectively, particularly in comparison 
with the employed staff (i.e. management). In Serbia, this idea has only been 
partially implemented: 15% of the sampled companies have no independent 
members, 36% have one, and 26% have more than 2. As to the Board of Direc-
tors members employed at the company, 11% companies have no employees 
on the MB, 35% have one, and 38% have two and more
In 22% of the sampled companies the Board of Directors meetings take 
under 30 minutes, in 44% 30-90 minutes and in 24% over 90 minutes.  Last 
year in 37% of companies there were up to 5 Board of Directors meetings, 
in 29% 6-10, in 22% over 10. In 22% of the sampled companies the Board of 
Directors meetings were attended by up to 3 members on the average, in 39% 
4-6, and in 27% 6 and more members.
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N 188 82 62 29 15 51 49 37 51 40 74 74
No. of members 5.7 5.9 5.8 5.0 5.3 4.6 6.2 5.8 6.1 6.8 5.2 5.5
Their average age 45.7 45.8 44.6 47.2 46.4 46.0 44.3 46.2 46.3 46.3 47.0 44.0
Female members 2.0 2.2 2.1 1.1 1.4 1.1 2.2 3.6 1.2 3.1 1.1 2.2
Independent BD 
members 
2.1 2.2 2.2 1.5 2.5 1.7 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.3
Board of Directors 
members employed 
at the company
2.9 3.6 2.3 2.6 1.2 2.0 2.6 4.0 3.0 3.7 2.2 3.0
Average duration 
of BD meeting (in 
minutes) 
66.9 70.7 61.7 64.8 72.3 64.4 76.6 61.9 63.9 90.3 54.1 66.8
Meetings held 
last year
9.3 8.9 10.9 6.5 10.9 8.9 8.4 8.0 11.7 8.3 9.8 9.4
Average attendance 6.0 6.1 6.8 4.7 5.0 4.4 5.5 8.0 6.9 8.6 5.9 4.8
Highlighting the averages by all above features, we see that there are 5.7 
members of Board of Directors, their average age is 45.7 years, with 2 female 
members, and 2.1 independent members, and 2.9 persons employed at the 
company and members of the BD at the same time. The meetings take 67 min-
utes on the average, and last year 9.3 were convened. 
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Functions of the Boards of Directors are presented below:
8 3 %
7 1 %
6 7 %
6 6 %
6 2 %
2 %
Подноси Скупштини годишње
рачуноводствене исказе, извештаје
Предлаже расподелу добити
Поставља и разрешава директора
Даје смернице директору за
остваривање пословне политике
Доноси инвестиционе одлуке
Одбија/не зна
It means that 83% of the Boards of Directors of public companies in the 
sample submit the financial statements and report to the Meeting; 71% pro-
pose distribution of profits, 67% appoint and dismiss directors, 66% provided 
business policy guidelines to the director; 62% make investment decisions. 
These are all usual functions of Boards of Directors. 
How is a Board of Directors elected? Who nominates the candidates, 
since the nominator may reasonably expect loyalty of Board of Directors 
members. In 63% of the sampled public companies with a Board of Directors 
of their own, the body was elected upon recommendation of majority share-
holders, in 12% the employees nominated them, in 9% the director, and in 
4% the appointment followed recommendation of other persons and organi-
zations. Obviously, in Serbia the majority shareholder controls the situation. 
He proposes members of the Board of Directors to the Meeting, following 
his own interests, and the Meeting complies since the majority shareholder 
controls the Meeting.  
In most public companies (57%) special majority of votes is required to 
appoint the Board of Directors Chairperson, i.e. majority of the Board of Di-
rectors members, while in fewer cases (39%) majority of the attending mem-
bers will suffice.
Information is power, as they say, and a prerequisite of successful manage-
ment and business. Company managers need all relevant information. Let us 
see what goes on in Serbia, i.e. what are the responses to the question whether 
Submits annual financial statements 
to Meeting, reporting
Proposes distribution of profits
Appoints and dismisses the Director
Provides guidelines for the Director 
for business policy
Makes investment decisions
Do not know/refuse to answer
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Board of Directors members have access to all company information and doc-
umentation. In 90% of the surveyed companies, Board of Directors members 
these companies they still do not understand who manages the company, i.e. 
the director successfully marginalizes the Board of Directors. We believe that 
it is partially a remnant of the past, self-management era, where the director is 
the only true power, and the others are just puppets on a string, and partially a 
realistic balance of power in a company in which the director prevails.17 
Collaboration between the Board of Directors and Director General is 
usually very good. Thus, Boards of Directors adopt proposals of the Direc-
tor General practically always in 38% of the sampled companies; they do that 
frequently in 45%, rarely in 4%, and in 11% of the companies the Board of 
Directors usually elaborates proposals of their own members. Obviously the 
harmony is not prevailing in just a tiny segment of the companies.
Most commonly it is the director who reports to the Board of Directors 
on the business operations. Only in 7% of covered companies the Director 
General does not report to the Board of Directors, and in as many as 48% he 
reports in writing (once a month in 32%,  quarterly in 22%); in 58% he reports 
in orally (once a month in 36%,  quarterly in 18%). Thus, the Boards of Direc-
tors always have an opportunity to discuss company operations and at each 
of the meetings decide on support to the Director by adopting or refusing to 
adopt the report.  
We have also directly asked who controls the company effectively, bearing 
in mind that direct questions usually do not lead to direct answers. 
Да
7 2 %
Делимично
2 2 %
Не
3 %
Одбија/не зна
3 %
17  The author is a member of the Board of Directors of a national public enterprise. He makes great 
efforts to make colleagues understand that the Board of Directors is in charge of company affairs, 
but nevertheless they appear not to be convinced. Most members chose to believe that the Board of 
Directors is an advisory body to the director, which they find agreeable since it is an easier job to do, 
and some even lack the required managerial abilities.
No
Do not know/ 
refuse to respond
Partially
Yes
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Therefore, the following results were obtained: only in 3% of the compa-
nies the Board of Directors does not retain full effective control of the com-
pany; in 22% it retains a partial control, and in 72% it has full effective control 
of the company implying oversight of the management and providing for full 
control on basic material affairs. The high percentages nevertheless suggest 
that Boards of Directors in Serbia do not have excessive problems with the 
management.
Let us now review the remuneration systems for members of the Board 
of Directors and Director General. In most of the cases earnings of the Board 
of Directors are fixed (45%), in 21% they depend on their attendance of the 
Board of Directors meetings, in 19% on total company revenue, and in 8% 
on the profits. Obviously, remuneration based on company performance (in-
come and profit) is not common, substantiating that the owners do not find it 
needed to stimulate Board of Directors members to work productively. They 
apparently believe that firm control of the majority shareholder is sufficient. 
In conclusion, Boards of Directors in Serbia apparently hold the reigns of 
the company firmly in their hands. The classical problem of corporate gover-
nance – the one called the principal-agent problem in economic theory – does 
not exist in a vast majority of Serbian companies. 
In the last three years, some public companies (6% of the sample) have 
bidden to take over another company. In 92% of the cases the Board of Direc-
tors of another company has taken no steps to oppose the takeover bid; in all 
cases the takeover bid was eventually accepted, substantiating a certain imma-
turity of corporate governance in Serbia.
Director General. Previous chapters revealed that the Director General 
usually takes a proper place – in charge of operational affairs, within the scope 
of competences. The previous practice where he was the dominating factor, 
with Workers’ Councils and Boards of Directors marginalized, has been dis-
continued. The survey shows that Director General manages the operational 
affairs independently in 48% of the sampled companies, partially indepen-
dently in 50% (in 49% since the Board of Directors participates, as well, and in 
9% since his staff has substantial independence).
As to the fate of the previous Director General, he was dismissed in 27% 
of the sampled companies, in 23% he left on his own, in 15% he passed away, 
and in 15% his mandate expired. 
In almost two thirds of companies the current Director General worked 
in the company even before the current assignment, and in one third he did 
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not. It appears that the (new) owners believe that familiarity with the company 
affairs is an important eligibility criterion for the top manager. 
Salary of the Director General is usually fixed (52%), or it depends on the 
profit (19%) or the overall company income (19%). Like with the Board of Di-
rectors, fixed salaries predominate. It probably means that in most companies 
they believe that directors are not sufficiently independent in decision mak-
ing or accountable for financial results of the business, so that their earnings 
should not be linked to the business performance of the public company. 
Other. Let us now have an insight into the tradeunionship in public com-
panies, conflict of interest, political influences and the like. 
In almost one quarter of the sampled public companies not a single trade 
union is active. In 30% there is at least one trade union, which is poorly active, 
and in 44% there is at least one which is very active. Accordingly, in over a half 
of the companies the management has no problems with trade unions, but in a 
substantial number of companies trade unions are present and active.
It appears that the conflict of interest is a fairly common phenomenon in 
Serbian public companies. Look at the graph. 
Да
2 3 %
Не
6 2 %
Не знам
1 4 %
Одбија/не зна
1 %
Namely, the results show that in 23% of the companies at least one mem-
ber of the management (Director, Board of Directors member, Executive 
Board member, etc.) is employed at a company, or owns a company dealing 
with similar core business, while this in not the case in 62%. The 23% partly 
account for the connections controlled by the majority owner (membership 
in Board of Directors of a daughter company or sister company), but probably 
Refuse to respond/ 
do not know
No
YesDo not know
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there are some links that should not be there, i.e. those that jeopardize loyalty 
of a management member to the public company subjecting it to the interests 
of another company. These links are most common in industry (29%), and 
least in finances (9%).
Similarly, in 62% of public companies not a single management mem-
ber has any business relations with the company (loan, trade, service, deposit, 
guarantee, etc.), 9% have with approval of the Board of Directors, and 7% have 
but without such approval. The latter 7 are a cause of concern, since they may 
illustrate deals that damage the interests of the company for personal gain. 
Most importantly, these are usually related to the finance sector (housing and 
other loans?), while in other sectors, they are negligible.
We have also investigated the influence of politics (influential individuals, 
ruling parties, governmental bodies, etc.) on some deals of public companies. 
It has been shown that the influence is much lower than it used to be in the 
past, which is only to be expected after privatization. The greatest influence is 
exerted through privatization (11.7%), investments (11.2%) and current busi-
ness decisions (11.2%), and lesser through organizational form (7.5%) and 
least with management election (4.7%). The predominant cause for political 
influence lies in the fact that Serbian public companies still have the social and 
state capital, thus the right of the state to participate in decision making.
TRANSPARENCY
Transparency, i.e. high level of information publication relating to com-
pany operations, it is one of the cornerstones of successful corporate gover-
nance. Here is why:
High level of information is required by shareholders to be able to make 
informed decisions within their scope of competence, particularly the strategic 
ones,
High level of information conveyed to the public is good for a public com-
pany since it enables potential investors to make a reliable decision in invest-
ment, i.e. purchase of securities.
Transparency should, by no means, be expensive for a public company, 
or lead to disclosure of confidential data or deterioration of its competitive 
position. 
47Empirical data: results of survey
The following responses were obtained to the question ‘Which of the fol-
lowing documents are publicly disclosed’:
Publicly disclosed documents
%
Annual report 87.4
Balance Statement 83.6
Income Statement 79.9
Auditor’s report 64.0
Changes in the registered capital 62.1
Cash Flow Statement 53.7
Auditor’s opinion 50.5
Report on materially important events 41.1
Verbal description of financial statements 39.7
Articles of Association and company rulebooks 34.1
Company organizational structure 29.4
Quarterly report 28.0
List of shareholders (their identities) 27.1
List of shareholders controlling over 50% of shares 21.5
List of related persons 19.6
CVs of Board of Directors members 15.4
Total amount of earnings of the Board of Directors members 15.0
Individual earnings of the Board of Directors members 14.5
Information on sale and purchase of shares by the management 14.0
Policies and principles of corporate governance 12.6
Identity of the final user blocking the shareholders 12.1
CVs of the managers 11.7
Total amount of earnings of the managers 11.2
Individual earnings of the managers 10.3
Nothing of the above 6.5
Do not know/refuse to respond 0.5
Thus, the annual report is the most commonly publicly accessible docu-
ment –  87% of the sampled companies; it is followed by the Balance Statement 
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(84% of the companies), Income Statement (80%), Auditor’s report (64%), 
changes in the registered capital (62%), Cash Flow Statement (54%), Auditor’s 
report (51%), etc. The reasons for not disclosing some of the aforementioned 
documents include: lack of legal obligation to do so (51%), lack of request for 
such information (45%), lack of economic reasons to do so (21%).
%
Report of the Board of Directors Chairperson 70.6
Analysis and discussion of financial performance and business risks 66.4
Report of External Auditor 53.3
Major liabilities and receivables 51.4
Report of auditing committee or company commission 39.7
Company aims and strategies 38.8
Market share and distribution of sales by the leading clients 36.4
Ownership structure, divided policy and dividend history 35.5
Major court disputes 34.6
Audited financial statements with pertinent notes 29.4
Principles and policies of corporate governance 26.6
Shareholders’ names and amount of shares they own 22.9
Number of shares owned by Board of Directors members and managers 20.1
CVs of Board of Directors members and managers 13.1
Earnings of Board of Directors members and managers 11.7
Do not know/refuse to respond 3.3
The latest annual report included the Report of the Board of Directors 
Chairperson in 71% of sampled companies, analysis and discussion of finan-
cial performance and business risks conducted by the management (66%), re-
ports of external auditor (53%), major liabilities and receivables (51%). All 
other documents are represented in less than 40% of reports of the samples 
public companies.
The responders suggest that a potential investor may obtain information 
on the management, business operations and financial performance by review 
of the annual report (53% of the sampled companies), obtain it from the com-
pany upon request (46%), at the company website (46%), and/or public quar-
terly report (14%).
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Major material transactions were less frequently disclosed to the public. 
Thus, 33% of public companies covered by the survey would publicly disclose a 
transaction before related parties and transaction exceeding 10% of the company’s 
book value, 12% would disclose only a transaction before related parties, 9% 
only transaction exceeding 10% of the company’s book value, while 32% of the 
companies would not disclose either.
The question: “Specify the reports that the company submits to the Se-
curities Commission and Belgrade Stock Exchange” yielded the following 
answers: To the Securities Commission: the annual report (67% of the sam-
pled companies), change of ownership including over 10% of ordinary shares 
(34%) semi-annual reports  (29%) and quarterly reports (13%); to the Belgrade 
Stock Exchange: the annual report (65% of the sampled companies), change of 
ownership including over 10% of ordinary shares (32%) semi-annual reports 
(31%) and quarterly reports (16%).
Nevertheless, the Belgrade Stock Exchange is not in a situation to insist 
on more extensive publication of business information, since it is faced with 
serious problems in its own activities: First, the A-Listing (the proper one) has 
only two public companies, while shares of a vast majority are traded on the so 
called OTC market; secondly, the number is decreasing, since the process of 
transformation of open/public public companies into closed/private or limited 
liability companies is in progress. 
Reliability of information, particularly the financial ones is increased upon 
certification by auditing companies. The business community then appreciates 
its credibility. Since audit is not only useful for impartiality of information, but 
in Serbia it is also a statutory duty, let us see who our public companies entrust 
the task to: a local auditing company (54% of the sampled companies), inter-
national auditing company (22%), and individual auditor (16%). Notably, com-
panies in the financial sector are prone to relying on services of international 
auditing companies (55%).
Shareholders and members of the Meeting get information on the com-
pany operations at the Meeting (55% of the surveyed companies), personally 
at the company seat (31%), from written materials that each owner receives by 
mail or at the company seat  (25%), at the bulleting board (22%), in the press, 
advertisement (22%), while only 1% of the sampled companies do not com-
municate this information to the shareholders.
Internet in an increasingly important means of communication and in-
formation for business purposes. Serbia lags behind in this respect since as 
50 Corporate governance
much as 28% of surveyed companies do not have their website, 53% have a 
modest one, while only 19% of the surveyed companies have a proper, com-
prehensive website. 
As many as 59% of the companies do not publish their financial results 
and business reports (except for the balance statement that is submitted to the 
National Bank), 41% of the companies do so submitting the reports to the me-
dia, 58% post the reports on their website, 17% submit the reports to economic 
and financial analysts, and 13% do that in other ways.
About 26% of companies tend to communicate information of all relevant 
company and related events to the media, 36% do that rarely, while 37% of the 
surveyed companies never do that. 
Quality of accounting statements is an important aspect of transparency. 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) are applied by 79% of the surveyed 
public companies, while 11% of the companies do not abide by them. Financial 
reports based on the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are 
generated by over three quarters of the sampled companies, while only 9% do 
not comply with these standards. Praiseworthy, we must say.
It appears that accounting is quite meticulous in Serbia. The latest audit-
ing reports did not contain any objections to the bookkeeping methodology in 
78% of the surveyed companies. Objections were made in 9%.
ATTITUDES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The international corporate governance standard is the one proposed by 
OECD. In Serbia, a half of the respondents were familiar with OECD corpo-
rate governance principles, while 47% were not.
We also investigated the opinion of respondents on the state of corporate 
governance in their company, in Serbia as a whole and legislation pertinent to 
corporate governance. They graded them as follows:
State of corporate governance in the company 3.2
State of corporate governance  in Serbian companies 2.8
State of legislation pertinent to corporate governance 2.8
Grades 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent)
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The difference between the evaluated quality of corporate governance in 
own company and other public companies is quite interesting. With perfect 
knowledge, the difference should not be present. Nevertheless, if we assume 
that the respondents are more familiar with the situations in their own com-
panies than in the other, which may reasonably be assumed, we may conclude 
that the state of corporate governance in Serbia is better than it is generally 
assumed.
The following main obstacles have been recognized in promotion of cor-
porate governance: lack of knowledge and information (36% of respondents), 
ineffective corporate legislation (16%), corporate governance information as 
business secrets (13%), etc. 
CONCLUSIONS
The key conclusions of the CLDS survey on corporate governance sug-
gest the following main processes in the corporate sector and main features of 
corporate governance in Serbia:  
 In Serbia, the corporate structure is mostly, for the time being, defined by 
the Privatization Law, by the type of companies and ownership structure,
 Predominant form of the company is an open/public public company, 
produced by the obligation to transform former socially owned compa-
nies through privatization into open/public public companies.
 By the ownership structure – predominantly conventional and in other 
countries outdated form of public company where majority ownership is 
in the hands of another legal or natural person. 
 The main problem of corporate governance thus, is not the principal-agent 
relationship with dispersed ownership, as it is in Anglo-Saxon world, and 
elsewhere, since in Serbian public companies there is an undisputable 
majority shareholder who appoints and controls the management easily.
 In Serbia, the main corporate governance body is the Board of Directors, 
instead of the management.
 The relationship between the majority and minority owner may be per-
ceived as a bigger problem, since the former has motives and opportuni-
ties to expropriate the latter, due to immaturity of both shareholdership 
and the judiciary.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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 Conflict of interest in managers of public companies is fairly widespread, 
with both knowledge and approval of the company bodies and without.
 Public companies do not make an effort to inform the public and poten-
tial investors on own performance; this is most probably caused by very 
low level of interest to raise new capital by the issue of new shares. 
 Managers in Serbia are aware of weaknesses of corporate governance, less 
in their own than in other companies. 
•
•
•
Concentration of ownership and 
the problem of investor protection 
INTRODUCTION 
All to date publicly available research identifies the presence of the own­
ership concentration process in public (open) public companies in Serbia. 
The same findings can be drawn from the CLDS survey and the activation and 
acceleration of the concentration process was announced already in the first 
issue of the CLDS monograph on corporate governance from 2003.18 Before 
the latest CLDS survey, the process was registered in the World Bank, name­
ly IFC19 survey conducted between 4 – 31 May 2006 and covered 130 public 
companies of different size and from different economic sectors and regions 
of Serbia. Other relevant findings came from the data of the Serbian Central 
Securities Depository (CSD). The results obtained that suggest the existence of 
the ownership concentration trend were to be expected.
The text below will first offer the available evidence of the presence of the 
ownership concentration phenomenon. Then it will address different causes 
of this process. In this context, particular attention will be paid to the inter­
connection between the concentration process and one of major problems of 
corporate governance – the level of protection enjoyed by the external (minor­
ity) shareholder. Finally, it will present the main consequences of the problem, 
both on the characteristics of corporations in Serbia and on the operation of 
the stock market in general. 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PRESENCE OF 
CONCENTRATION PROCESS20
Ownership concentration, primarily registered as a reduction in the num­
ber of securities accounts, was measured on three random company samples 
over a period of 2 years. This research covers the period before the market ex­
pansion in 2007, followed by the entry of a large number of individual investors. 
18 See: Unapređenje korporativnog upravljanja (Improving Corporate Governance), CLDS, 2003. 
19  According to: K. Veljović, Korporativno upravljanje i koncentracija vlasništva u Srbiji (Corporate Gov-
ernance and Ownership Concentration), doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Economics, Belgrade, 2007. 
20 More details in: K. Veljović, op.cit, pp. 144­290 
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For this reason, in this case the reduction of the number of securities accounts 
can be considered a reliable indicator of the presence of this process. Although 
the time of monitoring this phenomenon was relatively short, considering that 
the survey was conditional upon the period of CSD existence to the time when 
the monitoring commenced, its detection allows for the conclusion that the 
presence of this process was proved.
The first, main sample was formed from a set of public companies regis­
tered and entered in the CSD database in the period after 12 January 2004 and 
remaining in that database until 28 February 2004. In the period above, 47 pub­
lic companies were registered, so concentration of the equity was monitored 
for a longer period of time on the sample created. Following the sample of the 
original survey, K. Veljović included only the public companies that were sub­
ject to the takeover procedure in accordance with the then applicable Law on 
Securities. The sample was created from the public companies registered and 
entered in the CSD database in the period between 12 January 2004 and 30 
May 2004. This sample included 44 public companies.
Graph 1. Reduction of the number of securities accounts 
Source:  K. Veljović – Korporativno upravljanje i koncentracija vlasništva u Srbiji (Corporate 
Governance and Ownership Concentration in Serbia), doctoral dissertation, Faculty of 
Economics, Belgrade, 2007.
In the observed period of only 25 months, the number of securities ac­
counts was reduced by about a third, which is one of the proofs of the presence 
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of the ownership concentration trend (see Graph 1). The control variable (vol­
ume of capital) increased, at the same time, by slightly more than one third (by 
34.4% or approx. RSD 9.2 billion). The rise in the equity shows that the equity 
increase processes did not lead to the dispersion of ownership structure and 
higher number of investors but mostly to the purchase of the additional issue 
by the dominant shareholder. It would be realistic to assume that these occur­
rences were followed by massive capital dilution. 
The concentration process in the public companies created by insider 
privatisation developed through a divergence within the insider group. Un­
der the rules of the procedure, a dominant insider (majority shareholder) 
could not be created within this group. It was created through the concen­
tration process, either from the existing set of shareholders (mostly from 
the ranks of managers and associated persons) or externally.21 This process 
advanced relatively quickly, which is confirmed by the indicators shown in 
Graphs 2 and 3. It is obvious that the shareholders created through insider 
privatisation were most prone to concentration, namely most inclined to sell 
their shares. The data shown in Graphs 2 and 3 suggest that the observed 
period also saw a decrease of the number of their securities accounts and the 
absolute value and percentage of their ownership in the equity of the compa­
nies included in the sample. 
Graph 2. Number of securities accounts held by natural persons
Source: K. Veljović, ibid.
21  The first solution was allowed by the rules for trading in the shares from the Share Fund where the 
so­called employee consortia appeared as buyers.
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Graph 3. Total capital (RSD) held by natural persons
Source: K. Veljović, ibid.
The findings confirm the expectations from the CLDS 2003 study.22 In­
dividual shareholders from the insider set, who acquired their shares mainly 
through insider privatisation and who did not have any preferential treatment 
whatsoever, were most affected by the weak protection by formal rules. In the 
observed period, the number of securities accounts decreased by 34%, and the 
insiders’ capital decreased by 22.6%. If these findings are interpreted in the 
context of the findings shown in Graph 1, it follows that the process of segre­
gation of the insider set advanced very quickly. In the beginning the process 
monitoring, natural persons in the observed sample owned 99.44% of securities 
accounts and 26.4% of capital. In the end of the observation period, they held 
98.54% of securities accounts but only 15.2% of the capital of observed compa­
nies. It seems that this process was expected even by the general public. 
The relevant question is surely who are the main actors in the concentra­
tion process. Formally, they are the so­called foreign shareholders who, in 
the observed period, have both increase in number and percentage of eqyity 
they owe. This assessment must be relativised considering that local defini­
tion of this set includes all legal persons registered abroad, regardless of who 
their beneficial owners actually are. A realistic assumption is that these are do­
minantly domestic investors organised in the so­called pyramidal ownership 
schemes, where the top of the pyramid is registered in the tax haven countries. 
The CLDS 2008 survey shows that, according to the information known to the 
22 See: Unapređenje korporativnog upravljanja (Improving Corporate Governance), CLDS, 2003.
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respondents, foreign natural persons do not hold shares in 30% of the cases. A 
more significant result is the finding that half of respondents do not know, or 
do not want to answer the question asked. 
Graph 4.  How many ordinary shares are held 
by the respective groups? 
Source: CLDS 2008 survey
There is no doubt that a significant volume of equity of public companies 
in the given sample is concentrated in the hands of the above mentioned set 
of owners and that they tend to increase the ownership concentration. It is a 
relevant finding that the speed of concentration is highest in this set of owners, 
namely that relative increase of the number of these investors is less than the 
increase of their share. In the beginning of the observed period, 247 foreign 
investors or 0.5% of the total number of shareholders in the sample held 57.1% 
of the sample’s capital. At the end of the period, 375 foreign owners or 1.27% 
of the total number of shareholders in the sample held 67.6% of total capital in 
the sample or by 34.4% more than in the beginning of the period.
Different conduct is seen in institutional investors (Graphs 5 and 6). Their 
number increased much faster than the percentage of their equity which shows 
variability in both directions. The number of institutional investors’ securities 
accounts was very small both at the beginning and at the end of the period. 
The value of capital held by institutional investors mainly stagnated at the level 
of about 4% of the share in the total capital of the sample. The explanation 
for their conduct is simple – institutional investors are minority shareholders 
per definitionem. In the circumstances of low factual investor protection, 
they are indeed exposed to a high risk of expropriation. This assumption was 
30%
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51%-75%
76%-100%
N/A  /  don’t know
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Up to 25%
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confirmed by Katarina Veljović’ findings: out of three companies from the 
sample in which foreign investors dominate, institutional investors appear only 
in one with a share exceeding 1% of the equity. At the same time, the findings 
confirmed the assumption that minority shareholders, including institutional 
investors in this set, do not play any major role in corporate governance of 
Serbian companies.
Graph 5. Share of institutional investors’ equity in total equity
Source:  K. Veljović – Korporativno upravljanje...
Graph 6. Number of institutional investors’ securities accounts 
Source:  K. Veljović – Korporativno upravljanje...
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The third sample of the research conducted by K. Veljović included the 
companies taken over pursuant to the then applicable legislation. As it was to 
be expected, in this group of companies the concentration was fastest. Block­
holder in acquired companies continued with the purchase of shares from 
minority shareholder, despite already being controlling shareholder. Other 
relevant finding is that the capital increase process was accompanied not by the 
increase but rather by the decrease in the number of owners. If the status quo 
remains, there will be no IPOs to raise additional capital. In this way, high val­
ues of the controlling package (far above 50% plus 1 share) will be maintained, 
but the growth of the capital of open (public) public companies (corporations) 
in Serbia will remain limited by the wealth of their owners, which leads to a 
loss of one of the main advantages and, ultimately, the reason for the existence 
of corporations. 
This finding was indirectly confirmed by the CLDS 2008 survey. In the 
survey sample, in as much as 52% of the companies, there is one shareholder 
who holds more than 66.7% of the shares. Such ownership concentration con­
siderably exceeds the ownership concentration that is common in the devel­
oped economies but is comparable with the concentration level in the transi­
tion countries with a low level of investors’ protection23.
Graph 7.  Distribution of answers to questions: how many shareholders 
of common shares belong to which group – over 66.7% 
­ the number of shareholders
Source: CLDS 2008 survey
23  For more detail about the ownership concentration level in transition countries, see: Živković, B., 
Investor Protection, Corporate Governance Quality and Takeover Market Amidst Transition, Scientific 
Rewiew 31­32, 42­52
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The ownership concentration in Serbia may be proven by monitoring the 
orders on the Belgrade Stock Exchange. To prove our claim, we have analysed 
the number of new buy and sell orders between January 2004 and Septem­
ber 2008. The research shows that the number of new selling orders issued by 
natural persons by far exceeds the number of legal persons’ orders (Graph 8) in 
the entire period under observation. This finding does not change even during 
significant bull or bear market, i.e. individual investors leave the market to a 
much greater extent.
Graph 8.  Sell orders of natural and legal persons 
between 2004 and 2008
Source: Belex
In the case of buy orders, the analysis shows that their number is similar, 
except in the periods of marked market growth (Graph 9).
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Graph 9. Buy orders of natural and legal persons between 2004 and 2008 
Source: Belex 
The summary of results obtained and monitoring the net order trends24 
confirms the assumption of market draining. It is dominant in the case of nat­
ural persons, as well as when we observe all shareholders regardless of their 
natural or legal person status (Figure 10).
Graph 10.  Net orders of natural, legal persons and total net orders 
between 2004 and 2008
Source: Belex 
24 Order trend represents the difference between sell and buy orders.
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The drainage, with few exceptions, is noticeable even at the time of mar­
ket growth, as shown in Graph 11.
Graph 11.  Net orders of natural, legal persons and total net orders 
between 2006 and 2008
Source: Belex 
All the above evidence is in favour of the thesis that the Serbian equity mar­
ket is draining, that is, that the number of accounts is decreasing, and that the 
market is moving towards concentration and public companies going private.
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MAIN REASON FOR CONCENTRATION: 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Concentration of ownership over the shares of public companies in Serbia 
has several complexly interrelated causes25. It is to be expected, for it follows 
as a consequence of the mass privatisation model within the framework of 
which there are no conditions for sustaining a corpus of owners created in 
this way. Therefore, in the general phenomenological sense, the model of mass 
privatisation is the main cause of the fast concentration process. Privatisation 
in Serbia, in almost all its modalities, was followed by the incorporation of so­
cially­owned enterprises, and then by the obligation of forced listing of public 
companies created in this way as stipulated in the law. Such an outcome of 
the “ownership democracy” was seen in almost all countries which applied 
the mass privatisation model. However, it should be noted that concentration 
dynamics varies and, in some cases such as the Republic of Slovenia, is slow. 
In the second group of countries, concentration was fast and accompanied by 
massive undervaluation of shares, which led to creation of ownership oligar­
chy, where Russian Federation is indicated as a typical case.
The phenomenon of (de)concentration also exists in the so­called normal 
circumstances, that is, without phenomenology which is generally called tran­
sition or mass privatisation. Theoretical explanations for ownership concen­
tration in general, regardless of any special institutional circumstances and the 
level of development of the economy and financial market, may be roughly 
divided in three groups. 
The problem of ownership (de)concentration in corporations is one of the 
main problems of both the traditional and modern financial economy. Traditional 
Berle & Means Principal­Agent Theory has identified the moral hazard problem 
in this relation, but it did not explain the phenomenon of (de)concentration. In 
the 1990s, these ideas were further developed in the papers of a group of authors 
which were under a large influence of R. Coase, a Nobel­prize winner. New papers 
have essentially changed the traditional financial corporation theory and, becau­
se of this radical turn, they are often called the Coasian Revolution.26 The main 
relation in which the problem of moral hazard develops is no longer the Berle­
Means’s principal – agent relation but rather the principal ­ principal relation.27 
25  For more detail, see: B. Živković ­ Koncentracija vlasništva i problem zaštite investitora (Ownership 
Concentration and the Investor Protection Problem), zbornik radova sa X Miločerskog savetovanja, 
Finansijska tržišta, Savez Ekonomista Srbije, 2004, pp 42­54
26 R. Coase ­ Durability and Monopoly, Journal of Law and Economics, 15, 1972, 143­149.
27  A. Shleifer and R. Vishny – A Survey of Corporate Governance, The Journal of Finance 52, 1997, 737­783.
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The former, prevailing and currently a very dynamic group of ideas finds the 
main cause for ownership concentration in the level of protection of minority 
shareholders (investors). The main causal relation is as follows: if the level of 
minority shareholder protection is low, namely if there is a great likelihood 
of yield appropriation, there is a clear and marked ownership concentration. 
In the systems which do not have or do not apply the standards of minority 
shareholder protection, witness a high concentration of corporate ownership. 
This pattern does not change regardless of the stage of the company’s life cycle 
and the level to which the economy is developed. The findings of the research 
conducted by La Porta and co­authors28, Zingales 29, Dyck, and Zingales30, and 
many other authors, confirm this pattern. 
The second group of ideas finds the explanation for the concentration 
phenomenon in the long­term cyclicality. The findings of the research pub­
lished by Frenks, Meyer, and Rossi31 identify the cycle phenomenon in the 
case of Great Britain which had dispersed ownership in the first half of the 
20th century, even though it did not have any formal protection of minority 
shareholders, that is, investors. The protection of minority shareholders, as a 
decisive factor which determines the concentration/dispersion is relativised. 
The explanation of the concentration phenomenon should, in keeping with 
these ideas, rely on the assumption that the evolution of ownership in the di­
rection of (de)concentration is led by the demand for shares. Therefore, the 
companies will place new shares on the market when and only when there 
is a high demand for them32. The markets on which the demand is below the 
supply unavoidably lead to ownership concentration. Bhide33 argued that this 
cause led to a widely dispersed ownership in the US. At the same time, high 
liquidity of shares results in the company’s exposure to a great likelihood of 
takeover. If the controlling owner and his management do not manage the 
concentration effectively, there will appear the interest of a new controlling 
owner for the takeover at an appropriate premium. The cyclical functioning 
28  R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, R.W. Vishny – Corporate ownership around the world, 
Journal of Finance 54, 1999, pp. 471-517.
29  L. Zingales – The value of the voting right: a study of the Milan Stock Exchange experience, Review of 
Financial Studies 7, 1994, 125­148.
30  L. Zingales, A. Dyck ­ Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, Journal of Finance 59, 
2004, pp 537­600.
31  J. Franks, C. Mayer, and S. Rossi – Ownership: Evolution and Regulation, ECGI ­ Finance Working 
Paper, No. 09/2003, 2006
32  For more detail, see: C. Fritz Foley and R. Greenwood – Giving Up Control to Pursue Growth: The 
Evolution of Corporate Ownership After IPO, Working Paper Series, SSRN, 2008.
33  A. Bhide – The hidden costs of stock market liquidity, Journal of Financial Economics 34, 1993, pp. 31­51.
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of the takeover market indirectly confirms that this idea is realistic. Namely, 
it was noted a long time ago that mass takeovers in developed economies be­
have cyclically. It is obvious that the synergy of secondary market for shares 
and takeover market effectively protect the minority owner, even when their 
formal protection is not present in the formal law. In the circumstances where 
both markets function effectively, the need for concentrated ownership as the 
control mechanism is reduced. 
The third group of ideas sees the cause of ownership concentration/dis­
persion in the efforts of the corporate management to harmonize the time of 
share issue with the situation on the capital market. In case of the bull market, 
as found by Graham and Harvey34, approximately two thirds of corporations 
are trying to issue stocks. At such time the shares are overvalued. When the 
market conditions are opposite, the company may repurchase stocks because 
they are undervalued. Consequently, ownership concentration decreases when 
the value of the P/B ratio, that is, the ratio of market and accounting value of 
shares is low and when its growth is expected because that situation was pre­
ceded by a period of high yield.35 . 
Relationship between the investors and 
the controlling owner (insider)
Minority shareholders (investors) and the dominant shareholder have di­
fferent preferences. The main investor preference is the optimisation of the 
ratio between the risk and yield of their investment. Because of this, the inves­
tor minimises own costs of the use of management rights for as long as the 
marginal utility of the use of such rights is lesser than the marginal costs of 
the use of such right. The marginal value of the investor’s voting right depends 
on its marginal efficiency. If the costs of consummation of ownership rights 
exceeds the marginal yield from their use, there appears the problem of absti­
nence, namely minority shareholders do not use the voting mechanism (con-
trol by voting). The dominant owner or insider as per legal definition, namely 
the holder of the controlling share package, tends to maximise residual yields36 
which are under his control and constitute his private benefits. The insider’s 
costs are direct and indirect costs of corporate governance. Risk aversion is 
34  J. R. Graham and C. R. Harvey – The long-run equity risk premium, Finance Research Letters, Vol­
ume 2, Issue 4, 2005, pp, 185­194.
35  For more detail, see: J. Helwege, C. Pirinsky, and R. Stulz, Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An 
Analysis of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership, NBER Working Paper No. W11505, 2005.
36 Residual yield is the yield of the corporation that is not taken by the minority owners.
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characteristic of the majority owner as well; thus, he will also try to maximise 
the yield (residual flows, that is, private benefits) and minimise the risk to their 
own budget. Therefore, his third goal is to reduce the risk by Markowitz di­
versification of the capital budget. The resulting strategy of these three prefer­
ences and his main optimisation strategy is to appropriate the highest possible 
private benefit per investment unit with the smallest possible contribution (in 
terms of the exposure to costs and in terms of the share in his total capital 
budget), that is, with the least relative value of the controlling package. This is 
true under the standard assumption that controlling shareholder cannot influ­
ence the price of corporate shares. If the market is extremely imperfect and if 
he cannot influence the price of shares, the other strategy, the one that will be 
outlined in more detail below, will be activated. 
Marginal values of shares of one and the same corporation are different 
for the insider and for the investors37. The insider’s marginal value of share is 
higher than the investor’s if the private benefits of control exceed the marginal 
costs of managing the company. The value of investor’s shares is revealed on 
the secondary capital market. The value of the insider’s share is not known in 
the time continuum. These two values become aligned at the time when the 
insider’s share is the subject of transaction, namely when a given corporation is 
exposed to a takeover. The difference between these two values is the so­called 
takeover premium. This difference is revealed by the corporate market or the 
takeover market. Therefore, the very existence of this difference and the exis­
tence of the takeover market make sense if and only if the value of the insider’s 
share exceeds that of the outsider’s. The main determinant of this difference is 
the size of the residual yield that is appropriated by the insider and is not the 
outsider. That is why the basic Coasian argument is that the level of optimal 
concentration of corporate ownership (optimal in terms of the insider’s prefer­
ences) is inversely related to the level of investor protection. If the protection 
level is low, there is a great likelihood that high residual yield will be appro­
priated by the dominant owner. Hence, the relative value of the controlling 
package held by the insider is high because the additional yield appropriated 
by him is an adequately high compensation for the risk of concentration that 
he assumes.
This solution successfully explains the statics of a modern corporation. 
The financial systems with high standards of investor protection have relatively 
37  For a mathematical proof for this argument, see: B. Urošević – Dinamička optimizacija vlasničke 
strukture korporacije (Dynamic Optimisation of Corporate Ownership Structure), Faculty of Eco­
nomics, Belgrade, 2007 
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low share in the controlling package in the corporation.38 High standards of 
investor protection lower the value of the difference between the insider’s and 
the outsider’s share. The insider tends to diversify and increase the capability 
of the corporation to absorb the capital from the environment. Until recently, 
the problem of the ownership structure dynamics was open. Namely, it is well 
known that the insider decides on opening up, namely issuing shares through 
initial public offer (IPO)39, by which his ownership interest is reduced. In a 
borderline case, the so­called capital dilution may occur, defined as a reduc­
tion of the insider’s asset value. But this is a borderline case, and in normal 
circumstances the process of issuing new shares is followed by a concurrent re­
duction of existing owners’ interest and increase in value of their total assets. 
A recently published original40 solution for the problem of ownership 
structure dynamics comes down to the following: namely, the decreasing of 
the ownership concentration level may reduce the level of the insider’s private 
benefits and, accordingly, the same applies to the incentive to increase the cor­
porate governance efficiency. The consequence of this is a negative impact on 
the price of its shares. Consequently, the ownership structure dynamics affects 
the wellbeing of all owners, both large and small. So – how does the controlling 
package and the equilibrium price of corporate shares evolve optimally, and 
which factors determine the insider’s equilibrium ownership interest in the 
long­term equilibrium state?
It is assumed that the dominant shareholder’s interest in the company af­
fects the mean value and risk of the company’s cash flows, and thus the value 
of its shares. The efficiency of his governance and, consequently, the yield on 
shares are a consequence of the size of his share in the corporation. In a situa­
tion where the investor protection level is high and the insider’s residual yield is 
relatively low, the insider’s dominant strategy is conditional upon his aversion 
to risk. The premium on his investment risk grows as a function of the relative 
size of his ownership share. By reducing the relative value of the controlling 
package, the insider achieves a higher level of diversification of his portfolio, 
namely reduces the risk to his own total investment in the Markowitz sense. 
38 These systems dominantly rely on the Anglo­Saxon legal tradition.
39  In the case of Great Britain, the ownership interests of insiders, in particular the management, are 
considerably reduced in the process of the Initial Public Offering (IPO). See: W. Mikkelson, M. 
Partch, and K. Shah – Ownership and operating performance of companies that go public, Journal of 
Financial Economics 44, 1997, 281­307.
40  See: P.M. DeMarzo, B. Urošević – Ownership Dynamics and Asset Pricing with a Large Shareholder, 
Journal of Political Economy, 2006, pp 774­816. This paper develops a complex method of dynamic 
programming which enables to determine, at the equilibrium, both the equilibrium price of com­
pany shares and the optimal dynamics of the control package level, at the same time. 
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This choice involves a very important problem of time consistency of the op­
timum ownership structure. Namely, once the insider reduces his ownership 
interest, he has reasons to do it again, since as the owner of a smaller interest in 
the company he is no longer affected by the reduction of his investment as he 
was in the beginning, when his ownership interest was larger. Consequently, 
unless legal mechanisms are in place to prevent it, the ownership interest of 
a large shareholder and his overall efforts for the benefit of the company will 
become lesser with time. 
That is why in normal circumstances, i.e. in the circumstances of high 
investor protection, the relative value of the insider’s controlling package is, in 
general case, reduced with time. This pattern can be checked by analysing the 
evolution of the modern corporation which usually starts as a proprietorship 
and gradually grows into a widely­dispersed ownership structure. The pace 
of (de)concentration can be defined by an equation which is, to put it simply, 
reduced to the difference between the marginal values of the insider’s and the 
outsider’s share41. In the case of a high level of investor (outsiders) protection, 
the speed of change of the insider’s ownership interest is in proportion to the 
level of cash flow risk and in reverse proportion to the level of moral haz­
ard facing the insider. When the difference between marginal values is small, 
namely, when private benefits from controlling the corporation are small, the 
owner of a relatively high­value controlling package (measured by the share­
holding in the corporation) has a high­risk portfolio. Due to the exposure to 
high risk, his shares consistently have a smaller marginal value of the share 
than the outsider investor’s, so the difference between marginal values is nega­
tive. Generally, in the process of balancing out, the insider tends to reduce the 
relative value of his controlling package.
A similar thing happens in the situation when the growing trend on the 
share market, which is determined by the factors external to the corporation, 
results in a faster growth of share prices. In such a case, the insider’s yield may 
be lesser than the investors because the insider cannot, without risking a loss 
of control, sell the shares to make a capital gain. Unlike him, the investor can 
do that since the length of the holding period is in his case determined by 
the criterion of his portfolio optimisation and not by the criterion of retain­
ing control. Thus, the insider’s residual yield may be inferior to the investor’s 
capital gain created by the rising trend on the market. That is how the Gra­
ham–Harvey’s idea, according to which the offer of shares by the insider is 
41 See: B. Urošević, op. cit.
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dominantly dependant on the market conditions, factually appears as a special 
case of the Coasian idea. 
This solution successfully explains corporate behaviour in the circum­
stances of high investor protection. The controlling shareholder aims for de­
concentration with simultaneous maintenance of control. A corporation 
gets the opportunity to maintain the optimum ownership structure, theoreti­
cally without limitation. In the final outcome, this removes the limitation on 
the corporate growth which was imposed either by the level of the sharehold­
er’s wealth (in pre­corporate forms) or the need to maintain ownership control 
within the corporation. 
If the level of investor protection is low42 and private benefits from corpo­
rate control are high, the difference between marginal values of the shares held 
by the insider and the investor may become positive. The consequence: in the 
circumstances of low investor protection, the dominant shareholder increases 
the relative value of his ownership in the corporation. This consequence of 
the main solution explains the behaviour of European corporations and, in 
particular, of the corporate forms in which companies organise in the condi­
tions of transition. In Western Europe, which has a long tradition of corporate 
organisation but a relatively low level of investor protection, the level of owner­
ship concentration in the insider’s hands still remains high.43 This effect is even 
more accentuated in Eastern Europe, where the level of shareholder protection 
is lower than in Western Europe. The macroeconomic consequence: shares in 
this configuration are not a significant source of corporate financing and finan­
cial systems are configured with a strong dominance of commercial banks.
In the final outcome: in the circumstances of extremely low level of in­
vestor protection, the corporation ceases to exist and returns to the previous 
evolutive corporate form – proprietorship or limited liability company. This 
kind of “final outcome“ is exactly what is happening in a large number of pub­
lic companies in Serbia. Low level of investor protection leads to the increase 
of the relative value of controlling share package in the corporations with a 
high positive difference between the marginal values of the controlling share­
holder’s and minority shareholders’ shares, and a high level of this difference 
42  A detailed analysis of the behaviour of price and relative value of the insider’s controllinf package in 
th conditions of low level of investor protection may be found in: B. Urošević, B. Živković – Optimal 
Ownership Dynamics of a Controlling Ownerships Stake under Conditions of High an Low Investor 
Protection, International Conference Contemporary Challenges of Theory and Practice in Econom­
ics, Quantitative Economic and Finance, pp 230­238, Faculty of Economics, Beograd, 2007. 
43  The evidence for this statement can be found in: B. Živković – Investor Protection, Corporate Govern-
ance Quality and Takeover Market Amidst Transition, Scientific Rewiew 31­32, 42­52
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is a consequence of the high values of residual flows controlled by the insider 
controlling shareholder. 
The third, important consequence of this solution, which is at the same 
time essential for understanding of the phenomenon of ownership concentra­
tion in Serbia, concerns the problem of (in)stability of the ownership structure. 
Namely, it follows from this solution that the corporate ownership structure 
stabilises when marginal values of the insider’s and the minority shareholders’ 
shares almost even out. This equivalence defined the situation of long­term 
equilibrium as the situation in which the difference between marginal values 
of these two actors equals zero. Hence, in the case of high level investor pro­
tection, the situation of long­term equilibrium corresponds to the level of full 
Markowitz diversification. In the event of weak protection, i.e. in the situa­
tion when the benefits from control are large, the long­term equilibrium is 
established considerably below the level of full Markowitz diversification. The 
level of ownership concentration in this case will be considerably higher.44 A 
relevant consequence of this solution is the definition of the capacity of such 
type of corporation to absorb additional capital from the market. Namely, the 
controlling block residual (defined as the difference between the share of the 
controlling package and the total ownership) may be deemed to be an approxi­
mate measure of the corporation’s capability to absorb additional capital from 
the environment. 
Minority shareholders in Serbia
If the concentration process continues to speed up and remains under 
present institutional conditions, it may be expected, in the ad absurdum log­
ics, that minority shareholders in Serbia disappear. However, this will not 
happen. The number of present minority shareholders will probably decrease 
until the appearance of initial public offers motivated by the need to raise ad­
ditional capital. In these circumstances, which will at the same time mean the 
establishment of the main functions of capital market, the number of minority 
shareholders will stabilise. The level of their share in the ownership of open 
(public) public companies is impossible to foresee at this moment since the 
number and relative importance of minority shareholders in the corporate own­
ership structure is conditional upon the legal tradition, quality institutions, 
privatisation model, etc. 
44  Typical cases of this kind are average relative values of the controlling share package in Russia and 
Serbia.
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Generally, the main reasons for the existence of minority owners, include: 
  the individual investors’ need to invest their savings without assuming 
the entrepreneurial risk, where their investment is small compared with 
the total value of the company;
  the individual and the institutional investors’ need to reduce the invest­
ment risk through diversification;
  the need to maintain asset liquidity (large share blocks are far less liquid 
than individual shares and, consequently, their price can be lower);
  modern legislation which increasingly more intensely protects minority 
shareholders.
Minority shareholders, in accordance with their ownership interest, have 
less rights in corporate governance but at the same time they are in such posi­
tion that their rights may further be reduced or completely eliminated by the 
(arbitrary) will of majority shareholders or managers. A common misconcep­
tion is that only natural persons are minority shareholders. A large and the 
most important part of minority shareholders in the world are legal persons, 
special institutional investors.
There are two main ways in which minority shareholders can influence 
the company, regardless of the group of minority shareholders concerned, and 
protection of their governance rights: shareholders’ activism and lawsuits.
In recent years much has been written about shareholders activism and it 
is insisted upon as a way of monitoring and minority shareholders protecting, 
but also as a way in which they can assume an active role in corporate gover­
nance. This notion as such does not have a strict formal definition. Sharehold­
ers’ activism is deemed to be any expression of shareholders’ opinion intended 
to influence the manner of corporate governance and the decisions taken by 
the management. This term would be deemed to include any type of action, 
such as writing of a public letter to directors or other shareholders, voting, or 
proposing new items of the agenda at the shareholders’ meeting. Judging by 
the findings of the CLDS survey, shareholders’ activism is not widely spread 
in Serbia. 
In addition to activism, minority shareholders can resort to the judiciary 
to exercise their rights and influence the corporate governance decisions. The 
CLDS 2008 survey suggests that in the previous year, about 13% of sharehold­
ers filed lawsuits because of the infringement of shareholders’ rights and that 
most lawsuits concerned the companies from the financial sector.
•
•
•
•
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Graph 12.  Distribution of answers to the question: has any shareholder, 
in the past two years, filed a lawsuit against the company or 
company management because his rights were violated
Source: CLDS 2008 survey
Table 1.  Distribution of answers to the question: has any shareholder, in 
the past two years, filed a lawsuit against a company or company 
management for violation of his rights
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It is obvious that judicial protection of rights is not yet deeply rooted in 
Serbia, either as a way of actual protection of own ownership rights when they 
are threatened or as a way of fighting with the company management. 
Minority shareholders are often excluded from the decision­making pro­
cess. The survey showed that in 22% they do not have any representatives in 
boards of directors while in 29% this fact is not known.
Graph 13.  Distribution of answers to the question: indicate the number 
of BoD members who represent minority shareholders 
Source: CLDS 2008 survey
In the Serbian corporate ownership structure one may find corporate 
employees as minority shareholders. Employee shareholders have a dual role 
at odds with itself – on the one hand, they are company employees, whose 
main motive is to be paid as much as possible and, on the other hand, they 
are investors who have invested their capital and expect that the company has 
the highest possible profit with the lowest possible costs. This “schizophrenic 
role” is simplified in the cases when the employees acquired the shares through 
privatisation and did not invest their own funds nor had a personal motive 
to become shareholders. In such a case their role is only seemingly muddled 
– they are primarily company employees whose main motive is to be well­paid 
and confirming this is the fact that most employees in transition countries who 
have acquired free shares have sold them as soon as they had the opportunity.
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Graph 14. Share of employees and pensioners in total shareholders
Source: CLDS 2008 survey
This situation – with minority shareholders who are in actual fact the 
employees who acquired some shares in the course of privatisation – has a de­
cisive influence on the character of minority shareholding in Serbia, corporate 
governance technology, and problems in the relationship between relevant ac­
tors. This matter will be further addressed below.
Other causes of concentration in Serbia
Ownership concentration in Serbia, besides the above mentioned, is ca­
used by other factors, such as the very manner in which the corporations and 
shareholders were created through the privatisation model which was changed 
several times, low GDP per capita, inconsistency of different laws, institutional 
framework development level and coordination, etc. 
Financial markets all over the world were generally created as the response 
to the human need to allocate the accumulated savings with a yield exceeding 
the deposit interest rate and with the possibility of risk diversification. They 
are a result of the evolutive changes that followed the borrowing of funds, in 
which both parties, the investor and the entrepreneur, harmonised their mutual 
relationship, discovered the ways to obtain additional security, and influenced 
the creation of different intermediary institutions with the aim of ensuring 
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efficiency and reducing transaction costs. Contrary to this kind of evolution, 
the financial markets of transition countries were not created evolutively, as 
an expression of the issuers’ and investors’ needs, but rather by the will of the 
legislator. They were introduced by the strength of this will as a supplement to 
the mass privatisation model. The development of the financial system and its 
institutions is seen as the conditio sine qua non for further unhindered devel­
opment of the transition towards the developed economy. 
This (re)evolution may be viewed as the “inverse evolution”. Instead of 
investors and entrepreneurs who strive for further progress initiating the cre­
ation and continuous improvement of the financial market, the state creates 
the ad hoc institutions and then directs both of the above parties to become a 
part of that system. External introduction of shareholdership and its accom­
panying elements, which was not initiated by an internal need, caught many 
people unprepared who, by the force of circumstance, found themselves in the 
situation where, without any personal motive or at least basic knowledge, they 
became the shareholders. What most citizens and holders of the shares from 
privatisation are facing is an incomprehensible and, for them, absolutely alien 
financial market from which they cannot get answers to their doubts, such as 
the one about the value of shares they have received.45 For that reason, it is no 
wonder that many of minority shareholders, usually the employees who have 
acquired their shares through free distribution, tend to convert them to cash as 
soon as possible, which leads to ownership concentration. This process is only 
natural considering that (1) the employees are not ‘true’ shareholders nor do 
they intend to become true shareholders, and (2) their income is often low and 
any proceeds from the sale of shares comes in handy. 
The above fact is accompanied by numerous problems, among which in­
sufficient liquidity is the most obvious one. The stock exchange created in this 
ways is not in a position to offer the adequate supply of capital as required by 
the economy at a given level of development.46 The marked low liquidity and 
the fact that shareholders did not invest any money in the shares47 contribute to 
their fast exit from the market. Data suggest that, in transition countries in 2005, 
only about 3% of ownership was dispersed among minority shareholders.
45  Taking into account some individual negative experiences of minority shareholders in Serbia, this 
situation provokes absolute aversion on the part of potential minority investors, current and future 
shareholders.
46  In the theoretical considerations of this problem, a question may be asked whether the economy, at 
its current state, would be able to effectively use the capital, even if there were enough of it.
47  Taking into account the original model of privatisation in Serbia and the inflation rate, it cannot be 
said that the shareholders have invested their own funds to any significant extent and that they are 
the shareholders in the true sense of the word.
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Graph 15.  Share of ownership in transition countries, as per groups of 
investors in 2005
Source: ­WB Database on Financial Development and Structure
The additional motive for disinvesting in Serbia is the low level of income, 
namely the disproportion between the flows and stocks of funds available to 
the shareholders in the first instance. Graph 12 shows the movement of gross 
domestic product per capita. Bearing in mind that the savings of the popula­
tion were to a large extent exhausted during the 1990s, and that for a certain 
period of time people were not able to invest even in the most basic household 
items, it is only understandable that, with a GDP per capita48 below EUR 3,500, 
they are inclined to convert the shares to cash, i.e. to consumption or, to a great 
extent, to repaying their debts.
Graph 16. Movement of gross domestic product per capita 1997­2006
Source: The Republic Statistical Office
48  This is the average GDP and for most of the population the GDP is far below the one shown 
in the graph.
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The evidence in favour of the statement that the above mentioned causes 
of ownership concentration in Serbia, such as creation of the financial market 
through the privatisation process, shareholders protection level, low level of 
GDP per capita, etc, influence the development of the financial market, is the 
behaviour of domestic shareholders in the period of the accentuated growth of 
share prices (Graph 13). Even though it is to be expected that the price growth 
would influence the behvaiour of potential investors, in terms of considerably 
raising their average presence in the ownership of companies included in the 
BelexLine, we note that this did not happen.
Graph 17. Average share of domestic persons in the companies included 
in the BelexLine 
Source: Belex
LEVEL OF INVESTOR PROTECTION IN SERBIA
Corporate Governance Index (CG index) for Serbia49
La Porta et al.50 were among the first to measure the quality of corporate 
governance. After the names of authors, their index is also called the LLSV 
49  For more detail, see: A. Jolović – Merenje kvaliteta korporativnog upravljanja – primer Srbije, (Corpo-
rate Governance Quality Measurement – the Serbian Case) Trenutna ekonomska politika i strukturne 
promene u Srbiji , Belgrade, 2008.
50  R. La Porta, F. Lopez­de­Silanes, A. Shleifer – Law and finance, Journal of Political Economy 106, 
1998, 1113­1155; R. La Porta, F. Lopez­de­Silanes, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny – Corporate ownership 
around the world, Journal of Finance 54, 1999, pp. 471­517.
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index or index of anti­directory rights. Today, there is a large number of papers 
addressing the subject­matter of measuring the quality of corporate governan­
ce and all of them were built on the LLSV index. Since the time La Porta and 
his co­authors constructed this index with the idea to measure the corporate 
governance quality there has been further research with the aim to improve the 
existing index by extending the list of factors affecting corporate governance, 
introducing other fields of impact in addition to the legislative framework, 
and changing the countries in which the research was conducted. Some of 
this research was conducted in the transition markets, such as the research 
conducted by Slavova51 and Pistor et al.52. The same objection can be raised to 
all this research – the choice of factors, their number, existence/non­existence 
of factor weighting in the formation of indices, etc. Corporate governance in­
dices, regardless of their flaws, offer an overview of the corporate governance 
quality in the absence of any better measures for its determination. 
The past research of corporate governance in Serbia does not involve any 
serious attempts to construct a corporate governance index which would mea­
sure the level of shareholders protection. The main reason is the lack of a da­
tabase which would be used in the analysis. The authors were forced to use 
interviews and surveys. That is the reason why the research has been criticised 
from the very beginning – the answers obtained in the surveys come exclu­
sively from the companies who are willing to take part in them on a voluntary 
basis. The realistic picture is further distorted through the prism of manag­
ers’ and shareholders’ answers to specific questions when there is no reliable 
way to verify the answers obtained. The other part of the problem concerns 
the lack of a professional database, such as Moody’s International, WorldScope, 
IRRC (Investor Responsibility Research Center), which prevented the authors, 
in addition to having access to reliable data, to follow­up the time series. This 
made it almost impossible to track how legal provisions affect the quality and 
development of corporate governance Serbia53.
The text below lists the factors of the basic LLSV index for Serbia. The 
obtained index value is 2, which is somewhat below the average in the countries 
with French or German legislation but far below the average in the countries 
51 S. Slavova – Law and Finance in Transition Economies, World Bank Working Papers, 1999.
52  K. Pistor, M. Raiser, S. Gelfer – Law and Finance in Transition Economies, Economics of Transi­
tion 8, 2000.
53  Authors can always decide to build databases of their own, which takes a long time, is very inef­
ficient, and most of the time does not include all the required data.
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with Common law.54 The Company Law55 was used for the assessment of the 
index and the factors were, after the original research model, allocated either 
one point or zero points. 
The factors included in the index or supplementing it are as follows:
1.  “One share – one vote” principle is clearly defined in Article 208, para­
graph 3 of the Law.56 On these grounds Serbia was given one point for 
having the “one share – one vote” principle which, the same as in the case 
of LLSV, is not included in the index but rather constitutes its supplement 
in the analysis of the obtained results.
2.  Proxy by mail is not allowed in Serbia. Shareholders need to vote in per­
son or by proxy (Article 287), where the proxy must personally attend the 
shareholders’ meeting. This means that this factor contributed zero points 
to the index.
3.  Blocking of shares before or after the shareholders’ meeting to identify 
the shareholders with voting rights is not envisaged by the Law (Article 
286); accordingly, Serbia was allocated one point for this factor.
4.  Cumulative voting is defined by Article 309, paragraphs 4 and 5.57 If ac­
count is taken of the fact that Article 186, paragraph 5 at the same time 
grants the right to the board of directors to change the statute (unless such 
right was explicitly vested with the shareholders’ meeting by the instrument 
of incorporation) and that the chairman of the board of directors is at the 
same time the managing director (CEO) unless it is otherwise provided by 
the statute or instrument of incorporation (Article 312, paragraph 4), it is 
clear that cumulative voting may be avoided in the cases of the accentuated 
principal­agent problem. That is why this factor is given zero points. 
5.  Protection of minority shareholders in the manner defined in the LLSV 
model is lacking; accordingly, Serbia was given zero points58. 
54  Comparison with individual countries should be taken with some reserve considering that the orig­
inal research was conducted in 1997 and each and every one of these countries could have changed 
its legislation several times in the meantime.
55 Zakon o privrednim društvima (Company Law) (2004)
56  “The right to vote at the general meeting (shareholders’ assembly) based on the principle that one 
share gives the right to one vote.”
57  (4) In the open (public) public company, members of the board of directors are elected by cumula­
tive voting unless the company’s instrument of incorporation or the statute provide otherwise. (5) 
Cumulative voting in the context of paragraph 4 of this Article implies that voting, in which every 
shareholder or proxy has a voting right, the number of available votes is multiplied by the number 
of members of the board of directors which are elected and those votes may all be given to a single 
candidate or distribute without limitation to all the candidates.
58  Articles 302, 303 and 304 provide for the possibility to challenge the resolutions of the sharehold­
ers’ meeting, appointment of the managing director (CEO), members of the board of directors, 
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6. Right of priority subscription or pre-emptive right defined in Article 
213, paragraphs one and two59. The already mentioned Article 186, para­
graph 5, grants the board of directors the right to change the statute (un­
less the instrument of incorporation explicitly assigns this right to the 
shareholders’ meeting); it is, therefore, clear that Serbia does not comply 
with the requirement which La Porta and his co­authors considered de­
serving of one point in the index. The authors explicitly cite that it is a 
pre­emptive right which can be waived only by the shareholders by means 
of voting, which is rather an option than a rule in Serbia.
7.  In order to convene an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting in Serbia, 
shareholders need to submit a written request and hold at least 10% of the 
shares conferring the right to vote on the issue proposed for such share­
holders’ meetings (Article 277); therefore, this factor brings one point.
8.  The law does not provide for the company’s mandatory dividends to the 
holders of common shares on an annual basis, as it is the case in most 
other countries. 
Based on the points assigned to specific factors, the anti­directory rights 
index was constructed; how it compares to other countries’ indices and aver­
ages for specific factors and legislations are shown in the table below.
Table 2.  Value of the LLSV index for Serbia and its comparison to other 
countries’ indices
Country
One 
share 
– one 
vote
Allow­
ed vo­
ting by 
mail
No block­
ing of 
shares be­
fore share­
holders’ 
meeting
Cu­
mu­
lative 
vot­
ing
Protec­
tion 
of mi­
nority 
share­
holders
Pre­
emp­
tive 
right
% capital 
required 
to convene 
new share­
holders’ 
meeting
Index 
of anti­
direc­
tory 
rights
Man­
da­
tory 
divi­
dends
Serbia 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.1 2 0
Australia 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.05 d 4 0
and challenge the resolution of the approval of financial reports; however, they do not provide for 
the possibility of shareholders, in their own name or on behalf of the company, challenging the 
decisions made by managers or directors, or the possibility to automatically sell their shares to the 
company if they oppose any major decisions (such as merger or takeover) made by the managers or 
even those made by the shareholders’ meeting. 
59  “(1) Shareholder shall have the priority right to subscribe the shares from the public company’s new 
issue commensurate with the nominal value of the shares held at the time of issue, or commensurate 
with the accounting value of the NPV shares. (2) Shareholders referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article shall exercise their priority right to subscribe in accordance with the company’s instrument 
of incorporation, statute, or decision of the company’s board of directors.”
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Country
One 
share 
– one 
vote
Allow­
ed vo­
ting by 
mail
No block­
ing of 
shares be­
fore share­
holders’ 
meeting
Cu­
mu­
lative 
vot­
ing
Protec­
tion 
of mi­
nority 
share­
holders
Pre­
emp­
tive 
right
% capital 
required 
to convene 
new share­
holders’ 
meeting
Index 
of anti­
direc­
tory 
rights
Man­
da­
tory 
divi­
dends
Canada 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.05 5 0
Hong Kong 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.1 5 0
India 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.1 5 0
Ireland 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.1 4 0
Israel 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.1 3 0
Great Britain 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.1 5 0
USA 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.1 5 0
Argentina 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.05 4 0
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0
Brazil 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.05 3 0.5
France 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.1 3 0
Greece 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.05 2 0.35
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.2 1 0
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.33 1 0
The 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.1 2 0
Portugal 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.05 3 0
Spain 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.05 4 0
Turkey 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.1 2 0
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.05 2 0
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 1 0
Japan 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.03 4 0
South Korea 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.05 2 0
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.1 2 0
Denmark 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.1 2 0
Finland 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.1 3 0
Norway 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.1 4 0
Switzerland 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.10 e 3 0
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Country
One 
share 
– one 
vote
Allow­
ed vo­
ting by 
mail
No block­
ing of 
shares be­
fore share­
holders’ 
meeting
Cu­
mu­
lative 
vot­
ing
Protec­
tion 
of mi­
nority 
share­
holders
Pre­
emp­
tive 
right
% capital 
required 
to convene 
new share­
holders’ 
meeting
Index 
of anti­
direc­
tory 
rights
Man­
da­
tory 
divi­
dends
Countries of 
Anglo­Saxon 
law, 
on average
0.17 0.39 1 0.28 0.94 0.44 0.09 4 0
Countries of 
German law, 
on average
0.33 0 0.17 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.05 2.33 0
Countries of 
French law, 
on average
0.29 0.05 0.57 0.29 0.29 0.62 0.15 2.33 0.11
Countries of 
Scandinavian 
law, 
on average
0 0.25 1 0 0 0.75 0.1 3 0
Average of the 
sample 0.22 0.18 0.71 0.27 0.53 0.53 0.11 3 0.05
Source: La Porta et al60 and the Company Law61
The Serbian index is equal to the index of Ireland or Japan,62 but a part of 
the rights related to the shareholder protection, although provided for by the 
Law, may be eschewed by the agent if he does not find them to be to his benefit. 
Comparing Serbia with other countries shows that investor protection is at the 
same level as that in Denmark, Switzerland, Greece, Netherlands, Austria, etc. 
and it is better than in Germany or Italy. At the same time, better than Serbia 
are Peru, Columbia and Nigeria. 
The assessed value may be further checked by the comparative analysis us­
ing the indices which the transition countries had in the beginning of 1990s.
60  R. La Porta, F. Lopez­de­Silanes, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny – Legal determinants of external finance, 
Journal of Finance 52, 1997, pp. 1131­1150.
61 Zakon o privrednim društvima (Company Law), Official Gazette 125/04
62  If one takes into consideration that the Law provides the possibility of cumulative voting and pre­
emptive rights to shares.
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Table 3. Value of LLSV index in transition countries
Country Anti­directory rights index in transition countries (1998) and in Serbia (2007)
Armenia 5,5
Georgia 3
Kazakhstan 5,25
Kirgizstan 2
Moldova 3,5
Russia 5,5
Ukraine 3,5
Uzbekistan 3,85
Czech Republic 3
Latvia 2,5
Estonia 3,75
Romania 3
Hungary 3
Poland 3
Slovenia 2,5
Serbia 2
Average of all transition 
countries 3,13
Source:  K. Pistor, M. Raiser, S. Gelfer – Law and Finance in Transition Economies, Economics 
of Transition 8, 2000. 
Therefore, according to the criterion of the value of investor protection 
index, namely corporate governance quality, Serbia is at the level of Kirgizstan 
some ten years ago. At the same time, Serbia is somewhat above Slovenia and 
Latvia in the same period. Taking into account a very different development 
level of the mentioned countries and their financial markets at the moment, it 
is more than clear that some other factors had contributed to this. 
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Quality of institutions and the problem of 
implementation of investor protection norms
The construction of the corporate governance index for Serbia and its 
comparison with other countries’ indices suggested that there is a clear diver­
gence in Serbia between the legislative norms and the implementation thereof, 
namely between the legal and the factual situation.63 The main problem with 
the low level of corporate governance quality is not in legal norms but rather 
in the weakness of institutions. Research conducted by Veljović i Ječmenica64 
confirmed these statements. The conclusion of this research is identical to ours 
– the main problem with the low level of corporate governance is not in legal 
norms but rather in the weakness of institutions. Following the methodology 
developed by La Porta et al, the research covered four fields:
1. Assessment of the securities and equity market legislation;
2. Assessment of sanctions as the main instrument of implementation;
3. Assessment of private enforcement (courts);
4.  Assessment of public enforcement (Securities and Exchange Commission).
The methodology used was developed in cooperation with the Stockholm 
Institute for Transition Economies. Legal analysis was made with regard to the 
assessment of investor protection through the regulation of entry to an orga­
nized capital market and continuous information, and protection of market 
integrity against traindg on the basis of privileged information (insider trad­
ing) and market manipulation.
With regard to the entry to market, Serbia was assessed the lowest be­
cause, regardless of the legislator’s good intentions, due to inadequate solution 
in the securities legislation, legislative inconsistency, and mass violation of reg­
ulations by market participants, as well as the regulator’s inability to sanction 
this behaviour, the situation was created where the companies can enter the 
organized market even without a prospectus. On the other test (which assessed 
mandatory prospectus contents) Serbia scored well because the legislation ad­
equately specified mandatory contents of the prospectus. With regard to the 
63  If the index were to be taken as a comprehensive measure of minority shareholder protection, mi­
nority shareholders would be equally protected in Serbia, the Netherlands, Austria. At the same 
time, shareholders in Serbia would be better protected than shareholders in Germany. Considering 
that in practice we see major differences between the levels of minority shareholder protection in 
the above countries and in Serbia, the next step to be taken is to analyse the implementation of cur­
rent legal provisions protecting minority shareholders.
64  K. Veljović, T. Ječmenica – Kvalitet finansijske regulative (Quality of Financial Legislation), Kvartalni 
monitor no. 9, 2007.
85Concentration of ownership and the problem of investor protection
continuous information, the legislation as such is not problematic but non­
transparent business operation constitutes one of the greatest problems for the 
investors and corporate governance in Serbia. Rules of continuous information 
are regulated by current legal provisions in a satisfactory manner; all essential 
elements with regard to the required reports are covered and there is manifest 
tendency towards ensuring that they are regularly updated. However, in this 
case it is possible for the issuer not to be sanctioned for not fulfilling this legal 
obligation. Namely, a company which had initially entered the market with a 
prospectus but later on did not fulfil the obligation to continuously inform the 
investor will be sanctioned only by subsequently getting the BP (“bez prospe­
kta” ­ no prospectus) status. In the beginning of 2007, 42% of companies on 
Serbian market had the BP designation (2% have entered without a prospectus 
and others did not fulfil the continuous information obligation).
Enforcement of rights has two arms: the Securities Commission and the 
courts. The analysis has shown that both arms of the enforcement of legal rules 
protecting investors are underdeveloped, powerless, and ineffective. 
The quality of private enforcement was assessed by interviewing the Su­
preme Court and Commercial Court judges. With regard to the courts and 
case law, in the part related to the securities issue in the broadest sense, in­
cluding any disputes arising in connection with the securities market, it is the 
general assessment that the case law is underdeveloped. A similar conclusion 
applies to a somewhat more abundant but still quite modest case law related 
to company law. 
The assessment of public enforcement was obtained in close cooperation 
with the Securities Commission. The assessment of public enforcement 
covers five fields. The main characteristics of the regulator and its institutional 
independence are first assessed. The second field of assessment is regulatory 
independence of the Commission, where the attempt is made to determine 
whether the authority of the Commission to regulate the capital market is the 
Commission’s original authority or the authority delegated by the Ministry 
of Finance. The third field assesses the effective power which the regulator 
has in the investigation. If the Commission has power to order the issuer, 
distributor and/or accountant/auditor to provide relevant documentation, 
namely if it can order that relevant person give testimony, the Commission has 
the effective power in the investigation to identify the reasons for inaccuracy 
or obsoleteness of the information provided to investors. The fourth aspect 
is the effective power of the regulator to impose (non­criminal) sanctions. 
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This power is critical in assessing whether the regulator (public enforcement) 
can counteract the weaknesses of private enforcement. These sanctions most 
commonly involve an order to the issuer’s responsible persons to do something 
or to cease an activity, e.g. to remedy the problem and ensure compliance with 
the legislative requirements concerning the publication and transparency, to 
introduce the changes recommended by the supervisory authorities, to cease 
an illegal activity, to compensate the damage incurred to the investors, etc. 
These orders may also be directed to the issuer and the distributor and the 
accountant/auditor; therefore, in the assessment of the regulator’s effective 
power, the order to “do” and the “cease­and­desist” order for all categories of 
potentially responsible persons are also taken into account. Finally, the fifth 
aspect of the assessment of public enforcement concerns the criminal sanctions 
for violation of the securities related legislation and the role of regulator in 
criminal proceedings.
The final assessment of the first aspect of public enforcement – the char­
acteristics of the regulator (institutional independence) – is unsatisfactory. The 
process of appointing the Commission members is not adequately protected 
against interference by the executive power and politics. The term of office 
aspect was also unfavourably assessed because of the insufficiently clear legal 
definition of reasons for dismissal of the members before expiry of their term 
of office. Finally, although the focus variable (that the regulator regulates and 
supervises only the securities market and not the banks) receives the highest 
scores according to the adopted methodology. The question is how good this 
solution is in practice, considering the conflict of competences between the 
two regulators (the Commission and the NBS) and the Commission’s lack of ef­
fective supervision over some of the strongest players on the securities market.
As regards the effective power of the regulator in the investigation, even 
though the regulations have, on the face of it, furnished the Commission with 
the tools necessary to obtain desired information when performing its super­
vision, in the course of the project the Commission declared itself incapable 
of implementing effective supervision and stated that its effective powers in 
supervision are quite modest in relation to those of regulators in the compara­
tive legal systems. The main problem, according to the statements made by 
the Commission, is the inadequate power of the regulator in its supervisory 
function, the fact that its employees do not enjoy the immunity in perform­
ing their supervisory function, and inadequate measures (sanctions) for the 
violations committed. Before the adoption of the New Law, the Commission 
tried to fill the above mentioned legal “gaps” by subordinate legislation (taking 
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recourse in the regulatory power leverage). The New Law worsened the situ­
ation since it limited its regulatory power and sterilised the efforts which the 
Commission made to “close the loopholes” by adopting subordinate legislation 
and responding in a timely manner to the new situation on the market which 
is constantly in the process of creation and changing. Moreover, the Commis­
sion does not have the authority of documentation search and seizure, which is 
important for the discovery of insider trading and manipulation. In addition, 
the Commission does not have the investigative powers to impose injunctions, 
in particular those “freezing” the situation encountered in the course of super­
vision until the completion thereof, which would be of utmost importance for 
a successful investigation. 
With regard to the regulator’s effective power in the sphere of sanctioning, 
during the survey the Commission stated that it believes that it does not have 
appropriate powers to impose the necessary measures in the case it encounters 
unlawful and irregular act/practice in the course of supervision. Thus, for ex­
ample, the Commission has neither the authority to impose on the spot fines, 
nor the authority to conduct first­instance misdemeanor proceedings65. The 
Securities Law stipulates that only by the “second decision” by which it pro­
nounces a new measure if it finds that the unlawful or irregular practice has 
not been remedied pursuant to the “first decision” it issued when it discovered 
the presence of unlawful or irregular practice, the Commission may impose a 
fine on the supervised entities. The Commission’s decisions are final and may 
be appealed by initiating administrative disputes. The role of the Commission 
in the criminal proceedings is reduced to the filing of the criminal complaint, 
i.e. possibly initiating criminal proceedings. The Commission has never man­
aged to secure criminal prosecution of a perpetrator, which indicated the in­
efficiency and inefficacy of this sanction, even though in reality there is an­
ecdotal evidence of extensive insider trading, poorly informed investors, and 
market manipulation, for which criminal liability is envisaged. 
So, the research has shown that the legal status of the Commission is rel­
atively well defined (with the exception of the sphere of regulatory indepen­
dence). At the same time, the actual status of the Commission in Serbia is such 
that it may be concluded that the Commission has clearly defined competences, 
but not clearly defined goals. The current Law on Securities was a radical step 
backwards compared to the previous one, particularly concerning the Com­
mission’s institutional and regulatory independence. The Commission cannot 
65  Some representatives of the Commission believe that the Commission does not need to have 
this authority.
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effectively carry out its supervision, and the main characteristic of its activities 
thus far was a relatively small regulatory, supervisory, and institutional capacity 
of this body. It should be (and is not) operationally and financially independent, 
it should have enough expert staff who have the knowledge necessary for exer­
cising the regulatory functions and enough authority and political support (and 
does not have either) to perform effective supervision. At the same time, the 
Commission should operate in a transparent and accountable manner. The in­
fluence and open pressure exerted on the Commission by the executive power 
have been observed ever since it was set up. 
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF CONCENTRATION
Concentration as a solution for the corporate governance problem 
The problem of corporate governance, particularly the problem of in­
vestor protection, is solved, or, more precisely, eliminated for a short term, 
through faster concentration. The main method of solving the problem is 
the factual abandonment of the corporate form of the company. For a large 
number of companies which were forced to list, this is a rational solution. The 
problem is in the fact that the concentration develops fastest in the group of 
the best and largest companies which, according to their characteristics, can 
be open (public) public companies. The companies which, according to their 
performance, cannot be public corporations, remain open (public) and their 
shares are traded on the discontinuous market segment.
Maintenance of such configuration over the medium and long term may 
lead to an absurd situation where high­risk and low­quality companies remain 
on the market and large and valuable companies withdraw from the market. 
This manner of concentration sacrifices in a way the “civilisation” mission of 
the corporation as the only kind of company that can absorb and efficiently use 
the capital from the environment in the best possible way. 
Concentration and characteristics of the Serbian financial market
In the short and medium term, the concentration of ownership over 
shares deforms the basic functions of the financial market. This deformation 
stems from the change of the financial market’s basic functions. In this case, 
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it is not used as a mechanism for direct financial intermediation but rather 
as a mechanism for transfer of ownership. Most Serbian public companies 
which are listed on the capital market do not de facto raise additional capital 
in the market. According to the findings from the above quoted World Bank 
research, 89% of companies in the sample did not receive any external invest­
ments in the past five years, and 90% of interviewed companies do not intend 
to issue new shares or to raise additional capital through the capital market in 
the following three years66. 
In these circumstances, the capital market will stay shallow and illiquid 
over a long term. Things observed on the market for shares are a typical conse­
quence of the low level of investor protection. On the supply side, there domi­
nate the shareholders who have been given their shares in the privatisation 
process. The dominant buyers on this market are in actual fact the acquirers 
of these companies and not the buyers of shares (investors). Their aim is to ac­
quire the company’s share package which will ensure the actual control of the 
company. The owner who assumes control over a company is not interested 
in capital increase through a public offer since it can threaten the ownership 
structure and the control acquired. In such circumstances other buyers (stan­
dard investors interested in the yield) are not interested in such company in 
these circumstances since, due to the ownership and, consequently, the control 
structure they cannot have any significant influence on the company’s busi­
ness. The shares of such company are not interesting for the investor’s port­
folio either, since they are not liquid. The consequence: the company actually 
goes private (becomes a closed one), i.e. it is transformed, and the market as 
such is being progressively emptied up because of the withdrawal of shares and 
declining demand from the investor segment, including both individual and 
institutional investors. 
The capital market, with the exception of its continuous segment67 is not in 
actual fact an equity market but rather a company market. It is used for the redis­
tribution of wealth and control and not for the information­ and price­efficient 
66 K. Veljović, Op. cit.
67  In the continuous trading market segment, during the rise of the market in the second half of 2005 
the other source of offer was activated from the corpus of portfolio investors who had bought shares 
earlier and were now selling them to obtain capital gain or restructure their investment portfolios. 
A consequence of this is increased liquidity of the continuous trading market. The growth of trading 
volumes and prices in the continuous trading segment in 2005 resulted in a temporary break in the 
process of market drainage. The introduction of the banks’ shares to continuous trading contributed 
to this and these shares were the shares of banks in which there was no apparent takeover strategy. 
Even at the time of its most intense rise, the market still remained exceptionally narrow: if the trading 
in 3 or 4 most traded equities is excluded, the remaining shares on the market are just “stage props”. 
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allocation of capital. This mechanism explains the large difference between the 
market capitalisation level and the trading volume in Serbia. 
If the level of Serbian capital market development is measured only by the 
standard market capitalisation indicator which recorded high dynamic growth 
between 2000 and 2008, a conclusion can be drawn that Serbian financial mar­
ket underwent strong expansion. The above indicator, however, is inadequate 
and does not describe the real situation, considering that a large part of the to­
tal capitalisation is illiquid68. That is why the trading volume and the liquidity 
ratio are used as more reliable measures of activity on the capital market since 
they reveal the pattern of behaviour of the Serbian capital market. 
The data confirm the thesis that, despite a notable growth in trading vol­
umes, particularly in shares, Serbian capital market is illiquid. A small num­
ber of companies whose shares are actively traded and small trading volumes 
of those shares constitute the main problems for further development of this 
market. The liquidity ratio, as the ratio of total turnover to total market capi­
talisation, is low. The turnover to capitalisation ratio was 6.65%in December 
2003, 2.26% in December 2004, approx. 1.3% in December 2005, and about 
2.5% in the first quarter of 2007. That is why the liquidity ratio should be taken 
with reserve considering that the right measure of market liquidity would be 
obtained only after the truly liquid shares were identified and then their share 
in the total turnover and in capitalisation measured. 
The actual situation in the Serbian share market suggests that there are 
two markets: the continuous trading and the periodical auction trading. These 
two markets differ significantly. The periodical auction market is a one­way 
market. The experience shows that main sellers of shares in this market come 
from the retail sector, namely that these are shareholders who have acquired 
their shares for free within the process of mass insider privatisation (primarily 
in the second wave of privatisation in 1997). In other words, on the supply side 
it is the employee­shareholders that are dominant. The dominant buyers on 
this market are actually the acquirers of these companies, rather than buyers 
of shares. The aim of these buyers is to acquire a company share package which 
will ensure them actual control over the company concerned 
The above ownership concentration mechanism and the consequential 
drainage of the periodical auction market operate as follows: on the eve of con­
centration and in the course of that very process, the turnover of the “attacked” 
company’s shares gathers speed, the number of transactions increases and this 
68  Source: B. Živković, B. Urošević, D. Cvijanović i M. Drenovak – Finansijsko tržište Srbije: 2000-2005 
(The Financial Market of Serbia: 2000­2005), Kvartalni monitor br. 1, januar­jul 2005 (pp. 59­66).
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goes on until formation of a significant majority package, i.e. the share pack­
age which ensures factual control over the company concerned. Thereafter, the 
turnover of that share declines, the demand decreases and, consequently, the 
price of the share falls. 
Graph 18. Liquidity ratio
Source: www.belex.co.yu
The main cause of this phenomenon lies in the fact that, when a single 
person or a group of affiliated persons concentrate the ownership over the 
company’s shares in their hands, they do not want to sell their stock. The goal 
of the share purchase is to gain control over the company and the control is 
ensured through acquiring of the majority package. This fact confirms the 
theoretical proposition that a high value of the private benefits from control 
implies a low level of protection of investors’ ownership rights69. Namely, since 
insider privatisation has left behind a rather dispersed ownership structure, 
control over a company could be gained even with a significant share package 
which need not necessarily be a majority package. In the Serbian share market, 
however, it has been noted that the owners are, as a rule, interested only in the 
majority packages which guarantee factual control over the company and thus 
they render superfluous the reliance on legal protection. 
69  See: La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez­de­Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny – Law and 
Finance, 1998, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6, 1113­1155); La Porta, Rafael, Florencio 
Lopez­de­Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny – Legal Determinants of External Finance, 
1997, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 3, 1131­1150). ; La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez­de­Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny – Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 2002, Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 57, No. 3, 1147­1170).
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On the other hand, there is not much interest in the significant (although 
minority) packages offered by the Share Fund. Of all the companies offered 
on the capital market, primarily those offered by the Share Fund, only 55% 
of companies were sold in 2002, 57% in 2003, and 54% of offered companies 
in 2004. The absence of investors’ interest in minority packages and their in­
sistence upon factual control over the company suggest that there is a lack of 
investors’ trust in legal protection and the high value of private benefits from 
the control, which are typical for the low level of investor protection. 
The owner who assumes control over a company is not interested in the 
capital increase by means of the public offer considering that public offer may 
compromise the ownership structure and the acquired control. At the same 
time, other buyers are not interested in such a company either, because, due 
to the ownership and, consequently, the control structure, they cannot have 
any major influence on the decision making in the company, or its operations. 
A share of such a company is not an efficient allocation alternative for the 
portfolio investors either, since it is not liquid. Consequently, such a company 
actually (although not always in legal terms) becomes a closed one (goes pri­
vate). At the market level, the consequence is gradual “drainage”. Moreover, 
only low­quality companies remain and thus, aggregately, the price­to­book 
ratio was constantly falling until the beginning of 2006. At that time this ratio 
changed in a certain number of shares which attracted the interest of individ­
ual investors and investment funds from abroad. Considering that discontinu­
ous trading market still retained low values of these ratios, it is not really the 
share market but a company market. Also, this operating mechanism explains 
a great difference between the level of market capitalisation and the value of 
turnover in this market segment. 
It follows from this finding that periodical auction market (which is still 
dominant in Serbia, although its share is constantly decreasing both due to its 
drainage and the development of the continuous market, i.e. the continuous 
trading market) is used for the purposes other than standard ones: instead 
of being used for the companies’ going public, it is used for the companies’ 
going private. This process is taking place in the circumstances of low informa­
tion­ and price efficacy. Namely, it is assumed that, in these circumstances, 
the market undervalues the shares and this further accelerates the process of 
drainage. The evidence for this statement lies in the following facts: the sell­
ers on the periodical auction are dominantly from the retail sector and they 
have generally acquired their shares for free, in the process of mass privatisa­
tion. It follows that these shareholders cannot be thought of as investors who 
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have chosen to invest their funds in the equities of a specific company but 
rather as the employees who consider these shares a kind of compensation. 
Besides, since they are at the same time employed in the company concerned, 
there is always a possibility that their agent (manager) may terminate their em­
ployment and deprive them of income (salary) which exceeds the yield from 
shares. Bearing in mind that they chose between these two rights and the yield, 
they actually do not have the opportunity to control the managers. Since the 
agents (managers) have often acted against these principals (shareholders) and 
in concert with the acquirer, it was very hard to distinguish between the ami­
cable and hostile takeovers. This expropriation often included the cancellation 
of the right of disposal of own assets. The low quality of corporate governance 
and inability of employees­shareholders to use this mechanism to protect their 
ownership rights (although, enjoying them under the regulations) have addi­
tionally speeded up the conversion of discontinuous market into the corporate 
control market. 
Graph 19. Volume and structure of share trading, 2005–2008
Source: Quarterly Monitor No 1. 2008
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Specific limitations for institutional investors
In addition to the high yield and high systemic risk, the Serbian finan­
cial market at the present state of development and in the foreseeable future 
imposes some specific limitations on the institutional investors and mutual 
investment schemes. In addition to the yield and market risk, the activity of 
institutional investor is also subject to the level of specific risk to which he is 
exposed as a minority owner per definitionem. This risk is the risk of the expro­
priation of yield and assets that develops in the circumstances of low investor 
protection. The analysis that has been conducted so far indicates that low legal 
protection does not have its roots in the inadequate legal rules (regulations) 
governing the field of company law and in their implementation. The prob­
lem in the first place stems from 1) mass violation of these rules and inability 
of shareholders to ensure any enforcement of these rules, and (2) the share­
holders’ difficulties to vote by leaving the company, i.e. to “punish” the man­
agement by selling their shares on the illiquid capital market. The first set of 
problems could be resolved by reviewing corporate legislation and increasing 
the efficiency of institutional superstructure (regulatory bodies and courts). 
The second problem originates from the inefficient and inadequate regulation 
of the takeover market; therefore, a radical revision of current takeover law 
is needed. 
This group of investors’ main risk on the share market is the process 
of market drainage due to ownership concentration. This will continue un­
til the IPO market develops. The concentration process further narrows the 
investment base and limits the efficiency of institutional investors. This char­
acteristic of the market is essential in the estimation of the effects of the pub­
lic enterprises’ becoming open public companies, namely their listing. Taking 
into account the present situation on the share market, it is to be expected that 
their shares too will be captured in the concentration process, unless the basic 
market­related legislation is previously revised. 
The assumption on the continuation of the share market drainage process 
is based on the estimation that low level of investor protection will be kept 
in the long term. The arguments in favour of this forecast come from the 
experience of similar countries. Besides the reform of market and corporate 
legislation, the increase of the institutional superstructure quality is the main 
precondition for changing the investor protection quality and level. The low 
level of investor protection and low liquidity of the market on one the hand, and 
dispersion of ownership on the other hand, make an incompatible combination. 
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Studies have shown that the concentration of ownership is much higher in the 
countries with low level of protection, and that ownership most commonly 
concentrates in the hands of insiders70 who are in a strategic coalition with the 
management. At the same time, a feedback mechanism exists, since ownership 
concentration itself results in an underdeveloped and illiquid capital market. 
Namely, if concentrated ownership prevails, financial instruments are then in 
the hands of a small number of investors, which inevitably results in reduced 
liquidity. This illiquid market conserves the existing ownership concentration 
s well as the low protection level of the shareholders who do not have any 
exit strategy and cannot influence the management by threatening to leave 
(sell their shares). The previous chapter demonstrated the underdevelopment 
and illiquidity of Serbian share market which makes the alternative “voting by 
leaving” the company a feeble alternative for the Serbian shareholder.
In short and medium term, the limitations acute for institutional inves­
tors are those related to the opportunities to diversify the portfolio. Namely, 
the demand by both individual and institutional investors concentrates on a 
relatively limited market segment. The prices of the shares on this market grow 
and fall quickly and in large amplitudes. The other big limitation is the absence 
of the low or relatively low risk instrument. This is especially the case with 
debt instruments. Besides the foreign­currency savings bonds, the market of 
which is relatively shallow, there are no classic low­risk instruments from the 
municipal or corporate sectors. The result is a relatively shallow portfolio di­
versification, high share of cash, and a relatively low yield. 
An important consequence of the above findings concerns the current 
limitations in resolving the problem of institutional investors’ portfolio optimi­
sation. Although the market correlation coefficient is probably low, any wider 
diversification is limited by the low liquidity of shares. This brings different 
groups of institutional investors into different situations. The investment funds 
which can assume high risk (particularly the so­called private funds) and non­
life insurance companies can, conceptually, assume a higher risk than the pen­
sion (voluntary and mandatory) funds. For this reason, the capacity of the first 
group of institutional investors to optimise their portfolio is higher than the 
capacity of the other group. This was seen in the behaviour of investment and 
voluntary pension funds to date. The problem was radicalised in 2007 when the 
demand accrual, with the limited offer level and structure, resulted in a faster 
growth of prices and concentration of trade on a small number of shares. 
70  See: A. Shleifer and R. Vishny – A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance 52, 1997, 
pp 737­783.
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If high risks of the companies’ going public are not removed, the desyn­
chronisation of the demand and supply accrual dynamics may cause distortion 
of the market. In the present circumstances, trading has obviously concentrat­
ed on several shares and one treasury bond. If no new issues of securities and 
debt and equity instruments take place in medium term, the problem will arise 
regarding the market survival and growth of systemic risks. A consequence of 
any accelerated growth of demand will be the additional reduction of capac­
ity and efficiency of diversification. This characteristic of the market will most 
probably be maintained over the mid­term and this will, consistently, threaten 
the efficiency of institutional investors, particularly the investors whose capac­
ity of risk assumption is limited by the standard regulatory norms.
The limited liquidity and reduced depth of the market will in the medi­
um term continue to restrict the conservative institutional investors’ ability to 
adapt to the price shocks coming from the market. That is how the customary 
regulation of open investment and pension funds will come to crises. Standard 
limitations of the fund’s maximum exposure become ineffective if the status of 
securities changes fast in terms liquid/illiquid. This was, in our previous expe­
rience, seen in the behaviour of voluntary pension funds on the share market. 
Their ability to protect themselves from the price changes and to maintain the 
investment unit value growth trend in the circumstances imposed by the leg­
islation and fall of the exchange index, proved in 2007 to be limited. The shal­
low market places this group of investors before a specific problem: by with­
drawing from a security (disinvesting), they considerably increase its supply 
and, therefore, lower its price. This was not observed in the investment funds, 
which are given more freedom to choose to invest in the less liquid securities 
on the discontinuous market segment by the rules of portfolio structuring. 
A critical point of the future evolution of Serbian financial market will be 
the (il)liquidity of the periodical auction market. Depending on this market 
segment will be the (non­)formation of a critical investor mass on the side 
of demand. This especially applies to future strategies of all the institutional 
investors who are not specifically present in this market segment. It is not re­
alistic to expect any significant shift in demand towards this segment over a 
short term, considering that even a much deeper continuous market is highly 
sensitive both to small accruals and the change in demand structure. The key 
risk of this market segment is low investor protection; that is why this market 
is still being drained. If the causes of drainage are not eliminated, (primarily 
poor protection of investors’ ownership rights), the decline in demand will 
inevitably lead to the decline in prices. This segment of the capital market will 
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in this case operate as long as there exist the resources for distribution, namely 
the offer of shares derived from the privatisation process. It shall not perform 
any of its main functions. The necessary precondition for this is a fundamental 
change of this market’s regulation, strengthening of oversight in financial mar­
kets (institutional building), and effective protection of ownership rights.
The problem of the narrow investment base, namely the lacking and un­
favourable structure of the securities supply, could radicalise in short term, if 
the demand considerably rises at the present level and structure of the supply. 
Fast increase of the demand would cause the creation of small or larger price 
balloons on the share market.

Financial markets regulation: 
Main flaws and possible improvements
EVOLUTION OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
OR A STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK 
The Law on Market of Securities and other Financial Instruments that 
was enacted in November 200271 was, according to the general opinion, not 
good. Under this Law, the level and quality of protection of the investors in 
securities was low. This Law has only provisionally regulated the takeover mar-
ket. The activity of investment funds was not regulated at all, despite the fact 
that their activity on the national market was intensive. In a nutshell: the entire 
complex of securities issuance and public trading was either unregulated or 
under-regulated, and the regulator (supervisor) did not manage to effectively 
ensure the application of rules.
The Serbian securities market was a reflection (and a consequence) of such 
regulatory status. While this Law was in force, market capitalisation (relative to 
GDP) was large, but more than 90% of this capitalisation was illiquid.72 There 
were no IPOs on the market. Main reasons for revision of this Law (for the sake 
of simplification, hereinafter: the Old Law) included the following:
The first problem was the introducing of securities to the so-called or-
ganised market, the Old Law has declaratively “opened” all public companies 
(made them public) by the provision which treats all shares issued before the 
beginning of its application as the shares issued through public offer. With this 
provision the law has ignored the economic reality and logic. A paradoxical situ-
ation was created in which the companies which, due to their economic nature, 
cannot be corporations (single-member public companies, small and medium-
sized enterprises) had to enter the organised market – stock exchange.73 
71  Official Journal of FRY, No. 65/2002 and Official Gazette RS, Nos. 57/2003, 55/2004, 45/2005, 
101/2005.
72  B. Živković, B. Urošević, D. Cvijanović and M. Drenovak – Finansijsko tržište Srbije: 2000-2005, 
(Serbian financial Market) Kvartalni monitor No. 1., January-July 2005 (pp. 59-66). 
73  The subsequently adopted Company Law (CL) tried to reconcile the legal and the economic world 
and thus it introduced two categories of public companies – closed (public) ones and open (public) 
ones and brought the public companies which are by their very nature the closed public companies 
(which can have a maximum of 100 shareholders) closer to the form of a limited liability company, 
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The legislator tried to create a market by imposing the creation of an 
organised securities market and this with the requirements which makes it 
possible for all securities holders to place their (already issued) securities on 
such market. The goal of the legislator was, however, that the companies be-
ing traded on the organised market (i.e. whose securities are publicly traded) 
respect the obligations that the Old Law envisaged for public companies74 and 
that those companies are supervised by the Securities Commission (the Com-
mission) and that is why it directed them to the “organised market”.75 However, 
this intention of the legislator was eschewed by registering all “shares from 
privatisation” on the so-called free exchange market rather than on the formal 
Belgrade Stock Exchange listing. The market capitalisation of shares covers the 
market capitalisation of all the issuers who were included on the free exchange 
market, while both official listings (A and B), to which the Stock Exchange 
attached complex requirements which the Old Law had placed before pub-
lic companies, are almost completely empty. These requirements, however, do 
not concern the free market although it is, in actual fact “organised” by the 
Belgrade Stock Exchange. The requirements which must be met to enter the 
free exchange market are much less strict than the official listing requirements: 
only the registration of securities and their holders with the Central Deposi-
tory and applying with the Belgrade Stock Exchange for inclusion on the free 
exchange market, and signing the contract with the Belgrade Stock Exchange 
accompanied with the prospectus. This raises a question whether the Commis-
sion has any authority with regard to the companies on the free exchange mar-
ket (almost all Serbian companies traded in an organised manner) or whether 
its supervision is limited to the formal Stock Exchange listing, namely to the, 
until recently, an empty set.
with a possibility of imposing restrictions to the transfer of shares by internal company instruments. 
This left the possibility for the exclusion of free transferability and trading on the organised market 
and created a legal possibility to trade outside of the stock exchange, but also created a conflict with 
the Old Law. Open public companies (with over 100 shareholders and those with fewer shareholders 
which are open of their own choice), are treated by the CL as “public companies” in the sense of the 
Old Law. Therefore, the body of open public companies under the CL is more narrowly defined than 
the body of public companies defined by the Old Law.
74  The Old Law in Art. 5 para. 1 sub-para. 12 defines a public company as a legal person that has is-
sued securities through a public offer on the organised market, whose securities related operations 
are supervised by the Securities Commission, and which is obligated to inform the public about its 
operations in accordance with the law. 
75  The Old Law in Art. 5 para. 1 sub-para 5 states that an organised market is a market on which the 
trading in securities and other financial instruments issued in accordance with this Law is carried 
out in the manner and under the conditions laid down by such Law, the Commission’s instruments 
and the rules of operation of the authorised participants on the organised market supervised by the 
Commission.
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The second problem of the market and, at the same time, the reason for 
changing the Old Law was the lack of transparency in terms of issuer infor-
mation. On the face of it, the regulation of the market entry and continuous 
information as provided by the Old Law was defined in a satisfactory manner 
and included all key elements related to the prospectus, required reports, with 
a manifested aspiration to lead towards the achievement of its increasingly bet-
ter updatedeness. However, it was shown in practice that it is possible that the 
issuer is not sanctioned for non-compliance with this legal obligation. Namely, 
as it was said above, the shares which, according to the Old Law, should be 
traded on the Stock Exchange, were introduced to a special segment of the 
stock-exchange market, the so-called free exchange market where the trade 
can take place even without a prospectus, with a special designation BP (bez 
prospekta – without prospectus). Considering that, according to the rules of 
the Belgrade Stock Exchange, the acceptance to this market segment does not 
require a prospectus nor compliance with specific legal criteria for public com-
panies, the trading is regulated only by the rules of the Stock Exchange and the 
investors knowingly assume the risk to invest in the absence of obligation to 
provide inform of the listed companies. Further, a company which has initially 
entered the market with a prospectus and later on failed to comply with the 
requirement to continuously inform investors, will be sanctioned only by sub-
sequently acquiring the BP (without prospectus) status.
The third problem concerned the inefficiency of supervision and ineffi-
cient application of law. Despite the good intentions of the legislator, due to 
inadequate solution in the Old Law, frequent changes of the regulations, in-
consistency between different laws, etc, the market participants violated regu-
lations en masse and the regulators and courts were unable to effectively and 
efficiently sanction such behaviour. Private enforcement (application of law 
by the courts) was inefficient due to inadequate activity of shareholders them-
selves and due to the inefficiency of courts. As regards public enforcement 
(application of law by the public regulatory body, namely the Securities Com-
mission), it is also at a very low level. Firstly, it should be noted that a consoli-
dated supervision over Serbian financial sector is absent and that there are two 
competing regulators – the National Bank of Serbia (NBS) and the Commis-
sion – between which the conflict of competences may be both positive and 
negative.76 In the circumstance where private enforcement of law is inefficient, 
76  This primarily refers to the activities of banks, insurance companies and pension funds (falling 
within the scope of competence of the NBS) on the securities market. With regard to granting banks 
authorizations to engage in a business activity with securities and a business activity of custody 
bank, a conflict of authority cannot de iure occur between the Commission and the NBS. Namely, 
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the public regulatory body, that is, the Securities Commission, is the first and 
often (actually) the last line of defence of investor rights. It is a very important 
determinant of the investment climate and it is critical for the credibility of 
the entire financial market. However, as it was already mentioned above, the 
question was raised whether the Commission has any authority whatsoever in 
respect of the companies on the free exchange market (all Serbian companies 
which are traded in a regulated manner) or its supervision is restricted to the 
formal Stock Exchange listing. Also, the factual situation is such that a con-
clusion may be drawn that the Commission has clearly defined competences 
but not clearly defined objectives. Furthermore, it is not in a position to ef-
fectively carry out its supervision and the main characteristic of its operation 
thus far was relatively small regulatory, supervisory and institutional capac-
ity. The Commission should be (and it is not) operationally and financially 
independent, it should have sufficient knowledge to perform the regulatory 
function, and sufficient authority and political support (and it has neither) to 
effectively exercise supervision. It should operate in a transparent and respon-
sible manner. The influence and open pressure made by the executive power 
on the Commission has been noted ever since it was established.
In June 2006 three laws were adopted: the Law on the Market of Securi-
ties and other Financial Instruments (for the sake of simplification, herein-
after: the New Law),77 the Law on Takeover of Public Companies,78 and the 
it is envisaged that a bank may engage in a business activity of a broker-dealer company, or a busi-
ness activity of a custody bank, provided it acquires previous consent of the NBS and the license of 
the Commission to carry out such business activities (see Art. 137 and 141 of the Old Law, and Art. 
176 and 180 of the New Law. Therefore, the NBS grants a prior consent and the Commission issues 
the license. The New Law no longer requires the prior consent of the NBS. A danger of the conflict 
of authority may possibly occur in the sphere of supervision over the operations of the authorised 
bank. Namely, the Law (Art. 139 of the Old Law, and Art. 178 of the New Law) envisaged that if the 
Commission finds any unlawful practices or irregularities in business operations of the authorised 
bank in the course of the supervision procedure, it shall submit the decision on the measures taken 
to the NBS. However, the supervision function in relation to banks, and the authorisation for issu-
ing sanctions in the event of violation of regulations and practices by the bank, has been established 
in favour of the NBS by the Law on the NBS (Art.63). Thus, the Commission does not have the 
effective power (even though the law allocates the competences and the responsibility) to exercise 
the supervision over the banks’ activities on the securities market where the banks are de facto the 
largest players. A similar conclusion is drawn with regard to custody banks. The same Article of the 
Law on the NBS (Art. 63) stipulates that the NBS shall issue regulations governing the standards of 
prudential banking operations (regulatory power of the NBS). On the other hand, within the scope 
of its competence, the Commission issues instruments for the implementation of the law on securi-
ties. It is therefore easy to imagine a situation where a conflict of authority between the NBS and the 
Commission could arise in this sphere of regulatory authorisations too. 
77 Official Gazette of RS No. 46/2006.
78 Ibid.
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Law on Investment Funds.79 The Law of Investment Funds was doubtlessly a 
huge step forward. The Law on Securities and the Law on Takeover were a step 
backwards.
THE FIRST STEP BACKWARDS OR BASIC CONCEPTUAL 
ELEMENTS OF THE CURRENT LAW
The expectations that the New Law would change the relations on the fi-
nancial market were not met. The New Law, briefly put, is a slightly modified 
version of the previous one, and it enabled a faster pace for the drainage of 
the market.80 The main novelties in the New Law, compared with the old one, 
concern the following areas:
1.  Market morphology: a division of the organised market to the stock-ex-
change and over-the-counter market81 and a concept of the market regu-
lator are now introduced.82 The explanation of this solution is twofold. 
Firstly, the legislator believes that it enables the SMEs to enter the market. 
Secondly, this solution is supposed to ensure the competition to the Bel-
grade Stock Exchange so as to ensure that the competition between the 
market organisers, namely between the organised markets, remedy the 
above described weaknesses of the Belgrade Stock Exchange. This solution, 
in compliance with the experience in other comparable situation, should 
increase the number of companies on the free over-the-counter market 
and thus speed up the process of the share ownership concentration. 
2.  The relationship between the issuer and the market: the required com-
pany transparency is clearly increased, which should result in a reduced 
information asymmetry on the market; however, it is still unclear how far 
these changes can reach, given that they apply to a small body of listed 
companies.
3.  Supervision and regulation: the New Law considerably derogates already 
insufficient competences of the Securities Commission.
79 Ibid.
80  To be fair, a good side of the New Law is that, in some aspects, it has removed the inconsisten-
cies between the national legislation and the IOSCO and EU regulations. At this time it cannot be 
ascertained if the Transparency Directive and the Market Manipulation Directive were taken into 
consideration. A big step forward was made in this field and it will contribute to the protection of 
financial market integrity and prevention of the abuse of insider information. It remains unclear 
whether these provisions will be effective.
81 Art. 10 of the New Law.
82 Art. 2 paragraph 1 sub-paragraph11 of the New Law.
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Stock-exchange and over-the-counter market 
According to the solutions of the New Law, the stock-exchange and the 
over-the-counter markets have identical operating rules, require the same level 
of transparency, and provide the same possibilities of access. The difference in 
the definition of these two markets is in the structure and characteristics of 
the instruments traded on one or the other market. On the stock-exchange 
market, only those securities which comply with relatively strict criteria laid 
down by the Commission may be listed. On the over-the-counter market, the 
securities issued through public offers and without any additional stipulated 
requirements may be listed.
The New Law provides a precise definition of the concept of market or-
ganiser. The largest controversy among the experts in the field arose with re-
gard to the extension of the group of persons who can be the founders, namely, 
shareholders of the market organiser. These may include any local or foreign, 
natural or legal, persons. The only requirement is that any acquisition of a qu-
alified share in the structure of ownership over such entity must be previously 
approved by the Commission. There, however, the competence of the Com-
mission ends. This solution may result in the creation of more than one stock 
exchange and more than one over-the-counter market. Surely, this is not the 
necessary or the only outcome. However, this outcome is more likely than the 
one offered in a formal explanation of the legislator that the creation of the 
over-the-counter market will result in the companies’ easier access to financial 
resources other than through banking intermediation. The logic of the over-
the-counter market itself goes in favour of this assumption, since it does not 
function efficiently in the circumstances of high risk. Namely, this type of the 
market does not have centralised auction as the main procedure for price dis-
closure. Over-the-counter markets identify the price at several points of their 
structure (so-called market makers) within the range of buying and selling 
rate. This range expands with the increase of risk. Markets of this kind tend to 
form prices at a considerably lower level that the auction markets (stock ex-
changes). The same was seen, in quite dramatic forms, in the Czech Republic 
(RMS) and Romania. Even the most efficient and the best organised of these 
markets, the NASDAQ of the US, abandoned this concept and adopted the 
system of price identification in auction, through AMEX. The reason for this 
was the widening of the difference between the securities buying and selling 
price in the circumstances of high risk. In the circumstances prevailing in the 
US, the investors responded by leaving the NASDAQ. In the circumstances 
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when the investor protection level is low, in all the likelihood the outcome 
would be mass redistribution at the expense of small shareholders.
Information openness of the issuer
All shares traded on the Stock Exchange are included in the free exchange 
market on which the trade may take place without the prospectus (with a spe-
cial mark BP), where the investors knowingly assume the investment risk in 
the absence of the obligation of inform on the part of the quoted companies. 
Investor protection is primarily ensured through timely, accurate and com-
prehensive information which the issuer provides upon entering the market, 
and through continuous information provided to the investment public. This 
information enables the identification of the fair price and valuation of invest-
ment alternatives. Otherwise, high information asymmetry would create high 
transaction costs. In the event of stronger regional cooperation and EU acces-
sion, quality securities will migrate to other markets.
The concept of the prospectus for securities issuance that is incorporated 
in the New Law is, basically, in compliance with the EU Prospectus Direc-
tive.83 The New Law finally laid down the obligation of the issuer of securities 
issued through public offer to always publish a short prospectus in at least one 
daily newspaper. The main objection to this solution was that the responsibil-
ity for the contents is not focused, even though joint and several liability of 
the accountant and the issuing agent increases the chance for compensation of 
damage to the investor in the event of any problems with the prospectus. The 
solution would be to make the management clearly and unequivocally liable 
for the accuracy of information. 
Public companies’ reporting was, in general, made transparent. Under the 
New Law, the issuer is obligated to publish (in at least one daily newspapers) a 
report on outcome of public offer, a report on material events, an extract from 
annual accounts, as well as other reports relevant for the operation of those 
companies. Moreover, the New Law defines the procedure for transparent mo-
nitoring of changes in ownership structure. The concept of insider information 
is harmonised with the EU Market Manipulation Directive. Unauthorised use 
of insider information was defined as grounds for abuse and manipulation on 
financial markets.84 A more precisely defined concept of related parties enables 
83 Prospectus Directive, i.e. European Parliament and the Council Directive 2003/71.
84  There are some advocates of insider trade who support their thesis arguing that it actually leads 
towards better price information, which automatically improves the allocation of funds. L. Ausubel 
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the regulator to monitor and identify other important categories of manipula-
tive practices related to securities prices. 
In addition to the information asymmetry, also arising on the primary 
share market is a strong conflict of interest: the issuer wishes to sell shares at 
the highest price possible and thus conceals any negative information about 
the company. The investor is interested in getting accurate and comprehensive 
information about the issuer and, at the same time, wishes to buy the shares 
as cheaply as possible. Good regulation makes the issuers responsible for dis-
closure of all relevant information because such allocation of responsibility 
is most efficient economically (the issuer is a participant on the market for 
whom it is the least costly to obtain and publish such information).85 This prac-
tice is in the interest of the issuer as well. Namely, in the event of information 
asymmetry, the investors assume the worst possible scenario and include the 
premium on that risk into the purchase price of shares. Therefore, the price of 
securities burdened with information asymmetry consistently decreases below 
the equilibrium value and it is the good companies that are relatively more af-
fected by this. In other words, bad and inefficient regulation of the problem of 
information closeness/openness is harmful for good companies and beneficial 
for bad companies (negative selection). 
Here the Law was well on the way to solving the main problem with infor-
mation asymmetry. In our country this problem appears in a dramatic form, in 
the relation between the investor and the issuer. In order to eliminate or at least 
alleviate this problem, regulation may tend to lower the costs of obtaining the 
information and raise the quantity and quality of the information accessible 
to the public. This allows the investor to make a rational choice. There are two 
main aspects to the regulation of corporations’ information openness. The first 
is to lay down the procedures for applying for the listing and quotation on the 
Stock Exchange (entry into the market), and the other is to define the standards 
for continuous publication of market information by the issuer. Information 
affects the market price and, at the same time, enables efficient operation of 
the market, namely the situation where the price precisely reflects the value. 
In other words, the main purpose of the regulation of financial markets is to 
provide information and, accordingly, price efficiency of the market.86
– Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy, American Economic Review 80, 1990, 759-
776; M. Fishman, and K. Hagerty – Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices, Rand Journal 
of Economics 23, 1992, str. 106-122; D. Bernhardt, B. Hollifield and E. Hughson – Investment and 
Insider Trading, Review of Financial Studies 8, 1995, 501-543.
85 S. Grossman and O. Hart – Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, Journal of Finance 35, 1980, 323-334. 
86  F. Allen, R. Herring – Banking regulation versus Securities Market Regulation, Wharton School Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, 2001.
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The New Law has identified this problem but has not solved it. The vague 
regulation of the information disclosure obligation (listed companies or all 
companies whose shares are publicly traded?), protects bad issuers at the ex-
pense of good companies and good investors.
The achievements of the New Law 
The equities market today comprises the free exchange market and the 
Belgrade Stock Exchange official listing (A and B).87 The Stock Exchange has 
associated with the listed companies the complex requirements which the reg-
ulations on securities impose on public companies. Until recently, this group 
was completely empty. The number of listed shares is still quite low. So, a ques-
tion arises whether the law and the public regulatory body in charge of its 
application have any authority whatsoever towards the issuers whose shares 
are traded on the formal (listed) stock-exchange market or the Commission’s 
supervision is limited to the officially listed shares. In other words, whether 
the New Law, the same as the Old Law, actually regulate an (almost) vacant 
group? 
Regrettably, the answer to this question is affirmative. Officially listed 
companies (over which the Commission would, both in legal and practical 
terms, have clear authority related to public companies) are and will be few. 
Namely, a corporation becomes a real “issuer” in economic and factual terms 
only if it decides on a public offer of securities or if it appears on the formal 
listing of the Stock Exchange with which strict listing rules are associated. Thus 
far, Serbia has seen no case of IPO which would naturally result in the quota-
tion and formal listing and the legal status “public company”. There are only 
four formally listed companies. The legal definition of a “public company” was 
extended to include the companies which have never passed through the for-
mal legal procedures envisaged for the IPO. Many of them would have never 
obtained a positive opinion of the Commission had they really undergone 
87  Two formal listings of the Belgrade Stock Exchange (A and B) have been vacant for years. At the 
moment, this market hosts four shares. All other shares that are traded on the Stock Exchange are 
registered on a so-called free exchange market (approx. 1,650 companies). Only the shares of a 
hundred or so companies are traded, and the shares of about 1,200 listed companies have not been 
traded at all in the past seven years. Free exchange market is regulated by the Stock Exchange inter-
nal rules and, from the strictly legal aspect, the companies on this market are not public companies. 
The liquidity ratio, as the ratio between total turnover and total market capitalisation, is very low. 
The ratio between the turnover value and the capitalisation is decreasing – in December 2003 its 
value was 6.6% and in the beginning of 2007 it fluctuated around 2.5%.
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these procedures. Certainly, given free choice, many of these companies would 
have never taken this decision. 
To sum up, neither the New nor the Old Law, faced with the heritage 
of insider privatisation, with the lack of rules and lack of the Commission’s 
authority towards the corporation on the free exchange market and poor insti-
tutional capacity of the Commission as such, provide adequate protection to 
investors in these securities. The Commission does not have the authority to 
order the company whose shares are placed on the free exchange market (the 
actual issuer, considering that securities of that company are publicly traded) 
to discontinue any detrimental actions or to issue another appropriate order 
concerning either future business operations of the issuer or sale/purchase of 
the issuer’s securities.88 
Poor institutional capacity of the Commission and imprecise and incom-
plete IPO regulations suspend all good provisions on information openness of 
the issuer. This means that deep information asymmetry on our market will 
subsist, that share prices will be inherently low, and that present accelerated 
ownership concentration will continue. 
The solution could involve two steps. The first would be to clean up the 
market from low quality securities, and the other would be to clearly define 
supervision. Market segmentation would occur if the consistency the New 
Law, the Company Law and the Privatisation Law were harmonised and if ev-
ery company were allowed to, decide for itself whether it wants to be a public 
company or not, whether it wants to be an open (public) or a closed (private) 
public company, or whether it wants to be listed/quoted by fully complying 
with the procedures laid down by the Company Law. The attempt to impose 
the listing on companies has resulted in mass violation of regulations, which is 
impossible to prevent, and to “dumping” poor quality instruments on the mar-
ket. The proposed change would enable the differentiation of the structure of 
public companies and respect of the rules of minority shareholders protection. 
When the economic and legal reality draw closer, then the level of regulatory 
risk will decrease (the need for frequent regulatory changes or a high level of 
the regulatory body’s discretion), which will create an environment condu-
cive to public issues and filter the market instruments on the Stock Exchange 
“keeping” only quality securities. A clearer specification of supervision will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
88  A case was recorded (when the Old Law was in force) when the Commission issued an act order-
ing the issuer on the free exchange market to discontinue some specific actions with regard to the 
securities operations, and the issuer did not comply with such act because it was familiar with the 
fact that the Commission did not have any legal authority to issue such an act nor to take any action 
in the case of non-compliance therewith.
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Erosion of the regulatory body’s capacity
It was empirically shown that the Old Law made the Securities Commis-
sion an institution without a clearly defined goal, with inadequate authority 
and poor regulatory, supervisory and institutional capacity. Nevertheless, at 
least formally, the Commission was institutionally, operationally and finan-
cially independent from the executive branch of power. In actual fact, it was 
operating without sufficient authority and institutional support required for 
effective supervision over the market. The New Law was supposed to provide 
for the institutional reform of the Commission and remedy the flaws that pre-
vented it from effectively regulating and supervising the market.89
This did not happen. Firstly, consolidated supervision of the financial 
market was not provided. An important change that new legislation did bring 
was the introduction of a new regulator on the financial market. The “compet-
ing” regulator is the NBS which, in addition to banks, also supervises insur-
ance companies and pension funds. The likelihood of the conflict of authority 
between the NBS and the Commission is high, particularly in the field of regu-
lation and supervision of the operations of the authorised and custody bank. 
Moreover, the Serbian financial market is bank-centric (approximately 90% of 
financial assets are controlled by banks).90 Banks are gradually becoming the 
main players on the securities market as well (universal banking). Non-bank-
ing supervision is inefficient and lags behind the supervision over the banking 
sector. The NBS is a constitutional category and the Commission is not, not 
even after the passing of the new Constitution.
The solution for this problem is in the concept of integrated supervision. 
Integrated supervision could be located in the central bank. Alternatively, an 
institution outside the NBS can be the new regulator, defined by a special law 
and established by transferring the regulation of banks, insurance companies 
and pension funds from the NBS, and the regulation of the securities market 
from the present Commission. The key problem with this choice is how to 
efficiently and quickly establish a new institution.91 The experience with the 
89  See a more detailed analysis of different aspects of the independence of institutions in M. Quintyn 
and M. W. Taylor – Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability, IMF Working 
Paper, WP/02/46, March 2002.
90  See: Serbia and Montenegro: Serbia – Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA), including Reports 
on the Observance of Standards and Codes on the following topics: Monetary and Financial Policy 
Transparency, Banking Supervision, and Payment System, International Monetary Fund, Washing-
ton D.C., March 2006.
91  There is no doubt that, at this time, the necessary preconditions for the establishment of a strong and 
fully independent regulator are not met. The main problems are the conflicts inside the institutional 
structure and the competition in the political superstructure which actually enables political par-
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newly-formed independent regulatory bodies in Serbia makes this alternative 
seem inferior. 
In respect of the institutional independence of the Commission, the New 
Law is a huge step backwards. The Commission was declaratively defined as 
an independent and autonomous organisation of the Republic of Serbia, which 
is accountable to the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, but such 
declarative autonomy was radically relativized: the powers of the Commis-
sion are not original but delegated. Delegated responsibilities (in accordance 
with the Law on Public Administration) are discharged by different agencies, 
administrative authorities, etc. These are, simply put, the responsibilities that 
were originally within the scope of competence of a specific ministry and are 
delegated to those institutions. If a securities commission exists in the institu-
tional structure of a country, then its competences are not the competences of 
any ministry but rather its original competences. If the competences are del-
egated, then there is no need for a commission. In such a case, a more efficient 
solution would be that the Ministry of Finance both regulates and supervises. 
As it is, we now have a strange, hybrid solution which will result in further 
reduction of already low level of the Commission’s independence. 
With regard to the institutional design of the Commission, the New Law 
gets very low marks. Namely, according to the position taken by the Interna-
tional Organisation of Securities Commissions92, the regulatory body should 
in the first place ensure the achievement of the following objectives: investor 
protection, a fair, efficient and transparent financial market, and reduction of 
systemic risk. These objectives imply that, firstly, the law should clearly define 
the goals of the Commission as the protection of investors and market integ-
rity. Secondly, the regulator needs to be given greater authority and effective 
power in its supervisory function. Thirdly, the Commission needs to have the 
original and not the delegated competences to regulate and supervise the finan-
cial market. Fourthly, clear rules on career advancement would close the door 
for bribery and corruption and, in addition, enable the institution to attract 
quality personnel to perform those very important and complex governmental 
functions. Then, reasonable systems need to be in place that allow the audit 
and ensure accountability of the regulator, but, at the same time, they must not 
call into question the integrity of the supervisory function and must not be 
detrimental to the clients. To eliminate any interfering of laypersons, another 
thing to consider is the existence of special courts or at least special depart-
ties to exercise control over the formally independent institutions. A risk of this kind may strongly 
compromise the new institution of a single regulator. 
92  These objectives of the legislation were in 1998 defined in the IOSCO document: Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation, and they are binding for all members.
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ments within the courts. Furthermore, institutional independence is founded 
on three constitutive elements: appointment and dismissal of the regulator’s 
management, governance structure in the regulator itself, and openness and 
transparency of the decision-making process. 
With regard to regulatory independence, it is particularly important to 
take account of the fact that, up to now, the Commission has tried to over-
come the legal vagueness in inadequate authorisations by using its own Statute 
and other bylaws. The New Law worsened the situation because, firstly, it did 
not solve the problems with inadequate competences, and the fact that the 
Commission discharges all responsibilities as delegated by the Government re-
stricts its regulatory power and sterilises the Commission’s previous efforts to 
respond to the market evolution by adopting bylaws. The Commission is ob-
ligated to submit all the rulebooks and other bylaws that are placed within its 
scope of competence to the Ministry of Finance for opinion since it discharges 
its responsibilities as delegated (by the Government). After the New Law was 
adopted, the existing effective powers of the Commission were conserved and 
a natural evolution of the regulator was prevented, since any changes of com-
petences and authorisations require amendments to the law in the parliament 
(or approval of the Ministry of Finance in the case of bylaws).
The Commission or its successor (integrated supervisory institution) 
must have original authorisations and its regulatory power must not be lim-
ited by any a priori or a posteriori approval by another authority. The degree 
of autonomy which the Commission enjoys in defining prudential rules is of 
critical importance.93 The next big problem that turns the national regulatory 
body into the legendary “toothless lion” is the absolute absence of operational 
autonomy. (in comparison: the National Bank of Serbia may operatively act in 
an absolutely autonomous manner while the Commission does not have that 
possibility.)
93  In order to identify the adequate degree of regulatory autonomy, it would be useful to classify fi-
nancial sector regulations in three groups: economic (control of prices, profits, market entries and 
exits), prudential (concerns the control over product types and the supervised companies’ produc-
tion processes) and information (concerns the information which the supervised companies need 
to provide to the supervisory authority and the general public). Past experience has shown that 
economic and information regulations usually do not change materially with time and, therefore, 
can be left to the legislator in the classic sense (the parliament) with possible mandatory previous 
consultations with supervisory authorities. However, the situation is very different with regard to 
prudential regulations. These rules are the fundaments underpinning the entire supervision process 
and determining the stability and “soundness” of the entire financial system. The conclusion is that 
the degree of autonomy in the definition of prudential rules is of critical importance for regulatory 
independence is and that it is a necessary precondition for the financial sector of a country to re-
spect the best international standards and practices. 
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The Commission should be equipped with all instruments for effective 
supervision over the financial market.94 In addition, the relevant legislation 
should be quite specific with regard to the limitation of the decision-making 
level, the process and the time period in which appeal may be filed against 
the supervisory authorities’ decisions. The Commission should be allowed to 
impose regulatory fines. It was necessary to ensure by the New Law great-
er powers for the regulator in its supervisory function, and immunity of the 
Commission’s employees in performing such supervisory function, as well as 
the appropriate measures for violations with a minimum of discretionary pow-
ers in order to avoid pressures on the Commission. (Analogous solutions were 
incorporated in the new Law on Banks). According to the current law, the 
Commission is not authorised for search and seizure of documentation, which 
is of importance for the discovery of insider trading practices and manipula-
tive behaviour. The Commission has no investigative authorisations to impose 
injunctions and in particular those in which the situation discovered in the 
course of supervision is “frozen” until the supervision is completed and which 
would be of utmost importance for effective inspection. In this area, the New 
Law has made a huge step backwards. 
Finally, personal and financial independence of the Commission95 have 
never been at a high level. This solution derogates apparently soundly defined 
independence aspect. The Commission had great problems due to the non-ap-
proval of its budget by the Assembly on several occasions (the budget and the 
Commission’s final accounts for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 were not 
approved). Such obstruction by the Parliament is unacceptable if the intention 
is to build an independent regulator that will protect the investors and the 
capital market integrity. 
It would be desirable to prevent any political influence on the appoint-
ment of the Commission members. In this regard it is important to set up two 
different structures within the Commission – the governance and the super-
visory one. The decision-making and governance should be exercised 
94  Effective power of the regulator reflects in: the powers to assess the competence of the management 
and owners of supervised entities (fit and proper test); the application of suitable and versatile sanc-
tions against the infringing entities; the ability to directly intervene in the supervised institution if 
necessary; the power to revoke licence for engaging in a specific business activity within the finan-
cial sector; and, finally, the protection of regulator’s employees (in their discharge of the supervisory 
function) by providing them immunity against the lawsuits which the supervised companies may 
initiate against them personally.
95  Institutional independence was, declaratively, ranked very high, both by the old and the new law. 
The main problem is that past experience has shown that the law does not actually protect the Com-
mission against arbitrary dismissal before the expiry of its term primarily for political reasons.
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by a collegial authority, but the decision-making (two-tier validation before 
deciding on most important issues), and ruling (acting on appeal against the 
first-instance decision), needs to be two-tier. This would imply the existence 
of the executive and the non-executive segment of the Commission’s gover-
nance structure embodied in two mutually independent bodies, the governing 
one and the executive one. The governing body (management board), as the 
second instance, should consist of at least five members whose terms of office 
would last five years, except for the first term, which should be different so 
that these terms of office end with a two-year difference, which would prevent 
electing more than two members of the Commission by the same Assembly. 
The executive body, which takes decisions and manages, must also be elected 
by the National Assembly and it could be a single person body since the de-
cision quality control is ensured by the existence of the collective governing 
body. The appointment of members to these bodies could include public inter-
views with the nominees in front of the competent parliamentary committee. 
The legitimate wish of the authorities to exercise supervision could be fulfilled 
through a supervisory body which could reflect the parliament mandate struc-
ture, and the guarantee for this could be a resolution adopted in the National 
Assembly which would politically and morally bind the deputies to consistently 
represent the current composition of the parliament. The most important in-
strument of the supervisory authority could be the internal audit which must 
be completely independent from the governance structure and must operate 
in accordance with the internal audit best practice. The above method could 
divide the supervisory power as well as the political accountability for the op-
erations of the Commission. Accordingly, this would enable its operations to 
move outside the field of daily political argumentation. Continual insight into 
the operations of the Commission would enable all political participants to 
become a part of the “fourth branch of government” system and ensure that 
changes of the ruling majority in the National Assembly does not have a dev-
astating effect on the Commission’ personnel continuity and, consequently, 
its expertise, professional conduct, and independence. The supervisory body 
would have a second-instance authority to decide in the matters of Commis-
sion management, as well as to propose, in lieu of the Government, on the 
basis of consensus, the dismissal of members to the management board and 
the executive body. It is necessary to precisely define the role of the executive 
and the legislative power in determination of the size and use of the regulator’s 
budget, and prevent any obstruction.
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LAW ON TAKEOVER OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
OR THE SECOND STEP BACKWARDS 
After it had been repeatedly announced and drafted in several versions 
and concepts, the Law on Takeover of Public Companies came at the time 
when the main wave of takeovers had already passed without any serious rules 
of the game. So, the first and main problem with regard to this Law is that it 
came so very late. A large number of efficient and potentially efficient compa-
nies have been taken over. Widely dispersed ownership is still massively pres-
ent in small and relatively inefficient companies, and a relatively small number 
of efficient companies still operate according to the open (public) corporation 
regime with public trading of shares. 
So far, the takeovers have mostly concerned the good c ompanies, which 
were privatised after a model provided by the 1997 Privatisation Law. Some 
takeovers have led to the forming of monopoly market structure. In the past 
two years, the process of taking over the companies in Serbia has displayed 
all the characteristics of early, unregulated transition that were seen in other 
countries too (Russia is a typical example). The main features of this process 
include accelerated pace of ownership concentration, a low level of corporate 
governance quality in the public companies which were privatised under the 
1997 Law, and low level of minority shareholder protection. The outcome of 
this situation was that, in the past three years, takeover was a dominant meth-
od for ownership concentration in Serbia. In 2004, the volume of transactions 
on the takeover market exceeded that on the Stock Exchange. The main reason 
for the expansion of takeover market was the absence of rules, namely the ab-
sence of this law which has just been enacted. 
The takeovers took place in the circumstances of low price efficiency of 
the market and this resulted in the low value of the price-to-book ratio. The 
price efficiency level was particularly affected by the actual absence of the ob-
ligation of the acquirers to purchase all shares from the small shareholders at 
the takeover price, and a small number of competitive bids. There was an ad-
ditional risk in the fact that the agents (managers) often acted contrary to the 
interest of the principal (shareholders) in collusion with the potential acquirer. 
It was often impossible to distinguish between a friendly and hostile takeover. 
All these distortions of the market and absence of standard regulations allow 
that the manner the corporate control market functioned to date can be de-
scribed as discriminatory in favour of the acquirer.
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Protection of minority owners was, in almost all takeover cases, poor and 
inefficient. In the circumstances of poor protection of small shareholders, the 
offer of shares in the takeover procedure was large, in almost all cases seen so 
far. Observed in most cases was the presence of so-called selling avalanche, 
i.e. the avalanche of shares offered to the acquirer. In such circumstances it 
was the acquirer that decided on the price and thus the expropriation of small 
shareholders, in a large number of cases, could be proven by the share price-
to-book ratio. Because of this, the shareholders of this kind, in most cases, 
tended to sell their shares in the takeover procedure, because they had reason 
to expect that the price and the liquidity of their shares would fall after the 
takeover, when the company gets a controlling shareholder and when, due to 
the low level of minority shareholder protection, external investors lose inter-
est in such a company.
The only mechanism for the protection of small shareholders was gener-
ated by the market itself. This refers to the competing bid phenomenon which, 
as a rule, resulted in the increase of share prices. Unfortunately, the absence of 
the rules of the game and frequent collusion between the management and one 
of the bidders has discouraged competition on the demand side. Therefore, 
during 2005, only 21.62% of the total completed takeover bids featured com-
petitive bids, and 68.75% of them resulted in the increase of prices96.
Because of its above properties, the Law on Takeover should be either fun-
damentally revised or replaced with a new one.
Main flaws of the takeover law
The main purpose of the EU takeover market regulation, to which this 
Law refers, is the creation of the institutional environment for the activation 
of efficient corporate control market. Both the relevant directive and the Re-
port of the so-called Winter Group start from the viewpoint that the efficient 
market is the best investor protection. The efficient market is activated, on the 
one hand, by restricting the right of the current management of the public 
company to prevent efficient takeover, and, on the other hand, by the institu-
tion of the competitive takeover bid. Our law has successfully resolved the first 
problem but not the second. 
96  Report on the Operations of the Republic of Serbia Securities Commission and fluctuations on the 
securities market for 2005 and the period January – June 2006.
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The main weakness of the law is its vagueness in the definition of require-
ments for announcement of a public and competing bid. The law defines the 
competitive takeover bid in a more or less standard manner and in compliance 
with the sources to which it refers. However, the very oprerationalization of 
the competitive bid in the text of the Law contains a possibility to avoid or to 
sabotage it. According to the text of the Law, the bidder is obligated to publish 
the takeover bid within one day after the day of incurring such obligation. This 
obligation is in place regardless of the definition of the threshold at which this 
obligation is activated (EU standard is 25% of interest). If the precise definition 
of the moment when this offer must be activated is missing, the acquirer may, 
both in theory and in practice, in one day acquire 50%, 70%, or at least 25.1%, 
and only then publish the takeover bid.97 The likelihood of this happening in 
Serbia is not small considering that the basic market is inefficient and that there 
is a hard institutional conflict among the shareholders. Namely, the Serbian 
corporation features a definition of the principal-agent problem that is unique 
in the world. The agent (director) may dismiss the principal (shareholder). 
In the circumstances when there is a coalition between the management and 
the acquirer, the employed small shareholders are forced to choose between 
their wages and the dividend. Considering that both the former and the latter 
variable are controlled by the management, it is relatively easy for the manage-
ment to prepare a setting for a takeover at low prices. The arguments for such 
a claim can be obtained by analysing the takeovers that have taken place. In 
all those cases, small shareholders hurried to sell their shares. Therefore, the 
phenomenon that can be described by a well-known term: “selling avalanche” 
can be observed on the national market. In the final outcome: if there is a 
strong likelihood that a bidder may acquire control over the company before 
the expiry of a public bid, then the likelihood that a competitive bid will appear 
behaves as its residual. To put it more simply: every well prepared takeover 
may, in Serbia, exclude a competitive bid. 
The possibility of actual acquisition of over 25% share before the publica-
tion of the takeover bid may result in manipulations with the target compa-
ny’s prices. The likelihood that this happens is relatively strong in the case of 
companies whose shares are (mostly by will of the management) not traded 
on the Stock Exchange. Namely, there exists the obligation to publish the bid, 
according to the solutions provided by the Law, only if the target company’s 
shares have been traded for at least three months. Let’s assume that it is not the 
97  See more details in D. Malinić – Implikacije nove regulative na razvoj tržišta hartija od vrednosti 
u Srbiji (New Regulation Implications on the Development of the Securities Market in Serbia), SES, 
Miločer Economic Forum, pp. 229-255
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case here. (This assumption can be easily proved by comparing the number of 
public companies and the number of shares traded on the Stock Exchange.). 
If an acquirer attacks such a company, it has three months to obstruct the 
defence and any competitive bids. The main obstruction mechanism in this 
case is price manipulation. The likelihood that price manipulation will take 
place proved to be quite strong. The market is shallow, share liquidity is low, 
and the Law allows that the price is considered disclosed even if it was only 
one transaction with only share that took place. In the final outcome, the 
acquirer may “park” the price at the target value, and only then publish his 
takeover bid.98
In order to have its main function, the law must prevent any coalition be-
tween the management and the bidder at the expense of the company’s share-
holders, and it must define the operationalization of the competitive bid more 
precisely. 
Any imprecision with regard to the obligation of the acquirer to publish 
the public bid may result in the destruction of decision-making process and 
the target company’s business. Namely, any further acquisition of shares (above 
25%) in the situation which the Law defines as the situation where the require-
ments are met for publication of the bid, the acquirer may “obstruct corporate 
governance in the target company99”. The acquirer in this case loses the right of 
vote attached to the additionally acquired shares (any shareholding over 25%). 
Consequence 1: the total number of shares is reduced. Consequence 2: the 
management rights attached to the shares acquired by the acquirer above the 
25% threshold, which makes it possible to have control with a smaller number 
of voting shares. Consequence 3: the acquirer may control the company even 
with 25% of shares and, if the period of decision-making on the company’s 
investing, disinvesting, or borrowing is long enough, the characteristics of the 
company subject to attack can change. In the ad apsurdum logic, in the period 
of three months, the acquirer may even dispose of the shares he holds. There-
fore, in the end of the period, he will no longer hold more than 25%, which 
means that, according to what the law says, he need not publish the takeover 
bid. Such a regulatory situation allows the development of a coalition between 
the fictitious and the real acquirer. A typical strategy in this case would be that 
the fictitious acquirer first devalues the target company and then, in the end of 
a 3-month period, to sell the shares to the real acquirer. 
98 See further evidence in: D. Malinić, op.cit. p. 255
99 D. Malinić, op. cit, p. 248 
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Moreover, with still inadequately selective codification of the mandatory 
character of the takeover bid publication, the Law closes another source of 
competition on the corporate control market. This is a large and potentially 
powerful source of demand from the group of professional investors. They are 
not exempt from the obligation to publish the takeover bid. Any acquisition of 
more than 25% (including the shares which the professional investor is already 
holding) imposes the obligation on the professional investors to publish the 
bid to acquire all shares of the target company. The interest of professional in-
vestors is not the control but rather the return on their investment in the com-
pany and, therefore, their acquisition is not motivated by takeover. The Law is 
actually converting them to the takeoverers. The risk of this kind will exclude 
this group from the minority packages market and open a wider space for the 
real predators. A suitable solution of this problem would be to exempt some 
professional investors (private funds, in the first place) from the obligation to 
publish the takeover bid.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Ever since it was set up to this date, the financial market has dominantly 
been a mechanism for ownership rights redistribution and only to a lesser or 
almost insignificant extent a mechanism for corporate and public sector fi-
nancing. The main (strategic) goal of financial market development is to build 
its capacity to perform its basic function. This could be done through a fun-
damental reform of the regulatory framework which would enable the issuing 
of corporate and public sector securities. This reform needs to include a) the 
revision of basic securities laws, b) their harmonisation with company legislation, 
and c) the improvement of implementing legislation, and d) the efficiency of 
regulatory bodies. 
In addition to the New Law, which is partly harmonized with EU direc-
tives, it is also necessary to fundamentally reconstruct the Takeover Law which, 
since the existing solution actually suspends the competition on the takeover 
market. The main direction of legal revision is the harmonization with the EU 
standards. There are important issues that constitute an integral part of the 
regulatory framework for this area in the EU that are either not covered or 
not adequately regulated by this Law. Some solutions are ambiguous so their 
implementation is almost impossible. (Public Offer Directive 89/298/EEC and 
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subsequent directives) A part of this solution is incorporated in the currently 
proposed amendments. 
In parallel to lowering the risk, which would be achieved by revising the 
basic laws, it is possible, in a short term, to lower the costs associated with the 
issuing of new instruments. These fiscal and regulatory costs (fees of the Secu-
rities Commission, Central Depository and other related institutions) increase 
the costs of issuing securities both from the corporate and the public sector. 
These measures should encourage, in conjunction with new regulation, the is-
suing of new securities and this would contribute to the broadening and deep-
ening of the market. The activation of new sources of demand in the financial 
market from the sectors of investment and pension funds could otherwise lead 
to accelerated growth and equally fast fall of index values, as it was seen in 
2007. In addition to the revision of basic laws, it is also necessary to have a 
separate law on mortgage securities, i.e. on securitisation. This law would en-
able the issuing of mortgage based low-risk securities.
The strengthening of regulatory and supervisory functions on financial 
markets can also be considered a goal of strategic importance. It is necessary 
to redefine the regulatory body competences and increase its real capacity for 
regulation and supervision by defining its status as a regulatory body unam-
biguously and actually independent both from the Government and the mar-
ket participants. These goals may be achieved either by the strengthening of 
the existing institution (the Securities Commission) or by the setting up of a 
new institution for supervision over all financial activities (banking, insurance, 
funds, financial market) – the concept of integrated supervision. Bearing in 
mind the experience of other countries, it would be with considering a possi-
bility of setting up a new institution for integrated supervision over all financial 
activities, which would be de facto and institutionally independent both from 
the executive segment of power and from the participants on the market. (See 
specifically the chapter on institutions.) Also important is the goal of strength-
ening self-regulatory bodies and professional associations which facilitate the 
strengthening of market discipline and improvement of ethical standards of 
the professions, increased the level of expert knowledge and skills, and cre-
ation of investment community’s and general public’s trust in institutions.

Legal regulations of corporate governance:  
overview, analysis and suggested chagnes
BACKGROUND 
Essentially, economic purpose of statutory regulations of companies is 
to clearly assign and establish the mode of implementation and protection of 
ownership rights in relationships that the company establishes with external 
environment and relationships established inside, i.e. within the company. In 
either case, economic purpose of such establishment is to reduce the transac-
tion costs incurred in exchange, exercising and protection of ownership rights, 
as follows:
In legal transactions among both natural and legal persons, and
 In advocacy of interests of different groups, primarily the owners, within 
the company. 
Statutory regulations of the first set of issues are mostly boiled down to 
prescription of modes of incorporation, i.e. foundation of a company, registra-
tion of a company and its main data in public registers, as well as duties and 
responsibilities in legal transactions with third parties. 
Statutory regulations of the second set of issues are primarily aimed at 
resolution of the problems between principal and agent, as well as related prob-
lems of information asymmetry and class action. A set of regulations aimed at 
the resolution of the principal-agent issues and related problems establishes a 
legal framework for distribution of roles, responsibilities and rights within a 
company, or, in other words, legal framework of corporate governance. 
The source of problems between principals and agents originates from 
the separation of management and control from the company ownership. The 
company owner, i.e. principal – delegates the right and duty of management to 
professional managers, i.e. agents, relying on their knowledge and professional 
competence in an effort to increase the rate of return to his investment. At the 
same time, he is forced to find a way to prevent the professional management 
to appropriate or spend the company assets in the manner not conductive to 
the optimum profit/return for the owner.
In addition to problems occurring in the company owner(s) vs. man-
agement relationship, the rules of corporate governance strive to resolve the 
•
•
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problems ensuing in relationships among the owners themselves, particularly 
when one of them has a predominant stake. Like in any other circumstances 
in which the rights of a minority should be protected from selfish or malevo-
lent behavior of a majority, with concomitant preservation of basic principles 
of democratic governance (i.e. one person = one vote, and majority decision 
making), and a set of rules aimed at protection of minority shareholders, the 
following question needs to be answered: How to protect a minority without 
jeopardizing the majority rights? The answer to this question is particularly 
important in corporate governance since these are not general human rights, 
but very specific property rights.
In other words, under circumstances in which a relative influence on de-
cision making is directly linked to the relative amount of assets invested in the 
company, and parallel proportionally higher risks for the decisions, it is very 
important to carefully balance and identify the areas in which the sharehold-
ers are given decision-making impact which is disproportionately higher than 
their ownership stake in the company. The issue of the relationship between 
minority and majority shareholders is very important in Serbia, since most of 
the current public companies resulted from privatization, which will be elabo-
rated below.
This part of the study will review and analyze the parts of the Company 
Law100 (CL), as well as accessible examples of the Case Law relating to the regu-
lations of the corporate governance issues. Since these issues appear to be most 
acute in cases of public companies, primarily the open ones, the legislator tried 
to regulate them in detailed statutory provisions. We shall, therefore, focus on 
them. 
In respect to public companies, it is also important to keep in mind the 
following two tools that the owners have at their disposal to discipline the 
company management.
In addition to his effort to exercise and protect his rights within a com-
pany, any owner – shareholder, should, by default, be given an opportunity 
and right to simply and without any limitations whatsoever, leave the company 
by the sale of his shares. Decision on the sale of shares and implementation 
thereof (except only to a certain degree when it is primarily led by the need 
to improve solvency) is a powerful tool that the owner has at his disposal to 
control the management. By resorting to this tool the owner clearly commu-
nicates to the management, and sometimes to the general population as well, 
100 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, vol. 125/2004.
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that he is not satisfied with the operational results. This puts at stake the posi-
tion of management, monetary and other forms of compensation they receive 
in the current, and prospectively, in other companies, as well. In other words, 
it questions their position on the pertinent labor market and, in the long run, 
may undermine their plans for future revenue. Clearly enough, this tool is an 
indirect one and the easiness of its use and associated cost mostly depend on 
solvency of the capital market and pertinent governing rules.  
Another way of establishment of effective control of management by the 
owner is to concentrate his ownership in the company. By the increase of his 
stake in the company equity, the owner increases and occasionally monopo-
lizes the control of the company management which he may change, as the last 
resort. Thus, he provides a direct tool for himself: if he is dissatisfied with the 
operations of the professional management, the management shall leave the 
company, not he. The possibilities and modes to resort to this tool also depend 
on the mode in which the capital market is regulated and special rules that may 
limit the amount of stake in the equity.
Since the statutory rules that regulate the capital market and, especially, 
the procedure for takeover of public companies, will be analyzed in the second 
part of our study, we shall not elaborate them here. This means that out of 
five responses to the principal-agent and related problems, recognized by both 
theory and practice: 
1. ownership concentration 
2. hostile takeover
3. assignation of competences and control
4. managerial reimbursement policy
5. fiduciary duties of the manager and class actions.101
This part of the study will focus the overview and analysis of rules that the 
CL stipulates in respect to the last three groups of answers. 
The overview and analysis will be presented as follows. We shall start 
with the main features of the legislative framework of corporate governance 
in Serbia. This part will include the basics of the forms and main features 
of companies with detailed elaboration of the managing and controlling 
bodies, particularly the solutions relating to public companies. Besides, a 
review of available case law is also provided, identifying the common causes 
of dispute.
101  M. Becht, P. Bolton, A. Röell – Corporate Governance and Control, Finance Working Paper No 
02/2002, updated August 2005,www.ecgi.org/wp
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A list of open questions will follow, together with possible solutions in-
cluding the issues open not only due to CL, but due to other borderline pieces of 
legislation or the ones that directly affect the issues of corporate governance.  
Finally, in the concluding part, a review of the social context in which 
corporate governance operates in Serbia, as well as its impact on effectiveness 
and applicability of legislative solutions will be presented.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The basis of the legal framework for corporate governance in Serbia is 
provided by the Company Law and a set of regulations governing the capital 
market, the most important being the Law on Market of Securities and Other 
Financial Instruments102 and Takeover Law.103 Since the latter two pieces of 
legislation primarily regulate the issues focused in the second part of the study, 
they will not be elaborated here.
Two more groups of regulations directly influence the mode and outcome 
of implementation of the corporate governance in Serbia. These are regula-
tions on privatization, the most important being the Privatization Law104 (PL) 
and Law on Entitlement to Free Shares and Monetary Compensation in the 
Privatization Process105 (LEFS), and regulations on accounting and financial 
statements, led by the Accounting and Audit Law106 (AAL). 
By the stipulations that privatization of socially-owned capital is an 
open tender for shares, PL basically established public companies in to-
day’s Serbia. By appropriation of free shares to employees in the privatiza-
tion process and establishment of special protection measures for minor-
ity shareholders generated in this manner, the law greatly determined the 
structure and motivation of shareholders in vast majority of public compa-
nies. Therefore, one may suggest that the law, although essentially transi-
tory and made for a single occasion, actually has a decisive impact on the 
issues recognized as the primary ones in the area of corporate governance 
in Serbia today. 
By provisions stipulating the terms, deadlines and mode of compiling, 
auditing and publishing of financial statements, rules of internal audit and 
102 Official Gazette, vol. 47/2006
103 Official Gazette, vol. 46/2006
104 Official Gazette, vols. 38/2001, 018/2003 and 45/2005
105 Official Gazette, vol. 123/2007
106 Official Gazette, vol. 46/2006
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persons obliged to comply with these, AAL establishes the scope of corporate 
governance in the area, so that CL itself stipulates quite a number of norms 
that refer to AAL, as the source for such provisions. 
It should also be mentioned that Chamber of Commerce of Serbia in line 
with modern trends107 adopted two codes representing a sort of self-regulation 
in the area of corporate governance. These are the Code of Corporate Gover-
nance108 and the Code of Business Ethics.109 Relying on CL provisions, these 
documents aim at completing them or elaborate them by recommendations, 
focusing the rules on loyalty, transparency and ethics in corporate governance 
and operations of a company in general. This form of self-regulation is a nov-
elty in both business and legal practices of companies and courts in Serbia. 
It is, therefore, difficult to expect that at this point of time they may have any 
major impact on the corporate governance practice in Serbia, so they will not 
be discussed further.
A series of other pieces of legislation, laws and accompanying by-laws, 
such as Competition Protection Law, Law on Registration of Businesses, La-
bor Law, Law on Entrepreneurs, taxation-related and other laws cover the ar-
eas that border or overlap with issues of corporate governance regulated by 
CL. Pertinent provisions of these regulations will be presented to the extent in 
which their influence on corporate governance or its outcomes is relevant. 
In addition to regulations, the case law, i.e. court rulings in cases raised 
in relation to corporate governance issues, also plays an important role in the 
establishment of a legal framework for corporate governance. 
Forms, main features and bodies of companies
In an effort to comprise all legal forms of business, in addition to com-
panies, CL regulates the foundation, responsibilities and dissolution of entre-
preneurs. This form of business has no legal entity apart from the founder; 
instead, it has the status of a natural person. In the light of the fact that this 
107  In the last decade of the precious century, enactment of the corporate governance code, i.e. a specif-
ic self-regulation of companies in the area has become very popular. So far, almost all EU countries 
and EU itself, other supranational organizations (among which the most important are the OECD 
principles), quite a number of Asian countries, Canada, USA, some African countries have enacted 
their respective documents of this kind. Exhaustive review of these documents, including the texts 
may be found at the website of the European Corporate Governance Institute: www.ecgi.org
108 Official Gazette, vol. 1/2006
109 Official Gazette, vol. 1/2006
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form of business is also regulated under the Law on Private Entrepreneurs,110 
one may suggest that CL was only partially successful in this attempt, while 
it remains debatable whether it should have covered it in the first place. Al-
though it goes far beyond the topic of this study, it must, nevertheless, be stated 
that this form of business, which is basically self-employment, requires more 
systematic legislative efforts. The current situation is best illustrated by the fact 
that the law in force was enacted as early as 1989 and has been amended 13 
times so far. Actually, facilitation and simplification of the rules for businesses 
of entrepreneurs (which is a good quality of CL solutions) should be focused. 
Contrary to the previous Law on Enterprises, CL has no special provi-
sions of socially owned enterprises. Only in the final and transitional provi-
sions (Art. 454) it is prohibited to have socially owned companies or com-
panied with majority socially owned capital as founders of a partnership or 
limited partnership. They are not even mentioned elsewhere in CL. Until the 
privatization process is completed, these enterprises shall be governed by pro-
visions of the Law on Enterprises (Art. 456 CL), which is a good solution. 
The problem that the direction of change of organization of companies 
founded by the state (Republic or local self-government), the so called public 
enterprises was insufficiently clear at the time of enactment of CL (and has 
remained so) was resolved in the current CL by exempting them from imple-
mentation of CL provisions until new pertinent regulations are enacted (Art. 
453). Therefore, in principle, public enterprises should be organized in one of 
the forms of companies specified in the CL (where the pertinent provisions 
shall apply). When and how, however, depends on special regulations pursuant 
to which the public enterprises have been set up and/or organized, i.e. perti-
nent amendments of these regulations. It appears that this was a good, solu-
tion, pragmatic above all. 
In respect to companies, CL like the previous Law on Enterprises stipu-
lates four forms. These are two companies of persons: partnership (o.d.) and 
limited partnership (k.d.) and two companies of capital: limited liability com-
pany (d.o.o.) and public company (a.d.). 
The main problem that the corporate governance rules aspire to resolve, 
the relationship between principal and agent, is not particularly marked in 
either companies of persons or limited liability companies. Therefore, compa-
nies of persons will not be analyzed further, and provisions relating to limited 
110  Official Gazette, vol. 54/89 and 9/90 and Official Gazette, vol. 19/91, 46/91, 31/93 – Decision USRS, 
39/93, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 53/95, 35/2002, 101/2005, 55/2004, 61/2005.
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liability companies will be referred to only for comparison with solutions for 
public companies. 
In terms of public companies, CL differentiates between the open/
public and closed/private ones (Art. 193). The key difference between the 
two types of public companies lies in marketability of their shares. Namely, 
there is no public secondary market for shares of closed public compa-
nies, while shares of public companies must be traded on the open market 
only.111
Therefore, Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of 
a closed public company may specify various limitations in terms of trade in 
shares (pre-emptive right or acquisition of company shares or shares of other 
shareholders, approval of trade in shares with third partiers, etc.) while CL ex-
plicitly prohibits introduction of such restrictions for public companies (Art. 
196, para. 4). It is, therefore, prohibited for a closed public company to sub-
scribe share by public tender (Art. 194. para. 4), while an public company may 
subscribe shares through a closed tender only exceptionally, under the condi-
tions stipulated under the law.112
In its features, a closed/private public company is quite similar to a lim-
ited liability company, and the difference is essentially boiled down the mode 
of expressing the ownership participation in the company capital: shares or 
stakes.
Table 1 illustrates the most important features and bodies of a limited 
liability company and, closed and public companies. Similarity of an Ltd com-
pany and a closed public company is quite obvious. The differences are primar-
ily formal in nature: required minimum amount of the pecuniary capital to set 
up and the maximum number of founders. The only apparently more signifi-
cant difference is in mandatory independent audit. CL stipulates the manda-
tory duty for closed public companies to have an independent audit, while in 
case of limited liability companies, CL delegates the answer to that question 
to AAL (Art. 333). However, in the light of the fact that AAL exempts only 
111  Art. 51, Art. 52. and Art. 62. of the Law on the Market of Securities and Other Financial Instru-
ments stipulates that shares of an public companies may be traded beyond the organized market 
(i.e. without public secondary market) only in cases of takeover (when provisions of pertinent 
legislation shall apply), enforced sale/purchase pursuant to CL, execution of rights of dissenting 
shareholders, in company reorganization procedure, or upon ruling of the court as a closure of 
a court case, as well as in a series of various cases in which the state is the final owner of such 
shares. 
112  The Law on the Market of Securities and Other Financial Instruments and related regulations cover 
the area of the market of capital.
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entrepreneurs and small legal persons113 from mandatory audit of financial 
statements, it appears that this difference between an Ltd. company and public 
companies has no practical relevance.114 In terms of mandatory bodies there 
is practically no difference between provisions relating to Ltd. companies and 
public companies
Table 1. Companies of capital: capital and bodies
Ltd Closed jsc Open jsc
Minimum monetary capital € 500 € 10.000 € 25.000
The stake entitles to One stake Certain number 
of shares
Certain number of 
shares 
Minimum number of investors 1 1 2
Maximum number of investors 50 100 No limits
Issue of shares - Closed 
subscription
Rule: public invita-
tion, closed sub-
scription allowed by 
law and limited
Company bodies
(General) Meeting Yes Yes Yes 
Board of Directors (BD)
      BD members
BD or 
Director
BD or Director Mandatory
•  no less than 3 and 
no more than 15 
• Most non-executive
•  No less than 2 
independent 
Director General (DG) BD or 
Director 
BD chairperson 
or other person
BD chairperson or 
other person
Executive Board (EB)
Chairperson
- Optional
DG
Mandatory
DG
113  Article 7, AAL stipulates that small legal persons are those that meet at least two out the following 
three requirements: less than 50 employees, annual income below EUR 2.5 million, and average 
annual value of operational assets below EUR 1 million, while Art. 37, AAL stipulates mandatory 
audit of financial statements for all medium and large legal persons
114  The questions as to why the external audit of financial statements is mandatory for ltds, and why the 
financial statements and the pertinent auditor’s report have to be submitted to NBS should be ad-
dressed to AAL. We, nevertheless, have to underline that these solutions only substantiate essential 
lack of understanding of the role of audit of financial statements, and that it, albeit indirectly, affects 
the problems encountered in corporate governance that will be discussed below. 
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Supervisory Board (SB)
Internal auditor (IA) 
Board of Auditors (BA)
-
Optional
Optional Mandatory
BD committees - Optional 2 mandatory ones:
•  Appointments 
Committee
•  Remuneration 
Committee 
Company Secretary - - Mandatory
Independent Auditor (IA) If required 
under AAL
Mandatory, pur-
suant to AAL
Mandatory, pursu-
ant to AAL
Therefore, a following question needs an answer: Should a closed public 
company be recognized in Serbia as a special legal form of company organi-
zation, although it is not present in many countries? Prof. Vasiljević believes 
that it is more pertinent for Serbia, as a country in transition, to allow this 
option for public companies, as well.115 Proper response to this question will 
be obtained by the practice itself, i.e. the economic life in which this form of 
organization of a business company will find its place or not, as was the case 
with limited partnerships.
Generally, CL is dominated by dispositional solutions, except in cases of 
an public company. Thus, the law leaves it to the founders to regulate many 
very important issues in their Memorandum of Association, including the 
managing bodies they decide on. In case of public company, however, the law 
prescribes establishment and structure of strictly defined managerial bodies. 
In a more general context, somewhat more precise regulation of public com-
panies in comparison with closed ones and limited liability companies result 
from the intention of the legislator to protect the interests of a wide range on 
non-professional shareholders that usually account for most of the sharehold-
ers. Namely, it is believed that limited liability companies and closed public 
company are usually owned by business people that understand operations of 
institutions pertinent to the economic life, so that regulation of their mutual 
relationships within the company may be left entirely to their discretion. It is, 
however, justifiably believed that most owners of public companies are simply 
not familiar with these rules, and that it is needed, in order to protect them 
from manipulations and fraud, to regulate some forms and procedures under 
the law. 
115  M. Vasiljević - Komentar Zakona o privrednim društvima (Comments to the Company Law), Of-
ficial Gazette, Belgrade, 2006, pp. 367
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When opting for the form of a company, CL stipulates that the company 
capital must be expressed in shares if the number of founders exceeds 50, i.e. 
then the company has to be organized as a public company; if the number of 
founders exceeds 100, the company has to be an public company.
In principle, one may ask whether it is necessary that the law requires 
mandatory expression of the capital in shares only because the number of 
owners exceeds a certain arbitrary number. If we take the position that it is 
not a duty of the state to protect individuals from consequences/results of 
their own choices, setting any maximum number of founders of any legal form 
of a company makes no sense. Conversely, however, setting a number is al-
ways arbitrary, so that advocating another number is associated with the same 
shortcoming.
From the point of view of corporate governance, however, the only rel-
evant issue is whether the statutory managing bodies are up to the entrusted 
tasks, here in Serbia, and whether they are able to help in the resolution of the 
principal-agent problems, and other related problems of information asym-
metry and class action? In other words, is the statutorily imposed regulation of 
the internal relationships in the company sufficiently beneficial for those that 
it is intended to protect (share owners) to balance out the administrative costs 
imposed to the company.
Public companies: distribution of  
competences and control
Mandatory bodies of an public company, as stipulated in CP, as the body 
in charge for the election thereof, and accordingly the body to whom, hier-
archy-wise, these bodies report on their operations, are illustrated in Figure 
1.These are:
Shareholders’ Meeting (Art. 275, para. 1), 
Board of Directors (Art. 307, para. 2), 
Executive Board (Art. 322, para. 1), 
 Supervisory Body (Supervisory Board, Board of Auditors or internal au-
ditor, Art. 329. para. 1)
Director General (Art. 323), 
Company Secretary (Art. 337)
 Board of Directors Committees (Appointment Committee, Remunera-
tion Committee) (Art. 317)
External (independent) auditor (Art. 333)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Shareholders’Meeting 
The Company Meeting is composed of shareholders that, pursuant to the 
Company Articles of Association, are entitled, directly or through they proxy, 
to participate in decision making at the Meeting (Art. 275. para. 2). The Arti-
cles of Association may not deny this right. Instead, special mode of exercising 
it may be specified. The procedure, reasons and terms of convening the Meet-
ing of open or closed public company and, for comparative purposes, limited 
liability companies, as well, are summarized in Table 2. 
CL differentiates between regular (annual) and extraordinary Meeting of 
shareholders. The Meeting may be repeated with the same agenda for lack of 
quorum, but only once and within 15 days after a failed Meeting convention 
(Art. 292). CL stipulates the reasons to convene a Meeting upon a court order 
(Art. 278), mandatory shortest and longest terms for serving the summons, 
and the documents that should be furnished with the summons to each of the 
shareholders (Art. 281). CL leaves the selection of the Meeting venue to the 
company, but in dispositive provisions stipulates that the regular annual Meet-
ing be held at the company seat (Art. 276, para. 3).116 
Figure 1. Bodies of public company and their election
Скупштина
Управни одбор
Извршни одбор
Надзорни одбор
Одбор ревизора/
Интерни ревизор
Генерални директор,
председник ИО
Комисија за именовања
Комисија за накнадеСекретар друштва
или
Спољни ревизор
116 Companies with up to 10 members may hold the meeting using ICT equipment, Art. 296.
External auditor Meeting
Board of 
Directors Supervisory Board
or
Board of Auditors/ 
internal auditor
Director General, BD 
Chairperson
Executive Board
Company Secretary
Appointment Committee
Remuneration Committee
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CL opens the possibility of establishing the date to set up a list of share-
holders, i.e. composition of the Meeting, by the company Memorandum of 
Association or Decisions of the Board of Directors, if any. If there is neither, 
CL stipulates that it is the date at which the notification on regular Meeting is 
given, i.e. day on which the first request to convene an extraordinary Meeting 
is signed and dated (Art. 286).
Table 2.  Procedures, reasons and terms to convene an Meeting 
of a company of capital
ltd Closed jsc Open jsc
Regular/
annual
• Held •  Once a year, not later 
than 30 June of the 
current for the previ-
ous year
• Once a year, 3 
months after the 
financial statements 
are submitted to BD 
at the latest, but al-
ways before 30 June 
of the current for 
the previous year 
• Once a year, 3 
months after the 
financial statements 
are submitted to BD 
at the latest, but al-
ways before 30 June 
of the current for 
the previous year
•  Venue • Company seat or 
other
• Company seat or 
other, specified in 
the Memorandum 
of Association
• Company seat or 
other, specified in 
the Memorandum 
of Association
• Convening • DG, BD or other, 
specified in the 
Memorandum of 
Association
• Specified in Memo-
randum of Associa-
tion or convened by 
BD
• Specified in Memo-
randum of Associa-
tion or convened by 
BD
• Invitation • Personally, in writ-
ing, 15-7 days before 
the meeting date, or 
in other manner, if 
everybody agree
• Personally,  in writ-
ing, 60-30 days 
before the Meeting 
date
• Personally,  in writ-
ing, 60-30 days 
before the Meet-
ing date, or at the 
website and daily 
newspaper (cumula-
tively) if specified so 
in Memorandum of 
Association
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ltd Closed jsc Open jsc
•  Invitation 
contents
• Time and venue of the 
Meeting, proposed 
agenda, proposed 
decisions, substanti-
ating materials
• Time and venue of 
the Meeting, pro-
posed agenda, pro-
posed decisions, sub-
stantiating materials
• Time and venue of 
the Meeting, pro-
posed agenda, pro-
posed decisions, sub-
stantiating materials
Extraordinary
• Held • As needed, always 
upon request of no 
less than 10% of 
membership or less 
as per Incorp. Doc.
• Upon request of BD 
or min. 10 of share-
holders, and always 
in case of opera-
tional loss
• Upon request of BD 
or min. 10 of share-
holders, and always 
in case of opera-
tional loss
• Venue • The same as for 
regular Meeting
• The same as for an-
nual Meeting
• The same as for an-
nual Meeting
• Convening • The same as for 
regular meeting, and 
members themselves 
may do so (min. 10%)
• The same as for 
annual Meeting
• The same as for 
annual Meeting
• Invitation • The same as for 
regular Meeting
• Personally,  in writ-
ing, 60-30 days 
before the Meeting 
date, and otherwise 
if all members agree
• Personally,  in writ-
ing, 60-30 days 
before the Meeting 
date
• Invitation 
contents
• The same as for 
regular Meeting
• The same as for an-
nual Meeting, speci-
fying the reason for 
convening the Meet-
ing
• The same as for an-
nual Meeting, speci-
fying the reason for 
convening the Meet-
ing
Repeated • Within seven days 
after the failed con-
vening
• Only once, not later 
than 15 days after 
the failed convening
• Only once, not later 
than 15 days after 
the failed convening
Upon court 
order (non 
–contentious 
proceedings , 
to be resolved 
within 48 hrs 
after the appli-
cation is filed)
• Extraordinary: Upon 
request min.10% 
of the membership 
if  an extraordinary 
Meeting has not been 
convened upon their 
request
• Annual: upon request 
of shareholders with 
voting rights or DG/
BD if it is not held
• Extraordinary: Upon 
request of sharehold-
er who asked for it, if 
it is not held within a 
30 day term.
• Annual: upon request 
of shareholders with 
voting rights or DG/
BD if it is not held
• Extraordinary: 
Upon request of 
shareholder who 
asked for it, if it is not 
held within a 30 day 
term.
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The Meeting may decide only pursuant to the pre-set Agenda proposed 
by the Board of Directors, but the shareholders with no less than 10% shares 
with voting rights may require up to two more issues to be included in the 
Agenda of the Meeting in the manner stipulated under the law (Art. 284).
The Meeting quorum is defined as the simple majority of shareholders 
with voting rights on the subject matter, but CL makes provisions that the 
Company Memoradnum or Articles of Association may require a greater ma-
jority, as well (Art. 292). 
The Meeting is chaired by the Chairperson who is elected at the outset of 
the meeting (if that is specified in the agenda) or the mode of his/her election 
is specified in the company Articles of Association (Art. 285). The Chairper-
son appoints a minute taker and members of the voting committee (Art. 288)
A share-holder may participate at the Meeting deliberations in person, or 
may empower a proxy. The power of attorney shall be in writing, and its con-
tent and mode of issuance are prescribed. It is valid for one Meeting, but may 
be extended to apply to the repeated Meeting, as well. It may be revoked at any 
time before the company Meeting or by personal attendance of the member 
exercising his/her voting right. The Director, members of the Board of Direc-
tors, members of the Executive Board and controlling shareholders may not 
be proxies for shareholders employed by the company, or related persons, but 
may be so for other shareholders (Art. 287).117
Referring to contracts that shareholders may conclude voting-wise, Ar-
ticle 295 of CL specifies only those that shall be treated null and void. These are 
contracts binding a shareholder to vote pursuant to instructions of the compa-
ny or member of the Board of Directors, Executive Board or binding the share-
holder to use his/her voting right in a certain manner or abstain from voting 
in exchange for benefits granted by the company or member of the Board of 
Directors, Executive Board or Director. This provision of the law may allow 
for a conclusion that all other contract may be legally valid.118 On the other 
hand, since CL does not specifically regulate these contracts, they should be 
governed by provisions of the law on obligations, so that the implementation 
or violation remains within the relationships of the contracting parties. Case 
law on these grounds would be a novelty and at this point of time it cannot be 
predicted with any certainty what would be the positions of courts in evalua-
tion of liabilities of the parties and possible incurred damages. It can therefore 
117  This concept is partially in collision with the concept of proxy’s statement specified in Article 75 of 
the Law on Market of Securities and Other Financial Instruments.
118  This position is supported by Prof. Vasiljević in (Comments to the Company Law), JP “Official Ga-
zette“, Belgrade, 2006, pp. 572.
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hardly be expected that these contracts may become a more important means 
for exercising or abuse of rights in the area of corporate governance.119 
At the Meeting, simple majority of shareholders,120 attending personally 
or through proxy, is usually sufficient for decision making, except if the Mem-
orandum of Association specifies a higher number of votes and in cases where 
CL stipulates decision making by qualified majority (Art. 293, para. 1). CL 
specifies the qualified majority as no less than 2/3 of votes of shareholders with 
voting right on the issue that is at stake (Art. 293, para. 2).
Issues that require qualified majority in decision making are stipulated 
under CL as follows: changes in the Memorandum of Association (Art. 339), 
except for those that may be enacted by the Board of Directors (Art. 338), 
and company dissolution (Art. 345). Having in mind, however, the mandatory 
content of the Memorandum of Association (Art. 185) two third majority is 
needed in cases of the following changes: business name and seat, core activity, 
whether it is closed or open (except in cases in which this change is manda-
tory under law), amount of founding capital, number, nominal value, type and 
class of shares, powers and composition of the Board of Directors as well as 
any other provision that was entered into the Memorandum of Association 
pursuant to CL, and they want to change it subsequently (e.g. mode of voting 
of the Board of Directors members). In the light of these, it is obvious that 
ownership of no less than two thirds of shares is required for effective control 
of the company.121 
The law stipulates secret ballot for election and dismissal of director, 
Board of Directors members, auditors and bankruptcy administrator, as well 
as voting on adoption of financial statements and remuneration of managerial 
staff and members of the Board of Directors, while the public vote is stipulated 
in all other instances (Art. 297).
Previous rules relate to shareholders with voting rights, i.e. owners of or-
dinary shares; they also relate to owners of preferential shares in cases in which 
CL prescribes the right and duty for them to speak up. These are situations in 
which a decision made affects the scope of rights associated with shares of a 
certain class (Art. 341). Moreover, the impact is exerted not only by decisions 
119  In countries with developed market of capital, there are two types of these shareholder voting 
agreements – (1) pooling agreement and (2) voting trusts. The difference is that in case of pooling 
agreement the shareholders remain the title holders of the shares, while in agreement of voting 
trusts, the right to shares is transferred to the trustee, who is the registered title holder to such 
shares in the Company Register of Shareholders. 
120 Each ordinary share is associated with one vote (Art. 208)
121  In the sample of 204 public companies covered by this survey, 52% had a majority shareholder with 
two thirds stake in the company capital.
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changing the features of these share, but also buy amendment of any right or 
privilege associated with the shares of that class. In these cases, CL prescribes a 
duty to convene a special Meeting of holders of that class of shares.
All detailed regulations of preparation and holding a shareholder’s Meet-
ing are directed to the protection of their right to truly participate in com-
pany management that may be jeopardized by the managerial staff or majority 
shareholders.
Board or Directors, Board of Directors Committees  
and Company Secretary
The number of members of the Board of Directors of an public company122 
shall be specified in the Memorandum of Association, ranging from 3 (min) to 15 
(max) members (Art. 308). Members of the Board of Directors shall be elected 
at each annual company Meeting or at any other extraordinary Meeting con-
vened for such election (Art. 309, para. 1). Thus, the term of office of the Board 
of Directors members is limited to one year, which is explicitly specified in Art. 
311. The underlying idea of such solution is that in the course of transition and 
maturation of shareholding in Serbia easier replacement of the management 
should be provided. Members of the current Board of Directors, shareholders 
and Appointment Committee may nominate candidates for Board of Directors 
members.
Although CL establishes, in principle, that in an public company mem-
bers of the Board of Directors shall be elected by cumulative vote, it is nev-
ertheless provided that the company may regulate the voting method in its 
Memorandum of Associaiton differently (Art. 309, para. 4).123 The cumulative 
vote is defined in the usual manner: number of votes available to each indi-
vidual shareholder is multiplied by the number of members of the Board of 
Directors, and the shareholder is entitled to award the total number of votes 
obtained in this manner to one candidate or distribute them among more or 
all candidates. Legislator’s advocacy of the cumulative vote results from his in-
tention to protect the minority shareholders accordingly, since the cumulative 
vote increases the chances of a candidate of minority shareholder to be elected 
into the Board of Directors.
122  Closed public company may opt to have either a Director or a Board of Directors. If they opt for a 
Director, provisions for public company relating to the Board of Directors shall apply to the Direc-
tor of the closed public company, accordingly. (Art. 307)
123  With closed public company the situation is converse: Such public company may specify cumula-
tive vote in its Memorandum of Association.
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The law also provides for a possibility to fill in a vacancy in the Board of 
Directors (between two Assemblies) by co-opting, except in cases when this 
method of filling in the vacancy is forbidden by the Memorandum of Associa-
tion (Art. 311, para. 2). Although in cases in which the number of members 
of the Board of Directors is reduced below the half, CL stipulates that Meeting 
should be convened to elect new members (Art. 311, para. 2), it nevertheless 
does not limit the number of Board of Directors members who may be ap-
pointed by co-opting. Namely, if members of the Board of Directors leaving it 
are timely substituted by co-opting, it would be possible to have the member-
ship completely replaced between two annual Assemblies. Only in an excep-
tional case in which over a half of the Board of Directors would leave at the 
same time, the company is obliged to convene an extraordinary Meeting to 
elect new members.
A member of the Board of Directors may be dismissed only by a decision 
of the shareholders’ Meeting at the session convened in the prescribed man-
ner where the dismissal is on the agenda. The dismissal may, but need not be 
substantiated. The shareholders right to replace a member of the Board of Di-
rectors is undoubtedly derived from their ownership right. Sufficient number 
of votes for dismissal depend on the mode of voting for the initial election, 
i.e. a simple or qualified majority of shareholders with voting right present at 
the company meeting. If members of the Board of Directors are elected by a 
cumulative vote, and not all of them are dismissed at the same time, sufficient 
number of votes for dismissal of one member is the number that would be 
sufficient to elect him, had all members of the Board of Directors been elected 
(Art. 327).
Listed public company must have in their Board of Directorss a majority 
of non-executive staff, with at least 2 independent ones (Art. 310 CL).124 Pro-
visions regulating the membership of Executive Board suggest that not only 
the listed, public companies, but all public companies must have a majority of 
non-executive members (Art. 322, para. 5).
CL defines a non-executive member as a person who is not a member 
of the Executive Board. An independent person is the one that personally or 
124  Whether a company is treated as listed or not depends on the regulations covering 
the market of capital. The Law on Market of Securities and Other Financial Instru-
ments does not clearly specify which public companies are affected by this provision 
of CL. It is only logical to assume that listed public company is a company present at 
the stock market (Art. 101. Law on Securities). Accordingly, this provision in Serbia 
will be binding for three companies only: Energoprojekt holding a.d., Soja protein 
a.d. and Tigar a.d. All other public companies are on the so called over-the-counter 
(OTC) market. 
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with family members has not been employed by the company in the last two 
years or has paid to or received from the company an amount exceeding EUR 
10,000, does not own more than 10% shares or stakes in the person that paid 
to or received from the company the amount specified above, has not been a 
manager or member of the Board of Directors of the company, except in an 
independent capacity, and has not been an external auditor of the company. At 
the time of election and during the term of office, independent members may 
not be employed by the company, while the non-executive members may be so 
(Art. 325, para. 1 and 3).
Inclusion of the concept of (non)executive and (in)dependent members 
of the Board of Directors, the CL went along the global streamline, i.e. pre-
scription of the Board of Directors composition. It has, however, remained 
controversial in reference literature. Namely, it violates the right of company 
owners to elect the managing body as they choose, while on the other had 
there are no empirical proofs that such regulation contributes to promotion of 
the Board of Directors operations and corporate governance in general.
Convening and chairing the Board of Directors sessions is the duty of the 
Chairperson, who is elected by the Board of Directors itself and may dismiss 
him/her at any time, without any limitations whatsoever (Art. 312). However, 
the Memorandum of Association or Articles of Association may specify al-
ternative election. The Board of Directors Chairperson is also the company 
Director General, unless the Memorandum of Association or Articles of Asso-
ciation stipulate otherwise. Also, the Memorandum of Association or Articles 
of Association may vest the powers of the company president with the Board 
of Directors Chairperson.
Thus, it is possible that a company has a Board of Directors Chairperson 
and Director General, and it is also possible that the Board of Directors Chair-
person be the Director General and Company President at the same time. The 
law, however, does not prescribe a special role for the Company President, 
beyond the one vested with his role of the Board of Directors Chairperson, so 
that one may conclude that the position is more of the status nature, than of 
any practical significance.
In the period between two regular annual sessions of the Meeting, the 
board has to convene at least four times (regular sessions). The last regular ses-
sion has to be held not later than two months before the annual shareholders’ 
Meeting which is determined and harmonized with the terms for convening 
the annual shareholder’ assemblies. The number of extraordinary sessions of 
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the Board of Directors is not limited. The Chairperson may convene them at 
his discretion or upon written request of no less than one third of the member-
ship, who may also convene the Meeting if the Chairperson fails to do so. The 
invitation for the session has to be in writing, and served no less than 8 days 
before the session is due. The term may be shorter if the reason to convene it is 
urgent, as specified in the Memorandum of Association or Articles of Associa-
tion. Irregular invitation of a member of the Board of Directors is disregarded 
if he is present at the Meeting, except if he attends to protest the regularity of 
convening the Meeting (Art. 315). The sessions may be held with the use of 
communication equipment, except in cases when such possibility is ruled out 
by the Memorandum of Association or Articles of Association (Art. 316, para. 1)
If the Memorandum of Association or Articles of Association do not re-
quire otherwise, majority of the total number of members make the quorum 
for deliberations and decision making at the Board of Directors sessions; ma-
jority of present members are sufficient for decision making, and in case there 
is a tie, the Chairperson’s vote shall decide (Art. 319). Decisions come into 
force as of the enactment date, and are entered in the Decision Ledger without 
delay.
CL allows that a decision is treated as enacted even without the session 
held, if such decision is not contested in writing by any of the Board of Direc-
tors members (Art. 316, para. 2). The law, however, fails to specify how the 
Board of Directors members that did not participate it its enactment are to be 
notified thereof.
Board of Directors of an public company has to set up two committees: 
Appointment Committee and Remuneration Committee. The former proposes 
candidates for members of the Board of Directors and Executive Board, and 
the other remuneration policy for managerial staff and auditor. In terms of 
membership, eligibility requirement for membership, election and dismissal 
procedures and other issues relevant for operations of these committees, CL 
requires only that the committees must have at least three members each. Ev-
erything else is left to the discretion of the Board of Directors or the company 
Articles of Association. (Art. 317).
CL requires that an public company has a company Secretary, who is 
elected by the Board of Directors, while the term of office is specified in the Ar-
ticles of Association, while the earnings and other rights are regulated under 
a contract concluded with the Board of Directors, upon advice of the Chair-
person (Art. 337). The main duty of such Secretary is to organize and monitor 
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preparation of the sessions, take the minutes, keep the Decision Ledger of the 
Meeting, Board of Directors and Executive Board, as well as keep all docu-
ments specified in the law or Memorandum of Association, except for the fi-
nancial documents (these are explicitly listed in Art. 342).
Mandatory establishment of a secretary function in an public company 
is one of CL innovations in comparison with the Law on Enterprises, in con-
cert with the legislative intention to increase transparency and introduce mod-
ern rules of operation into the public companies in Serbia that are in prac-
tice only in their infancy. If nothing else, the company Secretary is a known 
address at which shareholders, auditors and other entiled persons may seek 
information.
Executive Board and Director General
Any public company has to set up the Executive Board composed of ex-
ecutive managers. The Executive Board members, i.e. executive managers are 
elected by the Board of Directors, which may dismiss them at any time, with-
out any limitations whatsoever. The Memorandum of Association or company 
Articles of Association may specify powers and duties of the Executive Board 
members (Art. 322). Executive Board members are elected from the ranks of 
the Board of Directors, but may also involve other company employees (Art. 
322, para. 5). The executive managers have to be company employees (Art.325, 
para. 2).
Director General of the company, elected by the Board of Directors chairs 
the Executive Board (Art. 323). Thus, the Executive Board Chairperson is also 
the company Director General, but the Director General may also be the Com-
pany President and Board of Directors Chairperson, as well.
The Law does not set any limitations as to the number of Executive Board 
members. Assuming that the legislator intended to set up a collective body, the 
Executive Board may not be composed of fewer than 3 members. If a company 
wishes that all Executive Board members are also the Board of Directors mem-
bers, which may have up to 15 members, where over a half have to be non-ex-
ecutive staff, an Executive Board may have 7 members at most.
141Legal regulations: overview, analysis and suggested chagnes
Internal supervision and control
CL stipulates that a listed public company125 establishes a function of in-
ternal control and supervision, but also gives the freedom to choose whether 
this will be accomplished by a Supervisory Board, Board of Auditors or an 
internal auditor (Art. 329, para. 1). Thus, CL introduces an option of the so-
called single-chamber model for management of public companies in Serbia, 
contrary to the previous Law on Enterprises requiring a two-chamber system, 
i.e. mandatory establishment of a supervisory board.126 Mandatory Superviso-
ry Board may, however, be required for certain businesses, pursuant to the law 
(Art. 329, para. 2). Closed public companies however, are bound to a single-
chamber system, since this type of company may decide to introduce a Board 
of Auditors or an internal auditor in their Memorandum of Association or 
Articles of Association.
If they decide to set up a Supervisory Board, the first Chairperson and 
members shall be appointed by the Memorandum of Association, and all other 
shall be elected and dismissed by the shareholders’ Meeting. The Chairper-
son and members of the Supervisory Board are elected by a cumulative vote, 
unless the Memorandum of Association or Articles of Association stipulate 
otherwise. The mode of voting for dismissal depends on the mode of election 
and shall follow the same procedure that is used for dismissal of the Board of 
Directors members. Members of the Supervisory Board may not be members 
of the Board of Directors, and all members shall meet the requirements for an 
independent member of the body (Art. 330). Supervisory Board shall be com-
posed of no less than three members.
CL does not limit the term of office of the Supervisory Board members 
which, contrary to the Board of Directors members, need not be dismissed 
and elected at each annual company Meeting. Also, CL does not specifically 
regulate the method of convening, operations and decision making procedures 
125  If we assume that in Serbia listed public companies are those that are on the stock market, only 
three previously mentioned companies would be obliged to do so. 
126  Three systems may be differentiated according to the manner in which a supervisory body is es-
tablished. In the so-called single-chamber system, supervisory board is not a mandatory body, but 
the auditors (external or internal) perform the controlling function. In the so-called two-chamber 
system, two boards are mandatory: managing and supervisory, where members of both are elected 
by the company Meeting. In this system, the controlling function is performed by the auditors, in 
addition to the supervisory board. In the third system, the Meeting elects the supervisory board, 
which in turn elects the Board of Directors, although it is possible to have the Meeting elect the 
Board of Directors, as well, see M. Vasiljević – Komentar Zakona o privrednim društvima (Com-
ments to the Company Law), Official Gazette, Belgrade, 2006, pp. 518-521
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for the Supervisory Board. Instead, the law refers to pertinent implementation 
of provisions relating to the Board of Directors (Art. 332, para. 6).
If the company opts to introduce a function of an internal auditor or 
Board of Auditors, the first internal auditor or members of the Board of Au-
ditors shall be specified in the Memorandum of Association, while all subse-
quent ones shall be elected from the ranks of independent members of the 
Board of Directors. The Board of Directors does not have sufficient number 
of independent members, the company meeting shall elect the rest. Internal 
auditor or members of the Board of Auditors shall be dismissed following the 
same procedure as for their election.
CL clearly stipulates the mandate of one year for the internal auditor or 
members of the Board of Auditors who are also members of the Board of Di-
rectors, i.e. they are elected at each annual Meeting together with other Board 
of Directors members. The law, however, fails to specify the duration of term 
of office of these persons when they are elected directly by the Meeting, so that 
one may assume that these issues have to be regulated in the Memorandum of 
Association or Articles of Association.
In addition to requirements specified for an independent member of the 
Board of Directors, these persons have to fulfill special eligibility requirements 
stipulated under the law. The Accounting and Auditing Law stipulates the fol-
lowing criteria: university degree, minimum three years of auditing experi-
ence, i.e. five years of accounting experience, certification (passed exam for 
chartered auditor), and clean criminal record, i.e. no convictions for crimes 
that would make him/her unworthy of these duties (AAL, Art. 4, para. 5).127
Auditor and Expert Fiduciary
Introducing a duty for any public company (open and closed, alike) to 
have an auditor, and duty to notify the auditor on any company Meeting at the 
127  Article 4, AAL. The new AAL with this provisions was enacted in 2006, i.e. in the year in which the 
deadline for companies to comply with CL expired. From the enactment of CL in late 2004 until that 
time, it was not clear what these special requirements are for an internal auditor or members of the 
Board of Auditors. The problems have not been resolved with enactment of the new AAL, either. In-
troducing a special professional title of a certified internal auditor, AAL stipulates that the Chamber 
of Chartered Auditors issues a special certificate substantiating the title, which is preceded by an exam 
also set up by the Chamber. Another year was needed to set up the Chamber and commence opera-
tions. Accordingly, only in mid 2007 there were no persons in Serbia meeting the requirements for 
the post of an internal auditor or members of the Board of Auditors. Even now, their number is quite 
small and limited by the capacity of the Chamber to organize and conduct exams and issue pertinent 
certificates. Refraining for more thorough elaboration of this issue, we have to say that provisions of 
AAL infer that persons with international certificates and corresponding exam passed abroad are not 
considered qualified in Serbia to pursue the job of internal or external audit.
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same time and in the same manner as any other shareholders, CL refers to the 
law covering accounting and auditing, i.e. AAL (Art. 333) for regulations on 
the auditor’s position and powers.
CL also regulates that the company Meeting elects the auditor (Art. 290, 
para. 1, item 8), which is a means to protect the shareholders, but fails to specify 
whether he is to be elected at each annual Meeting. However, AAL prescribes 
that audit of financial statements may be conducted by a single auditing com-
pany for five consecutive years at most, i.e. up to five more years if the audit 
is conducted by other chartered auditors of the same company, the so-called 
rotation of auditors (AAL, Art. 38, para. 8 and 9). Practically, this makes it pos-
sible for the same auditing company to conduct audit of financial statements 
for up to ten years, which is aimed at prevention of excessive bonding of the 
company and its auditor, which may incur adverse consequences.
AAL specifies that a (chartered) auditor is an independent professional 
performing the audit and is responsible for proper conducting of the audit, 
composing audit reports and expressing auditor’s opinion pursuant to the 
International Auditing Standards and AAL (AAL, Art. 4, para. 2). The same 
requirements apply for this title and for the title of certified internal auditor 
(AAL, Art. 4, para. 3). For a chartered auditor to audit financial statements, it is 
necessary to have a pertinent license (AAL, Art. 38), which is issued, renewed 
and cancelled by the Chamber of Chartered Auditors,128 and with endorse-
ment of the Minister of Finance prescribes the pertinent requirements and 
procedures (AAL, Art. 39).
AAL also specifies the circumstances under which an auditing company, 
i.e. an auditor as a natural person, may not conduct audit of a legal entity, i.e. 
conflict of interest in this area (AAL, Art. 45). AAL recognizes the conflict of 
interest in cases of ownership relation between the auditing company and/or 
auditor and audited company, as well as in case of kinship (blood relative, in-
laws or legal kinship) between the auditor and founder and/or company man-
agement (blood relative in the straight line, of any degree; in the side line up 
to the fourth degree; spouse or in-laws up to the second degree, regardless of 
128  ALL stipulates the following reasons to set up the Chamber: promotion and de-
velopment of accounting and auditing profession, implementation of international 
accounting and auditing regulations and harmonization with such regulation, pro-
tection of individual and general interests in the area, organization and service pro-
viding in this area, organization and conducting the exams for professional titles, is-
suance and cancellation of licenses for auditing of financial statements. All chartered 
auditors employed by auditing companies and certified internal auditors, as well as 
auditing companies themselves are members of the Chamber, which is a legal entity. 
(AAL, Art. 50)
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possible marriage breakup; adopted children or adopted parents of founders 
or directors of audited company, as well as guardian or foster parent of founder 
of audited company).
Since the Remuneration Committee also proposes the remuneration pol-
icy for auditors (Art. 317, para. 3, item 2), and since the company Meeting 
adopts the remuneration policies for Board of Directors members only (Art. 
290, para. 1, item 5), CL provisions actually stipulate that the Board of Direc-
tors negotiates the amount of remuneration for auditing services.
In addition to auditors, validity of financial statements may also be evalu-
ated by an expert fiduciary who, in terms of expertise and title, has to comply 
with requirements for auditors. An expert fiduciary is appointed by the Meet-
ing upon request of owners of no less than 20% of the company equity (Art. 
334).
CL does not specify special reasons that may entitle the shareholders to 
appoint an expert fiduciary. It appears, accordingly, that the right is derived 
from the very fact that representatives of a sufficient share of equity require 
additional check of validity of company books and financial reports.
The “sufficient” amount is double the 10% that is required to convene an 
extraordinary Meeting, whereby the legislator decided to link this option with 
a more substantial majority of minority shareholders. At the same time, the 
percentage is still sufficiently low to be accessible to the minority shareholders 
even in companies where the majority shareholder owns over two thirds of 
equity and statutorily can control all the issues that require qualified majority 
for decision making.
CL stipulates that, in principle, the term of office, rights and duties of an 
expert fiduciary may be specified in the Articles of Association or decision of 
fiduciary’s appointment (Art. 334, para. 7), but it is explicitly established that 
he is authorized to review the books and financial statements, take statements 
from the management, and that all persons that he approaches asking for in-
formation are obliged to provide such information (Art. 335). The company 
management is obliged to put the fiduciary’s report on the agenda of the first 
following meeting, and if the report shows any major violations of statutory or 
company regulations, the management must convene an extraordinary Meet-
ing without delay.
If the fiduciary’s report, instead, substantiates proper accounting and/or 
financial statements, the request to conduct a special audit shall be deemed 
unjustified. Shareholders requesting it, had they done it male fide or by gross 
negligence, shall be jointly liable to the company for the damage incurred by 
it (Art. 336).
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Distribution of competences in public company 
CL dedicates a whole article to the scope of work, i.e. competences of the 
company Meeting, Board of Directors and Supervisory Board (Meeting, Art. 
290, Board of Directors, Art. 313, Supervisory Board, Board of Auditors or 
Internal Auditor, Art. 332). Statutory distribution of competences of these and 
all other bodies of an public company may be discussed only in the context of 
other legal provisions. Table 3 presents a review of competences of the Meet-
ing, Board of Directors, Executive Board, Director General, and Supervisory 
Board of an open join t stock company.
Table 3. Competences of bodies of public company 
Meeting Board of Directors (MB)
Executive 
Board (EB)
Director Gen-
eral (DG)
Supervisory Board 
(SB)/Internal Audi-
tor (IA) and Board 
of Auditors (BA)
•  Changes of 
Memorandum 
of Association 
(MA): par-
ticularly equity 
changes
• Status changes 
•  High value 
property
•  Distribution of 
profits/coverage 
of losses
•  Adoption of 
financial state-
ments and 
reports of Su-
pervisory Body
•  Remuneration 
policy for BD 
members
•  Election and 
dismissal of BD 
members
•  Election and 
dismissal of 
auditor
•  Questions upon 
proposal of BD
• Other from MA
• Control of truthful-
ness of financial 
statements, super-
vision of EB
• Development man-
agement, business 
planning 
• procura
Convening the 
meeting:
-  proposal of agen-
da and decisions, 
• shareholders’ day 
with right to attend 
the Meeting
• Distribution of 
profits/coverage of 
losses (MA)
• Issuance of securi-
ties within the limi-
tations of MA and 
CL
• Establishment of 
value of shares and 
other assets pursu-
ant to CL
• Election, dismissal 
and remuneration 
of EB members
• Day, amount, terms 
and mode of divi-
dend payment (MA)
• Other from MA
•  Implementa-
tion of BD 
decisions
•  Running cur-
rent business 
•  Reporting to 
BD
•  Matters del-
egated by 
MA or BD 
decision that 
are not within 
the scope of 
competence of 
the Meeting or 
BD
• Convening and 
chairing the EB 
meeting
• Representation 
of the company 
• Responsibil-
ity for books 
and internal 
supervision
•  Reporting to the 
Meeting on:
-  accounting 
practice
-  compliance of 
operations with 
regulations
-  eligibility of inde-
pendent auditor
-  contract of the 
company BD 
members and/or 
related persons
•  Together with BD 
deliberations on:
-  remuneration for 
the independent 
auditor
-  financial 
statements
-  reporting to 
shareholders
-  compliance with 
code of ethics
-  pertinence and 
statutory compli-
ance of business 
policies
-  responses to 
objections
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It should not be overlooked that CL leaves a fairly broad leeway for com-
panies to regulate one of these issues in their Memorandum of Association or 
Articles of Association (MA). The only exception is statutory definition of the 
scope of work of the Supervisory Body, where such leeway is not given.
Thus, in addition to competences of the Meeting presented in table 3, the 
company Memorandum of Association may specify others as well, and some 
may be delegated by a Board of Directors decision. Also, unless otherwise 
specified in the Articles of Association, the list of issues that the law specifies 
as the field of competence of a Board of Directors (presented in Table 3) under 
normal circumstances, i.e. in absence of any judicial dispute, may not be taken 
by the Meeting unless the Board of Directors itself requires so. On the other 
hand, although it is allowed that the Memorandum of Association or decision 
of BD establish special issues to be the scope of authority of the Executive 
Board, CL clearly stipulates that these issues may not be the ones that are oth-
erwise within the scope of competence of the Meeting or Board of Directors.
Generally, review of the position of bodies of an public company sub-
stantiates that CL practically vested the competence in the Meeting to control 
the key, one may say decisive, issues for the company. These are amendments 
to the Memorandum of Asociation, status changes and disposal of high value 
assets.129 Although within the powers of the Meeting, adoption of financial 
statements and distribution of profits, i.e. coverage of losses (Memorandum 
of Association may also delegate the latter to the Board of Directors) are es-
sentially under the control of the Board of Directors that prepares such reports 
and is much more familiar with the details of the reports than the sharehold-
ers, so that it may present in to the Meeting accordingly. Thus, the second key 
leverage of control that CL assigns to the Meeting is the election and dismissal 
of the Board of Directors members, and election and dismissal of the company 
external auditor.
Assuming that expertise and time they dedicate to the issues of company 
managing are the Board of Directors strengths, the legislator decides to give 
the broadest freedom to the body in the manner in which the competence will 
be used. By allowing that members of the Executive Board may also be mem-
bers of the Board of Directors, CL aims at optimization of the cost of coordina-
tion and transfer of information in the company management.
On the other hand, by requiring that the Board of Directors has a major-
ity of non-executive members, i.e. those that are not concomitant members of 
129  CL defines high value assets as property the market value of which at the moment of decision on ac-
quisition/disposal is made accounts for no less than 30% of the company market value as presented 
in the last annual balance statement (Art. 442).
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the Board of Directors, CL tried to place the company management beyond 
the direct control of the executive power in the company, which is given the 
primary role of enforcement of decisions and implementation of Board of Di-
rectors policies.
If a company has no supervisory board, and since the internal auditor and 
members of the Board of Auditors may also be members of the Board of Direc-
tors, the Board of Directors is directly in charge not only of the supervision, 
but also of internal control of the company operations.
In addition to the right of representation and accountability for books 
and internal supervision, the Director General who is also the Chairperson of 
the Executive Board, derives his competences from the functions he performs 
in the company. In cases when he combines the chairing functions in both 
Board of Directors and Executive Board, the Director General plays a key role 
in the actual control of company business. In such cases, the Director General 
functions concentrate competences of both boards, and he gets a powerful tool 
for managing and administering company operations, which may hardly be 
expected to be restricted by the remaining members of both boards.
In distribution of competences CL tried to offer the possibility to the 
company meeting to play an active role in enforcement and protection of 
the principal’s rights, but avoided to call the Meeting the supreme company 
body.130 It is therefore obvious that the piece of legislation adopted the principle 
of conditional hierarchy whereby each body is independent within is scope of 
work. The principle of the scope of work is, thus, the foundation for distribu-
tion of roles among the company bodies and has been consequently imple-
mented through the pertinent legal provisions, where the Meeting is given 
an additional leverage – election of the Board of Directors and, indirectly, all 
other company bodies.
Duty to inform, fiduciary duties and remuneration policy
According to the above, CL entrusts the Board of Directors with the 
crucial role in control over an public company. It means that realization and 
protection of interests of shareholders and company itself depend substantially 
on professionalism, commitment, activity and honesty of Board of Directors 
130  Prof Vasiljević in M. Vasiljević - Komentar Zakona o privrednim društvima (Comments to the 
Company Law) Official Gazette, Beograd, 2006, pp. 534 substantiates the position that the lack of 
such definition and any direct definition of the company meeting, except that it is composed of 
company shareholders, is quite intentional. 
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members. In order however, to exert legal pressure on the management to 
honor and protect these interests, CL introduces a series of provisions to 
secure the right of shareholders to request and obtain information on company 
operations, establish duties of the management and provide for transparency 
of remuneration policy for the management,
Duties of the company management to provide 
information to the shareholders
Already in its first part, in the basic provisions CL established the duty of 
a company to notify the founders and shareholders on its operations and en-
able insight into the information or documents that the CL and, accordingly 
company articles require to be accessible. Should they fail to do so, the compe-
tent body or authorized person of the company shall be considered liable for 
damages incurred to company founders or shareholders, who may also resort 
to court, i.e. non-contentious procedure to exercise their right to information 
and access to company documentation (Art. 43).
Importantly, the right that CL grants to owners of all companies, includ-
ing the shareholders, is not determined by the size of their stake in the com-
pany equity. In other words, ownership of a negligible tiny percentage of the 
company equity entitles one to access to all business information and business 
records.
Interestingly enough, CL does not apply the same principle to the duty to 
keep business secret (Art. 38). Namely, CL specifies liability for damages in-
curred to the company by disclosure of business secrets for controlling share-
holders only, i.e. those who own over 50% of ordinary shares (ref. Art. 31, 38 
and 367). Since the right to information and insight into the business records is 
not limited by the size of stake in the capital, we suggest that liability of share-
holders for damages incurred by disclosure of business secret should also be 
independent on the size of their stake.
In addition to this general right, CL stipulates a special right of sharehold-
ers to be informed (Art. 289). This CL provision explicitly requires the Board 
of Directors to submit a timely and complete report to the annual Meeting 
on the company operations, focusing the financial statements, and in case the 
company bought back own shares presents the pertinent data to the sharehold-
ers. In case a shareholder is denied this right, regardless of the number and 
relative importance of his shares, he may resort to court to exercise this right.
In an effort to relieve any possible misunderstanding as to which docu-
ments should be accessible to shareholders, CL specifies a list of documents 
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that have to be kept, for how long, and place of storage so that they are accessi-
ble to the shareholders (Art. 342). In addition to the Memorandum of Associa-
tion, Articles of Association and all pertinent amendments thereof, financial 
statements and accounting records, they also include, inter alia, minutes and 
decisions of the Meeting, Board of Directos and Executive Board, Supervisory 
Body, list of all transfers of shares from shareholders, including all liens and 
other transfers of shares where the acquirer does not become a shareholder.
Such a long list of documents that a company has to keep for no less than 
five years (except for the Memorandum of Association that is kept indefinitely) 
at the location known and accessible to shareholders suggests that CL com-
plies with the First EU Directive on Transparency of operation of companies 
of capital.131 Some of these documents, however, are governed by regulations of 
securities market and should be regularly furnished to the organized market of 
capital. At this market, potential investors, in addition to the shareholders may 
get information and have access to these documents, which is equally impor-
tant in respect to public companies.
Any company is obliged to place these documents at disposal and enable 
copying to the shareholders and previous shareholders for the period in which 
they were shareholders (Art. 343). The only requirement the shareholders have 
to meet is to have valid evidence of their status that the company is entitled to 
require before allowing the insight into the documentation.
If the company management does not provide access to the required 
documents five days after the pertinent application, or rejects the application, 
any shareholder or a previous shareholder may resort to court and claim their 
rights in a non-contentious procedure. The court shall decide on such claim 
within a three-day term, while a person obtaining the right through court is 
prohibited from publishing or disclosing them and inflict damage to the com-
pany, accordingly. CL, however, does not specify the mode of establishing li-
ability and damages in case it nevertheless happens (Art. 344)
Duties of management to the company
CL establishes four main duties of members of the Board of Directors, Ex-
ecutive and Supervisory Boards, as well as members of the Board of Auditors 
and internal auditor to the company. These are: 
Duty to operate in the company interest (Art. 31), 
Duty of care and business judgment rule (Art. 32)
131 First Directive EU, Art. 2 and 3. 
•
•
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Duty of loyalty (Art. 33), and 
Duty of confidentiality (keeping business secrets) (Art. 38).
Duty to operate in the company interest is also established for controlling 
shareholders, meaning that the management has to represent interests of the 
company as a special entity, and only in this manner, i.e. indirectly, the inter-
ests of its owners – shareholders. In other words, representation of individual 
interests, even if they are interests of shareholders would collide with this le-
gal provisions. Thus, an issue arises as to whether there is a company interest 
that is independent of the interests of its owners? If the company is treated as 
a network of agreements and interests of different groups, shareholders and 
creditors, employees and the company management itself are the stakehold-
ers. Also, the community in which the company operates may also have some 
respective interests, and it usually has. Does, therefore, this legal provision ba-
sically requires the management to balance these interests and combine them 
into a new, special interest of the company itself? Regardless of the answer to 
the question, it is difficult to expect any management to behave like that in 
practice. The provision may, accordingly, be treated as one of (idealistic) prin-
ciples with little direct impact on behavior of the management. Provisions that 
specify behaviors in the interest of the company are much more important, 
together with those that recognize and sanction the opposite ones.
Provisions on duty of care and business judgment rule, duty of loyalty 
and duty of confidentiality (keeping the business secrets) are such stipulations. 
The first one relieves from responsibility any person that operates in the best 
interest of the company, basing the judgment on the information and opinion 
obtained from experts in the area. In other words, the management may be 
relieved of liability for their business decisions if they may prove to have made 
them carefully and conscientiously taking into account all relevant facts. Duty 
of loyalty clearly defines obligation of the management not to use the company 
assets for their own needs, and not to use (i.e. abuse) insider information and 
position for their personal gain. The third provision establishes liability of per-
sons for damage incurred to the company by disclosure of a business secret 
that is, in turn, defined as information specified in a company document that 
may inflict substantial harm to the company if disclosed to third persons.
By prescribing these four duties, the legislator wanted to stimulate the 
management to operate in the best interest of the company, i.e. the sharehold-
ers, since conversely, one may file against the violators and claim for compen-
sation damages. Such threat is not particularly effective in the most developed 
•
•
151Legal regulations: overview, analysis and suggested chagnes
countries either, since courts usually tend to refrain from evaluation of com-
plex issues of pertinence of business and similar decision, so that we, in Serbia 
cannot expect much, either, except in cases of obvious and gross offences.
In an effort to stimulate sound business judgment CL opens a possibil-
ity for the Board of Directors to adopt a written code of conduct (corporate 
governance guidelines) or adopt any other code that establishes the standards 
of qualifications, independence, responsibility, good judgment, conflict of in-
terest, remuneration policy and related issues, and that report on any annual 
meeting on compliance of operations with the adopted code (Art. 318).
By a definition of personal interest, i.e. situations of conflict of interest 
(Art. 34), CL establishes the manner in which a legal transaction involving 
a conflict of interest may be authorized, including its nullity if not properly 
authorized (Art. 35). In provisions on public companies CL additionally fo-
cuses situations in which the voting right is denied due to conflict of interest 
of shareholders (Art. 300), or a member of the Board of Directors (Art. 320). 
A shareholder is not entitled to vote in cases of decisions on decrease or relief 
of his duties to the company, initiation or dismissal of a case against him, and 
authorization of transactions in which he has conflict of interest with the com-
pany. A member of the Board of Directors shall be denied the voting right in 
case of issues generating conflict of interest, applying mutatis mutandis provi-
sions relating to a company shareholder.
The law also establishes prohibition of competition (Art. 36) specifying 
the capacity in which members of the management may not operate in a com-
peting business. Finally, CL regulates legal consequences of the violation of the 
prohibition of competition rule prescribing that the deals and pertinent in-
come and claims shall be recognized as transactions on behalf of the company. 
CL grants this right to any shareholder with no less than 5% of the company 
basic capital if he claims it through court 60 days after the discovery of the 
violation or three years after the violation date, at the latest.
In an effort to sanction behavior inconsistent with the stipulated princi-
ples of duty, CL explicitly prohibits that persons with history of conviction for 
crimes in economy or business and those violating CL provisions on limited 
payments be elected, inter alia, for members of company managerial bodies 
(Art. 45).
CL establishes cases of special material liability of members of the manag-
ing and executive boards (Art. 328). They will be jointly and severally liable for 
compensation of damages incurred to the public company by violation of their 
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duties stipulated under the law. These are, inter alia, duties listed at the begin-
ning of this section. Thus, CL additionally specifies liability of the company 
management for inloyal and unfair conduct.
Thus, the rules introduced by CL establish clear limitations and/or stimu-
latiuons for certain behaviors of the company management. However, motiva-
tion of an individual, and in particular management of a company is tightly 
linked to direct material stimulation, i.e. pertinent remuneration policy. The 
theory elaborating the principal-agent problem, i.e. opportunistic behavior of 
the agent, focuses the manner in which the agent’s, i.e. management’s remu-
neration is set as a means to overcome the problem, which is the best way 
to match the interests of the management with the interests of the principal 
(shareholder).
CL has not elaborated the area in great detail maybe because the law pri-
marily established duties to the company, instead to its owners. In addition to 
binding Board of Directorss of public companies to establish remuneration 
committees, CL only stipulates that the scope of duties of the shareholders’ 
Meeting includes adoption of the remuneration policy for the Board of Direc-
tors members (Art. 290, para. 1, item 5); also, approval of the contract with 
members of the Board of Directors (who are not employed by the company) 
and members of the Executive Board must be approved by the Meeting (Art. 
325, para. 5 and 6). Consistently with the commitment to full transparency of 
the information on operation of public companies, CL opens the possibility 
that these contracts, as well as the amounts of remuneration of the manage-
ment be included in the report submitted to the annual meeting and published 
pursuant to regulation on securities market (Art. 325, para. 6).
The role of courts and case law
Types of claims and role of court
In its basic provisions, CL specifies persons who may file and grounds on 
which they may file an individual (Art. 40) and derivative action (Art. 41), or 
both (Art. 42).
The right to file an individual action (lawsuit) on his own behalf against 
any persons that CL specifies to have duties to the company (controlling own-
er, members of the management and supervisory body – Art. 31) is granted to 
a member or shareholder of a company for compensation of damages that such 
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person has caused by violation of the legally specified duties. The lawsuit may 
be filed by several persons jointly.
Derivative action for compensation of damages to the company, i.e. action 
on one’s behalf but on the account of the company may be filed by a member or 
shareholder of a company against any persons that CL specifies to have duties 
to the company. It is assumed that a company suffered damage due to the fact 
that these persons operated contrary to their statutory duties. In this case, it is 
required that a member or a shareholder fulfills two more requirements before 
filing the lawsuit. One is to have individually or together with other persons 
joining the action no less than 5% of the company registered capital. The sec-
ond is that before filing the action, the plaintiff has addressed the commercial 
court in writing asking to file a lawsuit, where this request was either dismissed 
or has not been complied with 30 days after the filing date. Proceedings pur-
suant to derivative action may not be settled out of court. Compensation of 
damages in the derivative cases is ruled to the company, and the person filing 
the action is entitled to reimbursement of the incurred costs.
CL allows simultaneous filing of individual and derivative actions, where 
limitations pertinent to the derivative action do not apply to the individual 
one.
CL does not explicitly recognize a class action, i.e. action that although 
filed by one person, protects interests not only of the filing person, but also 
by all other persons in the same position. However, on two occasions, the law 
recognizes the possibility of such action. First, in Article 306, para. 11 stipulat-
ing that a ruling annulling a decision of the shareholders’ meeting is effective 
on behalf and against any shareholder and binding for relationships between 
shareholders and company on the one hand and company and management 
on the other. Secondly, in Article 444, para. 11 which stipulates that a ruling 
relating to the rights of shareholders in dispute is binding not only to the filing 
party, but also to all other shareholders holding the same position.
When derivative actions are concerned, CL established grounds to file 
them in case of violation of the rule of conflict of interest and prohibition of 
competition (Art. 37), business secret (Art. 38), statutory duties of the man-
agement (Art. 328), and in case of request for special audit in bad faith or with 
gross negligence (Art. 336)
CL prescribes court protection in the following situations, as well:
 Violation of shareholders’ right to information, when the court, upon re-
quest, orders the right to be enforced (Art. 43);
•
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 In case an annual or extraordinary shareholders Meeting is not convened, 
the court may, upon request of entitled persons (in case of annual Meet-
ing, any shareholder who is entitled to attend or any member of the man-
agement and in case of an extraordinary Meeting, shareholder who filed 
a pertinent request to that effect) appoint a temporary representative with 
powers to convene and chair the Meeting and set the time and date of the 
Meeting, as well as the pertinent agenda, where a decision to that effect is 
made 48 hours after the receipt of the request at the latest (Art. 278);
 In case two items, properly requested by entitled shareholders, are not 
introduced in the Meeting agenda, the court shall rule to introduce them 
48 hours after receipt of the request at the latest (Art. 284);
 In case of violation of right of shareholders to special information, the 
court shall order that the information be provided to the shareholder who 
submitted the request 15 days after the date of the shareholders’ Meeting 
at the latest (Art. 289);
 In case the Meeting fails to appoint a fiduciary expert upon request of an 
entitled person (shareholders with no less than 20% stake in the capital), 
the court may appoint one upon request of an entitled person filed within 
15 days of the Meeting date, having previously provided opinion of the 
company management (Art. 334);
 In case insight into books and documents stipulated under the law and/or 
company documents is prevented, the court shall order the right to be 
exercised (Art. 344).
CL entitles shareholders to file to court for annulment of decisions of 
the shareholders’ meeting, establishing the grounds for such annulment. The 
grounds for annulment may be general or special. The general include decision 
made at the Meeting that was not convened pursuant to the law, Memorandum 
of Association or Articles of Association, mode of enactment of such decision 
or collision of the decision with these documents (Art. 302, para.1). A lawsuit 
may be filed on these grounds by any shareholder who voted against such deci-
sion, as well as by those who were not properly invited or were not attending 
the Meeting at which the decision was made due to a justified reason; it may 
also be filed by any member of the Board of Directors and Executive Board. 
Special grounds for annulment include annulment of election of the director 
or member of the Board of Directors (Art. 303) and annulment of decision on 
adoption of financial statements (Art. 304).
•
•
•
•
•
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CL (Art. 306) established that proceedings pursuant to such lawsuit are 
urgent, that court may enforce a temporary measure of suspension of enforce-
ment of the shareholders’ Meeting decision that is contested, if the court finds 
that the enforcement of such decision may incur “substantial damage” to the 
company and shareholders, and that the ruling annulling the contested deci-
sion is in favor of and against all shareholders and is binding for mutual rela-
tions of shareholders, company and company bodies.
CL stipulates special protection of rights of dissenting shareholders (Art. 
444) if they were entitled to vote, voted against or abstained in the voting on: 
amendments to the Memorandum of Association changing their rights, status 
changes of the company or change of the company legal form, decision on 
disposal of high value property, and any other matter where the Memorandum 
of Association prescribes the right to dissent and compensation in case of dis-
sent. In these cases, a shareholder is entitled to request the company to buy out 
his shares at the market value, and the company is obliged to comply 30 days 
after the request at the latest. In case the company fails to comply with such re-
quest or buy the shares at a price that the dissenting shareholder believes to be 
below the market value, the dissenting shareholder is entitled to file an action 
to the court. If the court rules that the market value is higher than the one paid 
by the company, the same ruling shall apply to all dissenting shareholders, and 
not only to those filing the action. This court ruling is published in the manner 
in which the summons to the shareholders’ Meeting are published, notifying 
all shareholders, accordingly.
Claims from the company or company debtors and company claims 
against members, debtors and third parties shall expire 180 days after the date 
of becoming aware of the reasons for such claims, and three years after the 
payment due date at the latest unless law stipulates otherwise for special claims 
(Art. 47). It means that CL stipulates the subjective statutes of limitations of 
three months and objective of three years, leaving the option that other laws 
applicable to special kinds of claims may be invoked and other pertinent stat-
utes of limitations applied.
Case law
CL stipulates that commercial court with the jurisdiction at the seat of the 
company shall be competent for resolution of disputes resulting from this piece 
of legislation. Generally, the court rules in non-contentious proceedings. The 
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case is treated as urgent, and the court in the first instance is required to decide 
within 60 days of the receipt of the request, or even sooner pursuant to CL. An 
appeal may be submitted within eight days. A court in the second instance is 
obliged to rule upon the appeal within 30 days after receipt of the appeal, while 
appeal against this decision does not suspend its enforcement (Art. 46)
There are 17 commercial courts in charge of proceedings relating to CL, 
and one higher commercial court that rules on appeals. In addition to cas-
es referring to CL, they are also competent for other disputes in the area of 
economy. Large number of diverse cases and absence of systematically pooled 
and classified documentation makes it almost impossible to have complete in-
sight into any type of disputes, including those resorting to CL. Therefore, in 
continuation, the case law based on the issues stipulated in CL will be illus-
trated through decisions of the Higher Commercial Court, in the period 2005 
to 2008. Although it may mean that a substantial number of issues presented 
to the court is not covered, since the Higher Commercial Court deals with 
appeals only, it might not necessarily hold in this particular instance since in 
Serbia it is customary that a party losing the case in the first degree regularly 
appeals to the higher instance.
All issues relating to corporate governance ruled at the Higher Commer-
cial Court (HCC) in the period 2005 to 2008 relate to the position and rights 
of company shareholders.
It may also be concluded that the most common problem faced by the 
shareholders is convening the Meeting itself. In the reviewed cases, the issue 
of convening an extraordinary Meeting was the cause of dispute, when the 
company management refused or failed to convene. The most common dis-
putable issue, i.e. rationale for refusal or failure to convene the Meeting is the 
issue whether the shareholders requesting the Meeting are entitled to do so 
pursuant to CL.
HCC confirmed the ruling of the first-instance courts in the following 
situations: refusal of request to convene extraordinary Meeting because of in-
capacity of the applicant (associations of shareholders that do not have the 
status of a shareholder), appointment of temporary representative in case an 
extraordinary Meeting was not held (plaintiff claimed that the court has the 
right only in case of annual Meeting), extraordinary Meeting to appoint an 
expert fiduciary (the plaintiff claimed that appointment of expert fiduciary is 
not within the scope of competence of the Meeting).
HCC annulled the decision on the court in the first instance that refused 
the request of shareholders to order an extraordinary Meeting because of lack 
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of capacity (the company in question was 95.96% socially owned while only 
4.04% was the shareholders’ equity). The ruling in the first instance was an-
nulled, and the case returned for reevaluation because of breach of procedure, 
since the court in the first instance did not rule on the ownership structure, 
and accordingly capacity of the applicants on the basis of the data in the Cen-
tral Depository of Securities, as the source of valid data.
The following position of HCC is highlighted as the key for the future case 
law and corporate practice in Serbia: 
“In a situation when a company Board of Directors refuses to convene an 
extraordinary shareholders’ Meeting on the basis of validly proposed request, 
pursuant to Art. 277, it is obvious that this is the situation when provision of 
para. 2, Art. 278. CL should be applied and temporary representative appoint-
ed who will conduct all actions relating to convening of extraordinary Meet-
ing, since the order of the court itself to convene an extraordinary Meeting 
when legitimate rights of minority shareholders are obstructed by the Board 
of Directors, without simultaneous appointment of a person that will conduct 
all actions relating to convening and holding such extraordinary shareholders’ 
Meeting, will not result in actual protection of minority shareholders, granted 
by this provision of CL.“132
The next most common cause of dispute was exercising of the sharehold-
ers’ right to information. In these rulings, HCC consistently upheld the follow-
ing position:
“If minority shareholders have no information on shares, agents and Ar-
ticles of Association, and the public company management refuses to make it 
accessible, any shareholder, regardless of the number of shares, is entitled to 
court protection.“133 
The only decisive aspect of these cases was the evidence on whether a 
person is a shareholder of the company in question. Thus, for example, HCC 
took the position that shareholders of a parent company are not entitled to 
insight into documents of a daughter company, pursuant to CL, since they are 
not shareholders of the company in question, but shareholders of the founding 
company.
In case of appeal to the ruling of the first instance court refusing to an-
nul decisions of the meeting, HCC however took the position that since he 
132  HCC Ruling , Pž. 21/2006 of 24. 1. 2006, Sudska praksa privrednih sudova (Case Law of Commer-
cial Courts, Bulletin), Bilten vol. 1/2006, 
133 HCC Ruling , Pž. 5158/2004 of 9. 12. 2004
158 Corporate governance
participated in deliberations of the Meeting, the plaintiff could not contest its 
decisions on the basis of irregular convening, as stipulated in CL.
In the studied period, HCC did not rule on cases in which a shareholder 
addressed the court to protect the company interests (derivative action), or 
claims for compensation of damages suffered by individual or company result-
ing from unlawful operations of the management.
In one case, however, HCC upheld the ruling of the first-instance court 
on annulment of a legal transaction involving a conflict of interest. In this par-
ticular case, Chairperson of the company Board of Directors empowered him-
self, without the pertinent Meeting, to sign a contract on transfer of claims to 
another company that he personally owned. In addition to the fact that the 
grounds for such transfer were not stated in the contract, the court also high-
lighted that this legal transaction was also annulled because it was not autho-
rized in the manner stipulated in CL for situations involving the conflict of 
interest, when a person with the conflict of interest is deprived of the voting 
right.134 
Although the above may appear to suggest, at least at first sight, that 
shareholder in Serbia encountered greatest problems with the management 
that does not want to convene extraordinary Meeting, more detailed analysis 
of the cases reveals underlying conflict between majority and minority share-
holders. In some cases the majority shareholder is the one that prevents con-
vening of the Meeting and appointment of new management. These are usu-
ally post-privatization situations where the employees, now in the capacity of 
minority shareholder, support the old management that opposed the “hostile” 
takeover. The concluding remarks will elaborate this post-privatization situa-
tion in Serbia.
OPEN ISSUES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Shareholders’ rights
The set of legislative norms that regulate the rights of shareholders pursu-
ant to the OECD principles of corporate governance135 should provide for the 
following: 
134  HCC Ruling, Pž. 2664/2007 of 2. 4. 2008, Sudska praksa privrednih sudova (Case Law of Commer-
cial Courts, Bulletin), Bilten vol. 2/2008
135  For detailed illustration of these principles, and comprehensive analysis of corporate governance 
issues in the Serbian theory and practice, see K. Veljović - Korporativno upravljanje i koncentracija 
vlasništva u Srbiji, (Corporate governance and concentration of ownership in Serbia) doctoral dis-
sertation, School of Economics, Belgrade, 2008. 
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Reliable methods of ownership registration, 
Assignment/transfer of shares to others, 
Timely and regular information on any matter pertinent to the company, 
Participation and voting at the shareholders’ meeting, 
 Election of the board members (Board of Directors and supervisory 
board, if any), and 
Participation in the company profits.
CL provisions cover, establish and regulate the mode of exercising of all 
these shareholders’ rights. Entry in the Central Depository of Securities is the 
valid proof of ownership. Public companies are prohibited from any limita-
tions in free transfer of shares. A series of provisions establish the sharehold-
ers’ rights to information and access to company documents, and the list of 
most important documents is explicitly specified. The rules of participation 
and decision-making are also stipulated where all owners of the same class of 
shares have equal rights. Cumulative vote is also an option for members of the 
managing and supervisory boards, and the right to participation in company 
profits is limited to shareholders pro rata their ownership stake and pursuant 
to rules specified in decisions on emission of the shares they own.
CL particularly insisted on protection of minority rights. Thus, the right 
to request and obtain information and access to company documents is grant-
ed to any shareholder regardless of the size of his stake in the company capital. 
In order to resort to court protection in case of violation of the right to con-
flict of interest, it is sufficient that the shareholder’s stake account for 5% of 
the company capital. To be entitled to require an extraordinary Meeting 10% 
stake is sufficient, while 20% ownership is required to ask for a special audit of 
company operations.
In an effort to provide for documentation basis to enable shareholders to 
obtain information, CL binds companies to keep register of shareholders, list 
of transfer of shares, while all company bodies, including the Executive Board, 
are required to keep the register of minutes of their meetings and pertinent 
decisions. One should also bear in mind that public companies are also re-
quired, pursuant to regulations on the market of securities, to submit regular 
information, financial statements and other reports to the Stock Market and 
Securities Commission.
It appears, therefore, that in an effort to provide full information on 
company operations to shareholders, the legislator adopted the principle 
•
•
•
•
•
•
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that potential benefits for the shareholder is prioritized over the related 
administrative cost the company has to bear. In addition to being expensive, 
increased number of documents and reports make them less user-friendly and 
they may be completely useless to an ordinary shareholder. Therefore, the list 
should be revised. It appears that the register of shareholders and transfer of 
shares are completely unnecessary when CL itself specified that the Central 
Depository of Securities is the only valid source of pertinent information.
Also, cumulative voting for members of Board of Directors may be avoid-
ed fairly easily by establishment of an alternative mode of elections in the 
Memorandum or Articles of Association. Since it is not binding, the concept 
of cumulative voting as the mode of direct impact of minority shareholders to 
election of the management makes no particular sense.
Inconsistencies between CL and Law on Securities (LS) in the manner 
in which a shareholder may authorize another person to represent him at the 
Meeting, i.e. clarification of the role of representative and agent referred to 
in CL and LS, respectively, requires amendments to at least one of these. CL 
entitles a shareholder to empower a representative pursuant to a specified pro-
cedure, and establishes their mutual rights and responsibilities. LS however, 
binds a public company to notify shareholders with voting rights, together 
with the summons for a shareholders Meeting, that they are entitled to appoint 
an agent for that Meeting, and a form of pertinent statement of appointment 
prescribed by the Commission for Securities. In order to be able to represent 
a shareholder, the agent must be acknowledged by the shareholders Meeting, 
upon proposal of the management of shareholder (LS, Art. 75).136 
In the light of the fact that this domain of public companies is governed 
by Commission for Securities, they have to comply with LS provisions, partic-
ularly in situations in which the decisions enacted by the Meeting are subject 
to approval or control of this Commission, such as say, issue of new shares. In 
case of other decisions of the Meeting e.g. distribution of profits, shareholders 
may resort to a fiduciary, pursuant to CL. The situation, however, is associated 
with legal uncertainty, since one may not rule out that any entitled person 
(management or shareholders) contest any decisions because they resorted to 
one or the other concept. We shall refrain from preferring one over another, 
since both have strengths and weaknesses. We also do not advocate a solution 
whereby cases in which one or the other concept is pertinent are clearly de-
fined. Most importantly, any current ambiguity should be resolved since it is 
worse than any of the options available.  
136  This duty does not include public companies with fewer than 15 shareholders and those public 
companies whose Memorandum or Articles of Association exclude such statement.
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It should however, be underscored, that the above issues, except partially 
the inconsistency of CL and LS may not be treated as important obstacles in 
execution of rights and interests of shareholders in corporate governance.
Company management
In regulations of company managing-supervisory bodies, as it has already 
been said, the legislator has basically opted for compliance with the principle 
of scope of competence, avoiding the rigid vertical hierarchy, and for a single-
chamber management model (entitling an public company to elect a two-cham-
ber model, at its discretion). Thus, CL entrusts the company Board of Direc-
tors with the most important role. However, whether it will play this role, or 
will be superseded by the company Executive Board, depends primarily on the 
influence, motivation, and mode of behavior of its independent, but also on 
non-executive members.
Although CL explicitly specifies competences of the Board of Directors 
and the fact that the Executive Board may not deal with issues that are within 
the scope of the Board of Directors, the composition of a Board of Directors, 
method of defining independent and non-executive members, and stipulated 
one-year term of office of the Board of Directors members combined make it 
possible for the Executive Board to take control over fairly easily.
First, although CL stipulates that executive members of a Board of Direc-
tors should be a minority, since non-executive members may be employed by 
the company, the difference between executive and non-executive members 
may easily be only formal. Thus, any company manager will meet the require-
ments for a non-executive Board of Directors member the only requirement 
being that he is not a member of the Executive Board, as well. The difference 
between a Board of Directors member who is a company manager and an Ex-
ecutive Board member who is also a Board of Directors member, from the 
position of separation the roles of the two bodies is only negligible.
CL stipulates that a quorum for Board of Directors decisions is made up 
of majority of its members, while valid decisions may be enacted by majority 
of the present members. Thus, without the presence of independent members, 
members of the Executive Board may pass a decision of the Board of Directors. 
Besides, CL also allows that a decision is considered passed even if the Meeting 
has not been held at all, if the decision is not contested in writing by any of the 
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Board of Directors members (Art. 316, para. 2). Without specifying the mode 
or the terms within which the members not participating in a decision mak-
ing have to be notified thereof, CL gives a great opportunity to the Executive 
Board members to enact decisions on their own and subsequently substanti-
ate them (orally). At the same time, other Board of Directors members are 
required to contest the decision in writing, which requires serious elaboration 
of a decision which may, say, have been enacted several months before and ap-
parently had no major impact on the company business.
Further, CL stipulates one year mandate for the Executive Board mem-
bers, while, in principle, membership in the Executive Board is not limited in 
time. Additionally, without limiting the number of places on the Board of Di-
rectors that may be filled by cooptation, CL practically enables replacement of 
all members between two annual Assemblies. Under circumstances in which 
the Executive Board has taken over control of the Board of Directors one may 
easily imagine that the replaced members are its non-executive, i.e. indepen-
dent members who, for example, do not want to oppose any longer, have no 
willpower or motivation to wage public war and simply resign from the mem-
bership excusing themselves by various personal reasons.
The practical separation of competences thus relies on independent mem-
bers of the Board of Directors, i.e. their willingness to judge and vote really 
independently. Independence is a personality trait that need not (and should 
not) depend on one’s position and (direct material) interests of an individual. 
Since this, however, cannot be stipulated under the law, it only remains that 
law prohibits situations in which an individual may be more prone to fall vic-
tim of temptation to betray his independence in judgment.
Thus, CL also establishes situations in which an individual may not be 
considered an independent Board of Directors member. Focusing the direct 
relationships between individuals and company, CL also prevented some in-
direct ones, i.e. hiding behind another person, natural or legal. When natural 
persons are concerned, (broadly defined) kinship is pertinent, while for legal 
persons the property relations matter (direct or indirect ownership of over 
10% of the capital). Employment of persons in legal persons related to the 
company by capital, however, is not prohibited. It is, therefore, quite possible 
that a person employed by or in contractual (but not ownership) relation with 
the legal entity which is ownership-wise related to the company in question or 
even fully controls the company in question is still considered an independent 
Board of Directors member.
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In other words, CL provisions do not pose a serious obstacle to the Execu-
tive Board to take over full control of the Board of Directors whose role be-
comes only symbolical, which, apparently was not intended by the legislator.
Resolution of the issue, however, depends on the answer to the follow-
ing question: Is it possible or needed at all to prevent the Executive Board, i.e. 
direct executive power of the company, to play a leading role in the managerial 
and strategic, instead of only executive and tactical affairs? 
The answer to that question substantially depends on the belief of the 
respondent on human nature and behavior, as well as on the role that a state 
should play in an effort to guide and limit them.
Assuming, as the author does, that an effort to codify interests or human 
character traits is doomed to failure, in this particular case it would be better 
to refrain from imposing any structure of managerial bodies to companies. 
Instead, it would be sufficient to clearly establish the rights and duties of the 
owner (principal) and management (agent), ways of implementing them, and 
judicial protection and sanctions in case of breach thereof. It does not, how-
ever, imply that in case of listed public companies the state should refrain from 
stipulating duties of these companies to regularly publish important facts on 
their business operations. With such requirements for these companies the 
state fulfills one of its duties and advocates the interests of third persons in an 
effort to provide them valid information to make an informed choice.
This is substantiated by the current ownership situation in public com-
panies in Serbia. As it has already been shown, the companies are most com-
monly owned by unequivocal majority shareholders, since in the privatization 
process 70% of the socially owned capital was sold at once. When one owner 
controls 70% of shares, he may easily control both the managing and executive 
boards, so that a discussion on the relationship between two boards is more 
scholastic than truly relevant, at least in a large majority of public companies in 
Serbia and at least for now.
If, however, one finds the above position too liberal, and it appears that 
modern trends in corporate governance regulations confirm that this may be 
a prevailing impression, it would be needed to implement the desired concept 
in a consistent normative manner and rectify any shortcomings in stipulations 
relating to the composition, position, procedure and relationships with the 
management of an public company.
Bearing in mind the current situation in Serbia, the manner in which 
most public companies have been set up, as well as situation in other pieces of 
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legislation that at least partially affect the corporate governance issues, which 
will be elaborated in continuation of this study, it nevertheless appears that 
such changes would not affect practical life significantly and that they are not, 
accordingly, necessitated as a matter of urgency.
Position and purpose of external audit
In respect to CL provisions on external audit, one editorial comment and 
one principal question are due.
Maybe in an effort to limit the number of words used, CL used the term 
auditor to describe an internal auditor, a member of the board of auditors and 
an external auditor, alike. Regardless of the AAL stipulations that these per-
sons have to meet the same requirements to do the jobs, i.e. to be elected to the 
pertinent position, the roles of external and internal audits in a company differ 
a great deal. Therefore, different terms for the two would be preferred, so that, 
say, the term auditor could be used to designate only internal auditors, while 
external auditors should be always specified as such, or vice versa.  
One objection, as a matter of principle, relates to the mode of setting re-
muneration for an external auditor. CL stipulates that a Board of Directors 
Committee for remunerations proposes the remuneration policy for auditors, 
as well (Art. 317, para. 3, item 2), while the Meeting adopts the remuneration 
policy for the Board of Directors members only (Art. 290, para. 1, item 5). 
Accordingly, CL stipulates that the Board of Directors sets the amount of re-
muneration for auditing services. In the light of the situation described above 
(quite probable in real life) where the Executive Board has taken over the con-
trol of the Board of Directors, the remuneration is actually set by the Executive 
Board.
An external auditor supervises and verifies financial statements prepared 
by the company management, and does so on behalf of the shareholders. It 
would be only logical that the shareholders’ Meeting, which appoints the au-
ditor in the first place, also sets the amount of remuneration for the services, 
instead of the Board of Directors, as it is now. Assuming unblemished honesty 
of auditorship, this would, nevertheless, reduce temptation of both the man-
agement and auditors to set the amount sufficiently high to turn a blind eye on 
the possible different perceptions of the mode of bookkeeping.
Positions, tasks and objectives of financial statements audit as well as cov-
erage of companies that are obliged to have their statements audited externally 
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are covered by AAL, so that other objections refer to pertinent provisions of 
this law.
AAL explains that the introduction of professional titles of certified audi-
tor and certified internal auditor is aimed at the protection of “public interest 
related to financial reporting“ (AAL, Art. 4, para 1). In the light of the fact 
that this law establishes the duty of auditing on the basis of a company size, 
instead of its legal form, clearly enough AAL implies that neither shareholders 
of public companies nor potential investors to these companies are in the focus 
of the public interest.
It appears that the “protection of public interest” in AAL is an echo of 
the former role of the Social Accounting Service (SAS)137 and primarily im-
plies a special perception of the interest of the state institutions and state ítself. 
Moreover, legal persons and entrepreneurs are obliged to submit “approved” 
financial statements to the National Bank of Serbia (NBS) by February of the 
following years for the previous year (AAL, Art. 31, para. 1). Since CL specified 
30 June of the following year as the deadline for adoption of annual financial 
reports (Art. 276, para. 1), it remains unclear who can “approve” these state-
ments, and whether the word “approval” has any meaning in terms of CL.
Apparently, such “approval” does not imply the Meeting, since AAL stipu-
lates that this time, subjects of audit should submit the “adopted” financial 
statements for the reporting year that the auditor revised in comparison to the 
“approved” financial statements with auditor’s opinion, to the NBS by 30 Sep-
tember of the following year, at the latest. If the “adopted” financial statements 
are not different from the “approved” ones, only the auditor’s opinion should 
be submitted to NBS (AAL Art. 31, para. 2 and 3).
What does NBS do with the submitted financial statements? 
The Bank processes them and published data supplied in the reports to 
review operational results and financial standing of legal persons and entre-
preneurs, keeps them for 20 years, while the data contained in these reports 
are public and accessible to all legal and natural persons (AAL Art. 33). NBS 
also prescribes remuneration for these jobs, from collection and processing to 
publishing and providing of the data (AAL Art. 34).
An AAL provision making it possible for an “adopted” financial report 
to differ from the “approved” one only in case the auditor writes a qualified 
opinion, which it the true meaning of the phrase “if the audit resulted in 
137  In the system of social ownership of companies, this service played a role of a special public auditor 
that protected the interest of principal (whole companies) and controlled the agents (employees 
– self-managing bodies of socially owned companies).
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correction” in AAL. This would actually mean that the “approved” financial 
statements did not represent the financial results truthfully, which would re-
quire dismissal of the management, to say the least. Having in mind, however, 
that the deadline for submission of the “approved” statements is the end of 
February of the current for the previous year (as used to be the case for annual 
balance statements), which is not sufficient for this task, it frequently happens 
that the management itself, independently of the auditor, identifies some er-
rors subsequently. Moreover, it is neither unusual nor unacceptable that the 
management has a different opinion on the amount of a certain provision or 
any other item in the balance statement, and subsequently complies with the 
auditor’s position, in order to obtain a non-qualified opinion. That is actually 
the true purpose of auditor’s report – to check truthfulness of financial state-
ments that are furnished to shareholders and their compliance with business 
and accounting policies adopted by the company. Truthfulness of the financial 
result, in the above sense, need not and as a rule is not the same as the exactly 
assessed taxable base.
In Serbia, financial statements and auditor’s report are additionally dif-
ferentiated from the roles they have in the countries with developed market of 
capital by the regulations on income taxation. Namely, the Tax Administration 
accepts only financial statements stamped with the NBS seal, where the analysis 
of the taxable base is grounded on the income stated in the financial statement, 
where the statement itself is not reviewed. Accordingly, NBS has practically 
retained the role of tax review (played by the former SAS) since it “guarantees” 
the accuracy of the financial results presented in the income statement. Valid-
ity of this guarantee is highly questionable, since neither the NBS processing 
procedure, nor its professional capacities are up to such requirement.
Although these issues do not appear relevant for corporate governance, 
at least at first sight, they are nevertheless important for proper understanding 
of the overall context in which it operates in Serbia. Presented provisions of 
several laws (and there are more of them) substantiate that Serbian legisla-
tors still associate the purpose of financial statements with the meaning of for-
mer annual balance sheets, while the auditor’s report is associated with fiscal 
functions.
As the shareholders are interested in the amount of profit they may im-
mediately distribute as dividend without jeopardizing the future rate of return, 
the state is interested in the amount of the taxable base that can be assessed 
immediately, regardless of whether a future expense is maybe even correctly 
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accounted as a cost of the current period, following the IAS rules. It would be 
logical, accordingly, to separate the audit of financial statements conducted by 
external auditors, which is aimed at providing for truthfulness of information 
conveyed to the owners on the management operations and company results, 
from tax control which is primarily aimed at assessment of the taxable base, 
which is, as it has already been said, not the same as the profit calculated pur-
suant to IAS.
It means that the duty to submit financial and audit reports to NBS should 
be discontinued, and in general duty to audit companies should be abolished 
for all companies, except for the listed ones, which does not rule out auditing 
of others if they specify so in their internal documents. It is not clear why, for 
example, an owner of a limited liability company would try to represent his 
financial statements untruthfully and have the state protect him by obliging 
him to hire (fairly expensive) auditors.
As to the necessary transparency of financial and auditing reports of pub-
lic company, it has already been provided for by the regulations on securi-
ties that require their submission to the stock market and publishing in mass 
media.
Fiscal interests of the state should, only naturally, be protected by the Tax 
Administration, and fiscal regulations may and should require all tax payers to 
submit pertinent reports for the purpose of taxation.
Thus, the need for unnecessary and meaningless differentiation between 
the “approved” and “adopted” financial reports would no longer exist. Open/
public companies would be given enough time to produce their own financial 
reports pursuant to CL, and all companies would have their administrative 
(and cash) expenses related to unnecessary reports to other state institutions 
reduced.
Three more issues open in other laws
Who is entitled to a dividend? CL correctly and logically limits the right 
to distribution of profits, i.e. dividend, to owners, i.e. shareholders, only (Art. 
218). IAS, which do not allow accounting of payment to any other persons as 
a distribution of profit, also apply the same principle. The Labor Law, how-
ever, allows the so called participation of employees in the profit (Labor Law, 
Art.14). The Law on Personal Income Tax (LPIT) goes another step forward 
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and treats remuneration of employees and members of a company manage-
ment related to the participation in the profits as income from capital (LPIT, 
Art. 61, para. 1, item 3). In the light of the fact that employment may provide 
grounds for distribution of profits in socially owned companies only, it would 
be advisable to delete these provisions with completion of privatization.
What are own shares? The concept, acquisition requirements, time-wise 
and amount-wise limitations relating to own shares are regulated in CL care-
fully and in great detail (Art. 221-224), in order to introduce rules that make 
companies acquire own shares only exceptionally and temporarily. The Privati-
zation Law, however, establishes a company duty to acquire own shares. These 
are the shares that the company buyer, i.e. new shareholder, acquires by capi-
tal increase at the time of effectuation of obligations contained in the priva-
tization contract. However, although acquired by the buyer, PL treats them 
as company own shares that the company will assign to the shareholder if he 
fulfills all duties stipulated in the privatization contract. Should he fail to do so, 
and the contract is terminated, the “own” shares are transferred to the Share 
Fund, which will, on the occasion of repeated sale of such company, pay a part 
of the generated income to the previous buyer with whom the contract has 
been terminated (PL, Art. 41). It is easily understandable why these provisions 
have been introduced with the latest PL amendments (to prevent dilution of 
other shareholders before final contract execution), although it is not quite 
clear what they achieve (preservation of influence of minority shareholders 
– employees or closer ties of the buyer with his investment, or reduction of the 
number of interested buyers in the privatization process?), it could, neverthe-
less, have been avoided if these objectives (whatever they are) were achieved 
by borrowing the names of concepts specified in CL that has a completely dif-
ferent meaning.
How is it possible to become an public company with five million share-
holders that possess under 15% of company shares in six months only? Large 
public companies, commonly various mutual funds, frequently have a very 
large number of shareholders that individually hold a tiny part of the equity. 
In order to set up such a company, it is necessary that it is the intention of 
the founder, to design and successfully implement pertinent strategies and, 
not least importantly, it is necessary that such company is proven to be a safe 
investment opportunity for a broad circle of investors. In Serbia, however, a 
company may get 5 million shareholders overnight, without any intention of 
its own! It suffices that the company, its current shareholders or other poten-
tial investors, do not believe that it is profitable to buy its shares entered in 
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the privatization register at the price at which the socially owned capital was 
bought at the time of privatization. In such a case, pursuant to Art. 17 of the 
Law on Entitlement to Free Shares and Monetary Compensation in the Priva-
tization Process (LEFS),138 enacted in 2007 the company is obliged to distribute 
the shares currently held in the privatization register to all holders of such 
right. All citizens of Serbia, having turned 18 before 31 Dec 2007 have this 
right under the condition that they have not received anything in the privatiza-
tion process before. Thus, 5 million people responded to the call for registra-
tion of their entitlement. Clearly enough, an individual citizen may or may not 
have any benefits from such exercise, but the companies in question will bear 
huge initial and permanent administration costs. It remains to hope that since 
implementation of this LEFS provision collides with numerous provisions of 
CL, the very fact will be sufficient to have this law amended timely.
Previously discussed issues brought about by provisions of other laws il-
lustrate political and economic environment in which CL and corporate gov-
ernance are implemented in Serbia. The final review will, instead of a conclu-
sion, complete the puzzle.
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION 
In order to analyze the influence, justifiability and implementability of CL 
provisions in the concrete Serbian milieu, it is necessary to understand the na-
ture and motivation of the most important category of corporate governance 
participants – the category whose protection is aimed at by the pertinent rule – 
the owners themselves. These are domestic139 owners and most of them may be 
easily distributed into two large groups: one is composed of company found-
ers, i.e. persons, limited liability companies and large/majority shareholders 
(hereinafter: owners), and the other is composed of minority shareholders.
The difference between two groups is substantial and relevant for under-
standing of the social context in which the statutory rules of corporate gover-
nance are applied.
The owners are a part of the entrepreneurial layer, very tiny in Serbia, that 
decided in the course of the eighties and nineties of the previous and the first 
decade of the current century to generate own income independently conduct-
ing own business. Some differences are present within this layer, as well. They 
138 Official Gazette, vol. 123/2007
139 Foreign investors usually have all the features usually associated with the corporate governance theory.
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are primarily caused by different personality traits of persons who wanted and 
could plunge into own business in different political and economic conditions 
present in Serbia over these three decades. The eighties were characterized by 
marked economic and political crisis of the former SFRY, with eventual con-
sequences that most people were unable to perceive. SFRY disintegrated in the 
nineties, and the times were scarred by war, economic and political sanctions 
and isolation of Serbia. After 2000, the previous socialist regime was deposed 
and efforts, at least declaratory ones, were introduced to build market econo-
my based on private property and rule of law, i.e. transition.
In spite of apparently clearly different political and economic conditions 
in Serbia over these three decades, there is an important common feature, as 
well. It is decisive to enable pooling of all owners in Serbia, at least from the 
corporate governance point of view, in a single category. During the whole 
period, now three decades long, Serbia has been burdened with a high level of 
uncertainty in respect to basic and usually unquestionable issues. These relate 
to the exact borders of the country, manner in which the current property 
and contractual rights may be enforced (e.g. collect uncontested claim or ob-
tain a building permit on a plot where urban planning and property issues 
are resolved, or when an economic dispute will be resolved). Discretionary 
judgments, inconsistency and bias of public institution are more of rules than 
exceptions. Corruption, although receding with time, and reliance on “con-
nections” are usually the only modes of protection and enforcement of owner-
ship rights.
Under these conditions, lack of reliance on the legal system and pertinent 
rational behavior make the owners combat the principal-agent problem by not 
even creating it in the first place. In other words, they assign their manage-
rial power in management, administration and representation to professional 
managers to a minor degree, if any. If they, nevertheless, decide not to be in 
the front row, they appoint completely dependent managers and make sure to 
increase their dependency over time.
Although the above features are more or less common for all founders 
of companies of persons and limited liability companies, they are particularly 
salient in Serbian owners because of their utter lack of trust into honesty and 
effectiveness of public administration and judiciary system. Therefore, they 
are not interested in understanding and/or implementation of legal provisions, 
particularly the principled, systemic solutions such as those spelled out in the 
Company Law. They address compliance of this and other similar pieces of 
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legislation almost exclusively to abide by the legal form, fearing the sanctions, 
if they are sufficiently probable. The findings of this year’s survey should be in-
terpreted in that light. Namely, a year and a half after the expiry of the statutory 
deadline (30 November 2008), 97% of public companies have either already 
harmonized their Memorandum of Association and other documents with the 
Company Law, or are in the process of harmonizing them.
Owners believe that their success primarily depends on their ability to 
have direct control over all internal company operations and external stake-
holders, primarily the state, that may have an important impact on their reach-
ing the set goal.
On the other hand, most of small shareholders in Serbia have acquired 
the status through privatization of socially owned companies, by free acquisi-
tion or purchase at exceptionally privileged terms. This is substantiated by the 
fact that only in 9% of public companies the current and former employees are not 
company shareholders. Moreover, most of public companies also occurred as 
a result of privatization, due to the statutory requirement that issue of shares 
in the privatization process is treated as an open one. Thus, as expected, over 
two thirds (68%) of public companies in the surveyed sample resulted from 
privatization.
This aspect determines motivation and behavior of a typical Serbian mi-
nority shareholder and how he understands his own role.
First of all, he is not, and he is rarely prone to be an investor. In other 
words, he does not perceive the return on his share – dividend – as his owner-
ship right, or the amount (if any) of such return has any relevant impact on his 
decision to retain/sell the shares. Most commonly he is also employed at the 
company and perceives acquisition of the shares as his right derived from his 
labor relations.
Secondly, he frequently perceives acquisition of shares in the privatization 
process as a poor and/or unfair compensation for the loss of right that used to 
be associated with labor relations in the course of socialism. Inter alia, this is 
the right for direct management (self-management) and decision on distribu-
tion of profits that is perceived as a natural part of his earnings in the labor 
relations. Therefore, practically all privatizations implemented through sale of 
companies to strategic investors were perceived as hostile takeovers by most 
employees, now minority shareholders.
Third, like the categories of owners, minority shareholders also lack 
trust in the legal system, state and its representatives, and they are utterly 
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disinterested to learn more of their legal rights as shareholders, as well as their 
implementation by legal means. Therefore, in Serbia, in addition to problems 
encountered with any class action, lack of interest of minority shareholders 
results also from their belief that resorting to legal means to execute their right 
is futile.
When a domestic dominant shareholder/owner and minority sharehold-
ers – employees are together present in a company, the statutory rules of cor-
porate governance, even if all documents and written procedures are present 
and are fully compliant with the law, are only hurdles or means that should be 
removed or used, as the case may be, to reach the final objective.
In terms of corporate governance, the most common final objective of 
any dominant shareholder in Serbia (this time not only the domestic one), is 
to close the company, i.e. transform it into a limited liability company. Except 
for three isolated examples, all other public companies have shown neither the 
wish nor intention to obtain resources for its financing at the market of capital. 
Moreover, in Serbia trends of cost of share at the market are not perceived as 
reliable or relevant information on the company success. Thus, reasoning lead-
ing companies to remain open/public in Serbia is not related to either finances, 
or reputation. Most of them remain at the market because of the set of legisla-
tive norms stipulated in the Privatization Law, Company Law, Takeover Law 
and Law on Securities and Other Financial Instruments.
As to a domestic minority shareholder, his pertinent objective is most 
commonly boiled down to selling his shares at the highest possible price, pri-
marily because he needs cash, and to preserve his post if he is also employed 
at the company.
In principle, selection of a company form is not an expression of free 
will of the founders, except in a limited number of cases. Therefore, before all 
open/public companies, whose majority shareholders want to do that, have 
become closed/private and transformed into limited liability companies, and 
before a critical number of minority shareholder have become investors in the 
true meaning of the word, the rules of corporate governance in Serbia will, 
essentially, be more of the rules of the game between two currently existing 
groups of shareholders – majority external owner and minority – employees 
– to achieve their final objectives, than serve its main purpose.
This should be born in mind when the effects of the Company Law on the 
Serbian corporate scene are evaluated. In most of the provisions, which will be 
elaborated below, the Law is a good example of continuation of development 
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of the Serbian legislative framework on the foundations of the existing legal 
and practical rules, integrating solutions derived from solutions to problems 
at the markets that are similar or more mature in the respective aspects. In 
other words, the law, contrary to many “transitional” laws governing Serbian 
economy that frequently and unfortunately are only sets of poorly translated 
recommendations of foreign consultants or laws of the countries of origin, is a 
fruit of knowledge, systematic exercise and effort to find best solutions.
Nevertheless, the impact of its solutions on the corporate governance 
practice in Serbia will, mostly, be evaluable only when the most important 
participants in the corporate governance, the owners themselves, approach the 
usual theoretical definition of a principal, in terms of their motivation and be-
havior. Development of the milieu in which they conduct business is not less 
important; it is expected that after the turbulent pre-war, war, and eventual 
transitional changes the more peaceful “evolutional” times will follow.
Rationale for some unusual solutions in the Company Law, in particu-
lar the provisions on the methodology for determination of market value of 
shares (Article 445) is related to these features of business environment, char-
acteristic of Serbia. This provision stipulates the method for determination of 
a value that, by definition, is an expression of the balance between supply and 
demand, whereby its determination pursuant to the law is paradoxical.
This provision is an effort to protect minority shareholders from dis-
proportionate reduction of their stake in the company capital, i.e. the provi-
sion stipulates that the issue price of a share has to equal its market value, 
compounded by the methodology to calculate it. This is the best proof that 
the legislator was aware of the utmost objective of majority shareholders in 
public companies generated by privatization: dilution of minority sharehold-
ers and minimization of their influence on the company management and 
increasing the chances to close. In substantiation of the above, when would 
any management or majority shareholder who really find their interest in 
keeping the company public company, want to issue new shares of their com-
pany at the price which is below their market value and thus, decrease inflow 
of financial resources for own operations and, accordingly, reputation of the 
company?
The fact that such provision is included into the Company Law suggests 
that in regulation of these issues, in the conflict between the majority share-
holder – owner and minority shareholder – employee, the legislator decided 
take the side of the latter. The same applies to other laws in the area (e.g. Take-
over Law). Regardless of whether the reasoning may be defended from the 
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ideological, demagogical or professional points of view, the only true conse-
quence of these provisions is to impede closing (turning private) of companies 
whose owners are not interested in keeping them open, i.e. listed on the stock 
market. This, however, does not imply that the mode of closure (turning pri-
vate) will really stop them (it still remains questionable whether they should be 
prevented and whether this was the underlying intention of the legislator). The 
closure will, most probably, eventually be accomplished, but the cost incurred 
by majority shareholders and received by the minority one will be higher than 
the one which will be achieved without such hindrances.
Some may suggest that it is fairer this way. Even in terms of fairness, there 
is only an attempt of the state to subsequently rectify some “injustices” from 
the past. They have, however, been generated by the very manner in which the 
state has implemented the laws (and unfortunately, still does). Therefore, it is a 
natural result of transition, one may say its very purpose, transfer of ownership 
of “social” capital from all citizens (in theory) to the hands of fewer owners, 
associated with the need of political elite to justify itself before the (voting) 
majority. It appears, therefore, that demagogy here prevails over justice, i.e. 
political elite is not ready to publicly acknowledge the unpopular, but only 
natural consequences of transition.
From the purely economic standpoint, redistribution itself, regardless of 
who the loser and who the winner is, leads to loss of efficiency that, eventu-
ally, is suffered by all, most of all ordinary citizens. In other words, the longer 
the attempts to codify interests of players in the field of economy, the later the 
clear-cut ownership rights and effective market economy will be established, 
with increased associated cost and with usual set of issues that are subject of 
regulation of the rules of corporate governance.
SUGGESTED CHAGNES
The Company Law, as it has already been said, regulates all issues that 
modern understanding of corporate governance finds relevant for resolution 
of issues that may occur in the relationship between owners and management, 
and those relating to protection of minority shareholders. This law is also one 
of the few good examples of development of Serbian legislative framework 
harmonized with the changes and economic milieu in Serbia, as well as with 
development of pertinent regulations in more mature markets. It follows mod-
ern solutions and introduces new legal concepts but also takes care that their 
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transformation into legal norm is conducted, whenever it is possible, by the 
use of the existing concepts, familiar and understandable to the legal and busi-
ness communities in Serbia.
On the other hand, in Serbia there is a vast majority of open/public public 
companies that have not become public by the intention of their founders, but 
by the force of the Privatization Law. Only three open/public public companies 
are also listed and have intentionally opted to have their shares listed on the 
market. In all others, business operations and implementation of CL are usu-
ally formally complied with, with no true interest of the parties that participate 
in corporate governance. When and how the situation is going to change de-
pends mostly on their willingness and readiness of the Serbian companies to 
provide funding for their operations on the stock market. The Company Law 
makes no hindrances whatsoever; instead, it provides a solid legislative frame-
work and more or less unequivocal rules.
However, even now, and particularly in the light this possible chain of 
events in the future it is necessary to highlight some inconsistencies and need 
for improvement of some CL provisions and other laws that should be har-
monized accordingly. These provisions and direction of their possible changes 
have already been elaborated in detail in the chapter discussing the open is-
sues and possible solutions. Therefore, only the most important ones will be 
focused here.
In terms of rights of shareholders the most important is the following:
 Harmonization of CL and Securities Law (SL) on the mode and procedure 
for empowerment for representation of shareholder at the Meeting (repre-
sentative or agent). Unfortunately, the proposed draft amendments to the 
SL failed to include this harmonization. Since this is actually the matter 
of the right of shareholders that should be covered by the CL, and that 
the current SL provisions are administratively bulky (imposing the duty 
for companies to furnish a form of Proxy’s statement to each shareholder, 
regardless of whether they want to have a proxy or not), it would be best 
to enter a provision referring to CL, instead of entering a new definition 
of Proxy’s statement.
 Precise list of company records that a shareholder is entitled to have insight to. 
Clearly enough, any shareholder, regardless of the size of his/her stake in 
the company capital has to be entitled to all information required for valid 
decision, for the voting at the Meeting and keeping or selling his/her shares. 
It appears, however, that by granting the right to insight into the company 
•
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books and statutory (broad) list of pertinent documents, the possibility 
of abuse of the right and its untoward use have been underestimated to-
gether with the cost that the company incurs in the process. In parallel, the 
possible benefits that such right may bring to an individual shareholder 
and the company itself have been overestimated. SL has already stipulated 
a duty for open/public public companies that the general public, Com-
mission and Stock Exchange have to be notified on all relevant events, and 
that they have to update the prospectus regularly and publish financial re-
ports with auditor’s opinion. This information in itself provides sufficient 
grounds for valid decision making. In addition to this (already available) 
information, the CL should specify that any shareholder should be en-
titled to see the Memorandum of Association, Articles of Association and 
all documents relating to the Meeting proceedings (minutes, decisions). 
Additionally, his right to request notification on the amount of remunera-
tion of members of the Managing and Executive Boards, and external 
auditor may also be stipulated. It goes without saying that any shareholder 
should be entitled to request that the company prepares and presents all 
notifications that are published or should be published pursuant to the SL 
provisions. Thus, the CL should clearly differentiate between notification 
and documents that each individual shareholder is entitled to see, from 
the documents that the company is obliged to keep following the CL pro-
visions. As to this list, the documents should by no means include those 
that fall under the competence of the Central Depository (e.g. transfer of 
shares…).
In the area of managerial bodies and their compositions, the following is-
sues have been recognized: 
 Definition of a listed open/public public company. Although the SL in-
directly suggests that only companies present at the stock exchange are 
listed, in the current Serbian circumstances it is not quite clear whether 
public companies whose shares are traded over the counter may be sub-
jected to the duties that the CL stipulates for the listed ones. Therefore, 
to clearly specify the duties of public companies in the SL, it is necessary 
to precisely define which ones will be treated as the listed ones. For the 
time being, the concept used in the CL has no corresponding term in the 
SL. Harmonization of terminology in CL with the one used in SL is also 
an option.
 Number of Board of Directors Members that may be appointed by coopta-
tion. The current solution practically enables replacement of all Board of 
•
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Directors members between two annual Meetings by cooptation. In the 
light of the fact that one of the most important roles of the shareholders’ 
Meeting is to elect and appoint Board of Directors members, the number 
of members that may be appointed should be explicitly restricted. The 
rule of thumb suggests that the number should be less than a half of the 
Board of Directors members.
 Limitation of the Board of Directors member mandate to one year. Al-
though the legislator’s intention to enable easy replacement of the Board 
of Directors members is legitimate, bearing in mind the current transi-
tional circumstances in Serbia, it nevertheless appears that the stipulated 
mode is too rigid. It shortens the horizon within which each manager 
evaluates opportuneness of certain decisions. This particularly applies 
to non-executive and independent Board of Directors members whose 
managerial position is subject to the risk of (re)election. In the Serbian 
situation, predominated by companies where a majority shareholder 
owns more than two thirds of the shares, this CL provision may have 
an effect completely opposite to the intended one. It would be advisable, 
therefore, to implement the idea of easy replacement of the management 
in some other manner. This may be achieved, say, by introducing a provi-
sions stipulating that the mandate of Board of Directors members shall be 
terminated instantly, should the Meeting refuse to adopt the annual Board 
of Directors report, or financial statements and/or the company operates 
with a loss.
 Role of non-executive Board of Directors members. Due to the already 
elaborated reasons there is no substantial difference between an Executive 
Board member who is also a Board of Directors member and his non-ex-
ecutive colleague who is employed at the company. Besides, if we assume 
that the Executive Board, as a collective body, needs to have at least three 
members, it appears that open/public public companies need to have 
at least seven Board of Directors members. It is quite doubtful whether 
and how much this contributes to the Boards’ impact, substantiation of 
its decisions and quality of corporate governance under the Serbian cir-
cumstance. Explicit statutory requirement to have a majority of non-ex-
ecutive Board of Directors members was probably aimed at limitation of 
the direct influence of executive power of the company to the Board of 
Directors decisions. Maybe an attempt was made to give opportunity to 
non-managerial company staff to be Board of Directors members, e.g. 
representatives of employees and/or trade unions, enabling representation 
•
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of all stakeholders, not only the shareholders. Inasmuchas the intention 
is justified, it cannot be put in practice in the manner in which the CL stipu-
lates the Board of Directors composition and election of the Executive 
Board members. Due to the already presented rationale, the current CL 
provisions actually pave the road for full domination of the Executive 
Board over the Board of Directors. Therefore, to consistently implement 
the legislator’s intention – establishment of unequivocal domination of 
the Board of Directors over the Executive Board – differentiation of the 
two Boards, member-wise, is needed. In other words, it should be stipu-
lated that members of the Executive Board may not be members of the 
Board of Directors, i.e. rule out the possibility of executive members of 
the Board of Directors. The only exception to this rule is the Board of 
Directors Chairperson who may, as stipulated in the current CL, chair the 
Executive Board as well. This would be a guarantee enough for coordina-
tion and shared information on operations of the two boards, which was 
the underlying reason for the present CL solutions.
 Definition of an independent member. The causative relationship between 
the presence of independent members of Board of Directors and quality 
of corporate governance has not been proven in economies with more 
mature market of capital than the Serbian one. In Serbia, contribution of 
these members has been questioned a great deal. Two independent mem-
bers of the Board of Directors and no less than five members employed 
at the company out of whom three are also members of the Executive 
Board in the situation in which there is one controlling shareholder with 
over two thirds of shares (which is the most common situation in Ser-
bia), can hardly be expected and motivated or practically able for that matter 
to essentially influence business policies and quality of corporate gover-
nance in the company. Therefore, the need for any such stipulation should 
be reconsidered. If we assume (regardless of the above) that the Serbian 
law should follow contemporary trends and require open/public public 
companies to have independent Board of Directors members, it appears 
that the specification of requirements to be met by independent Board 
of Directors members has a major flaw. Namely, one can hardly be inde-
pendent and also employed at the company or be in another contractual 
relation with the major company shareholder. Formally speaking, howev-
er, requirements stipulated in the CL treat such persons as independent. 
Accordingly, for consistent implementation of the independent member 
idea, the requirements should be incorporated into the CL.
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 Notification of Board of Directors decisions made without the meeting. The 
praiseworthy intention of the legislator to enable flexibility of the Board 
of Directors operations is recognized, enabling valid decisions to be made 
even without the Board of Directors meeting. It appears, nevertheless, that 
by failing to specify the deadlines and modes of notification of the Board 
of Directors members who did not participate in such decision making, 
it has been (unrealistically) assumed that all Board of Directors members 
are mutually fully supportive and open for collaboration. It would, there-
fore, be advisable to spell out the pertinent rules.
When the mode in which the CL refers to the AAL to cover the issues of 
internal supervision, the following issue has been identified as the key one:
 Required qualifications for an internal auditor or member of the Board of 
Auditors. CL opts to refer to a special piece of legislation for the require-
ments to be met by an internal auditor; the requirements stipulated in the 
AAL suggest a very narrow role of an internal auditor, i.e. board of audi-
tors. Namely, the requirement that both the internal auditor and members 
of the board of auditors have specific accounting qualifications reduces 
the role of internal supervision to almost exclusively oversight of compil-
ing of financial statements and their contents, regardless of the fact that 
CL empowers them for a much broader scope of issues. Appreciating the 
major, maybe the key importance of financial statements for true insight 
into the company operations, combined provisions of CL and AAL unjus-
tifiably give only secondary importance to all other features and modes of 
operation. Basically, the key role of internal supervision is to establish and 
oversee procedures of enactment and implementation of business deci-
sions and reporting on results thereof, in other words, establishment and 
oversight of all internal, not only the accounting, rules that provide for 
lawful and purposeful operations of the company. Therefore, CL should 
delete the provision on requirements stipulated in another law (AAL), 
since it practically reduces the role of internal supervision to oversight of 
financial reports, although it has a much broader meaning. Thus, ability of 
these persons to have a substantiated position on financial reports would 
not be impaired, since the CL, as it is, gives explicit right to the internal 
auditor or board of auditors to hire external experts for pertinent areas in 
order to perform their duties competently. On the other hand, this would 
enable a broader set of experts in various fields (economics, law or natural 
or technical sciences) to pursue this important role.
•
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The manner in which AAL (in)appropriately regulates the role and posi-
tion of external (independent) audit of financial reports has already been sub-
stantiated sufficiently. The main recommendations include:
 Unequivocal terminological differentiation of internal supervision from ex-
ternal audit. For faster establishment and understanding of different roles 
played by internal supervision, internal auditor or board of auditors and 
external audit in business operations and corporate governance of a com-
pany, it would be necessary for CL to differentiate them terminologically 
in a consistent manner. The best thing to do may be to use the adjectives 
internal whenever the provisions refer to persons such as internal audi-
tor or members of the board of auditors. Current wording of certain CL 
provisions requires interpretation of the context to differentiate among 
internal and external auditors.
 Right of the Meeting to establish remuneration or be informed on the 
amount of remuneration for the external auditor. The key recommenda-
tion in this area for CL improvement is to stipulate either the right of the 
Meeting to set the amount of remuneration for the external auditor or the 
duty of Board of Directors to notify the Meeting on the set remuneration. 
In addition to providing the important information to shareholders, it 
is the right they are logically entitled to and their scope of competence, 
since independent auditors check the truthfulness of financial statements 
prepared by the company management on their account and on their 
behalf.
 Eligibility requirements for persons to conduct audit. We would here re-
frain from discussing all issues opened in respect to the scope and mode 
of exercising the powers vested with the Chamber of Chartered Auditors 
and Ministry of Finance by the law regulating this profession. Instead, it 
is important to underline that the AAL should limit stipulations of the re-
quirements for the persons performing auditing duties to chartered audi-
tors, i.e. persons (legal and natural) who conduct external audit, and not 
the internal supervisions, as the provisions currently suggest.
 Coverage of companies that AAL requires to conduct external audit. AAL 
should harmonize the provisions relating to the mandatory external audit 
with those in CL, i.e. annul provisions requiring companies that are not 
open/public public companies to have their financial statements subject-
ed to external audit.
 Duty to submit financial statements to NBS. The underlying logic of the 
need to compile and publish (in case of open/public public companies) 
•
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financial statements requires annulment of the requirement to submit fi-
nancial and auditing reports to the NBS. The justified need of the state 
to have statistical data may be met through the National Statistics Of-
fice (NSO) by introducing the duty of all companies to submit information 
necessary for the calculation of GDP or other macroeconomic indicators 
to the NSB. This would, inter alia, overcome the need to differentiate be-
tween “approved” and “adopted” financial statements that makes no sense 
from either the standpoint of corporate governance or collection of statis-
tical data, or information of the public.
When other regulations are concerned, that have most blatant provisions 
in collision with CL provisions that have to prevail in the pertinent matters, 
and require, accordingly urgent amendments, the following are salient: 
 Right of employees to participate in the profit. Although this right is intro-
duced as an optional, not a mandatory one, this provision should never-
theless be deleted since it is incompatible with provisions of both CL and 
IAS. Namely, only shareholders are entitled to participate in the distribu-
tion of profits. It does not rule the possibility for employees to get certain 
bonuses based on successful operation of the company, but they may not 
be entitled to distribution of profits.
 Definition of participation of employees in company profits as the income 
from capital. This provision of the Law on Income Tax should be deleted 
in the first oncoming amendments due to quite obvious rationale.
 Establishing the deadline to submit tax returns for corporate tax in relation 
to the deadline to submit financial statements to NBS. The Law on Corpo-
rate Tax should specify the content of tax returns to match the need to 
establish the taxable base and differentiate them clearly from the rules 
that IAS prescribes for financial reporting. Deadlines for submission of 
tax returns should be independent of those for submission of financial 
reports, but care should nevertheless be taken to harmonize them with 
terms stipulated in the CL whenever it is needed (say, require open/public 
public companies to submit their auditor’s report to the tax Administra-
tion, as well, but the deadline for such submission may not be indepen-
dent of the deadline specified in CL for adoption of the documents).
 Treasury shares defined in the Privatization Law. Refraining from to ques-
tioning the legislator’s intention to stipulate special treatment of increased 
capital of the buyer of socially owned capital under the contractual ob-
ligation to invest into the subject of privatization, the treasury shares 
•
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generated in this manner pursuant to the Privatization Law should, at 
least terminologically, be differentiated from treasury shares defined and 
regulated under the CL. Although better solutions could be found for fail-
ure to meet the contractual obligations in the privatization processes, the 
simplest one would be to introduce pertinent fines.
 Company duty to issue shares to all holders of right to free shares and mon-
etary compensation. The recently introduced manner to resolve the issue 
of shares held in the Privatization Register (in addition to the fact that it 
may not be enforced without violation of the CL provisions) is also a kind 
of violence over fundamental rules of market economy. Namely, if there 
are no interested buyers to purchase the shares at the lowest price set in 
the Law on Free Shares (LFS), the company in which the Privatization 
Register holds shares is obliged to issue them to all holders of the right, 
about 5 million in all. Thus, a substantial number of companies is laden 
with administrative problems associated not only with huge cost, but al-
most insurmountable problem of finding a venue for the meeting of such 
an enormous number of shareholders. Although one may assume that 
most of the shareholders would not respond to the summons to attend the 
Meeting in the first place, this does not rule out the duty of the company 
to comply with CL provisions and send pertinent summons to all of them. 
Obviously, benefits of each individual shareholder associated with owner-
ship of a share, that may have negligible face value, would be meaningless, 
to say the least. The damage, however, inflicted by this hasty solution to 
the very idea of shareholdership and its development in Serbia is far from 
negligible. Therefore the LFS should be amended by the end of this year 
before unnecessary serious harm is done.
•
Corruption and corporate governance 
INTRODUCTION
All studies of the phenomenon of corruption in Serbia so far suggest a 
fairly high level of spread, although it is fairly certain (pursuant to an empirical 
survey conducted by CLDS in 2006)140 that after 2001 both intensity and spread 
of corruption in Serbia have had a falling trend. In comparison with other 
countries, regardless of numerous associated methodological problems, a rela-
tively high level of prevalence of corruption in Serbia is indicated yet again. 
It, therefore, appears pertinent to investigate the link between corruption, on 
the one hand, and corporate governance, on the other, both theoretically and 
in concrete example of Serbia as a country in transition, which is character-
ized with the already mentioned level of corruption, and the specified issues of 
corporate governance, which have already been elaborated in other chapters 
of this book.
In theoretical terms, several links between corruption and corporate gov-
ernance issues may be identified. The issue of direction of the causative rela-
tion is always relevant: do the problems of corporate governance affect the 
increase of intensity and spread of corruption or, conversely, corruption affects 
the corporate governance issues. There is no single, generally pertinent answer 
to that question. Instead, each particular case has to be interpreted by its own 
merits. Accordingly, concrete cases of links between corporate governance and 
corruption need to be studied.
First of all, problems in the area of corporate governance lead to the co 
called corruption of the private sector, i.e. corruptive transactions in which 
both parties (corruptor and corrupted) are in the private sector. Obviously, 
without problems in corporate governance, this type of corruption would not 
be present since owners of private resources increase their wealth on the mar-
ket, maximizing the profit they appropriate. Therefore, this type of corruption, 
more than any other (e.g. extortion) is greatly associated with corporate gov-
ernance issues, where the problems, i.e. weaknesses of corporate governance 
lead to the private sector corruption, instead of vice versa. Accordingly, those 
claiming that upgrading of corporate governance is a solution for corruption 
140 Corruption in Serbia five years later, CLDS, 2007
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in the private sector are right, i.e. resolution of corporate governance problems 
resolves the issue of corruption in the private sector.   
Since corruption of the private sector is the most important form of cor-
ruption brought about by corporate governance issues, it should be prioritized. 
Namely, offer of corruption in this case comes from corporation managers. It 
has already been said that the problems of corporate governance result from 
the agency issue, deteriorated by the information asymmetry. Aims of com-
pany managers differ from those of owners, and information asymmetry pre-
vents owners from effective oversight. Therefore, under conditions of severe 
agency issue, it may happen that a manager finds it beneficial to conclude a 
contract with third party with is not the most favorable deal for the company, 
and generates certain benefits for agreeing to enter into such deal. To exem-
plify, Director General intentionally concludes a contract on procurement of 
certain inputs, i.e. products (goods or services) for the corporation, selecting 
a supplier whose offer is not most favorable in either the price (for the given 
quality) or quality (for the given price). By the purchase of a more expensive, 
i.e. inferior quality product, the manager increases expenses of the compa-
ny, i.e. reduces the profit, meaning that he does not operate in the interest of 
the owners of the company capital. In this situation, with severely prominent 
agency issue, the interests of owners and managers collide. Conversely, the in-
terests of the manager coincide with the interests of third party, his partner in 
corruption, i.e. the only remaining outstanding issue is the distribution of the 
corruption proceeds generated by such deal.  
For example, if a corrupt manager purchases one million beer bottles at 
the price 5 dinars above the market one, the beer factory registers increased 
expenses by 5 million dinars, and the amount has to be distributed between 
the partners in the corrupt deal.141 They may disagree on how to split it, but 
both are motivated to reach such agreement, since with realization hereof they 
will appropriate any amount of rent. In other words, this form of corruption 
is dangerous for a society, since both parties in corruption are motivated to 
cooperate, making their agreement sustainable, profit i.e. rent generating for 
both,. The only loser in this case is the company owner(s), so that promotion 
of corporate governance is the key prerequisite for elimination of this type of 
corruption. 
141  This calculation of rent is based on the assumption that the manufacturer delivering the bottles in 
the course of sale at the market price does not appropriate any rent, bit only the normal profit, i.e. 
covers the opportuned capital cost. 
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CORRUPTION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SERBIA
Studies of corruption in Serbia so far have not suggested that this type of 
corruption, private sector corruption, is very intensive, i.e. it has not proved to 
be widespread. Corruption of the public sector has been focused much more 
– in conducted surveys entrepreneurs complain on corruption associated with 
public procurements for public companies, but very few complain on cor-
ruption associated with procurement in private corporations. Although these 
findings have not been subjected to greater elaboration and investigation of 
results obtained in surveys of entrepreneurs, it is undeniable that the structure of 
corporate ownership in Serbia is a potent obstacle to corruption in the private 
sector. Namely, as the survey conducted for this study has substantiated (see 
Chapter III), as many as 63% of the surveyed corporations in Serbia have a ma-
jority owner, i.e. concentrated ownership structure, where the origin of such 
ownership structure has already been discussed. Also, analyses presented in 
previous chapters illustrate the trend of pooling of company capital ownership, 
i.e. trend of open/public public companies to turn private, meaning the trend 
of increasing motivation of the owner, reducing the issues of class action for 
the owner on the level of direct control of the company management, i.e. man-
ner in which the managers govern the company. Obviously, owners of capital 
still find the indirect methods of corporate management supervision fairly in-
effective, so that they opt for strengthening of the direct methods, which is 
achieved best by pooling of the ownership and, thus, overcoming the agency 
issue. In other words, it appears that the low level of corruption in the private 
sector is an indirect indicator of the fact that the agency issue, i.e. corporate 
governance problems are not very prevalent in Serbia.
Corruption of the public sector, regardless of whether administration 
corruption or state governance are concerned, particularly the one based on 
extortion by public officials (when civil servants solicit bribes in order to do 
their job and implement regulation, i.e. when they solicit bribes from parties to 
let them exercise their rights) does not depend on corporate governance to any 
major degree. Namely, in case of extortion the interests of corporation, i.e. its 
owners on the one hand, and managers entrusted with corporation manage-
ment on the other, are similar, i.e. substantially identical. The same mechanism 
is present in case of corruption in collusion, when two parties in a corrupt deal 
agree to breach the rules for the mutual benefit. Finally, interests of owners 
and managers also coincide in case they overpower the state, which appar-
ently makes it possible to corrupt those that formulate the rules, so that these 
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rules are beneficial for such corporation, i.e. the branch in which it conducts 
business. 
Contrary to the corruption of the private sector, it has been established 
that the agency issue, i.e. corporate governance issues do not exert such an in-
fluence on extortion which is typical for the public sector corruption. Namely, 
in such a case the interests of owners and managers do coincide – to pay the 
required amount of bribe. The owner’s interest is for the company to oper-
ate uneventfully and generate profit, so that he is willing, say, to pay a cer-
tain amount to obtain all urban planning permits although he does not fulfill 
all the requirements, as long as the amount is lower than the cost, i.e. loss 
that would be incurred due to delay of construction works on the building for 
which the permit is required. The manager’s interest is to show the owner that 
he is able to cope with all “challenges” a developer encounters in Serbia, even 
if it implies bribing a public official. Until this moment the interests of own-
ers and managers do coincide. The problem from the corporate governance 
standpoint may occur when the amount of the bribe is set. The owner wants 
to pay as little as he possibly can, i.e. as much as it is absolutely necessary to 
“smooth his way through”, with the lowest associated cost. Accordingly, it is in 
the best interest of the owner that the manager negotiates the lowest amount 
of bribe. Conversely, the manager finds no interest of his own in negotiating 
the lower amount of bribe – there is nothing in it for him. Quite the opposite, 
the manager is motivated to report a higher amount of the bribe to the owner 
(higher than the one actually requested by the public official), i.e. keep a part 
of the money earmarked by the corporation for “resolution” of the problem for 
himself. The probability of such chain of events increases under conditions of 
decreasing spread and intensity of extortion, which has exactly been the case 
in Serbia in the last five years. Under these conditions, a manager may use 
“outdated” information to hide the true amount of bribe, even hide that the 
bribe is not solicited any longer; instead he may increase the cost of the cor-
poration incurred for “oiling the wheels” of business, where the wheels do not 
need any oiling, but the manager appropriates the amounts for himself.
In the case of administrative corruption, in addition to one direction of 
causative relationship (from corporate governance to corruption), there is an-
other one, as well: the greater the corruption, the poorer the corporate gover-
nance. And this is exactly the case: if extortion as a form of corruption is wide-
spread, and the whole bribing deal is, naturally, in the hands of the manager, 
asymmetry of information held by the management and owners is increased. 
Since corruption, in its essence, is a hidden activity, company owners have no 
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information on hidden transactions made by the company mangers on their 
behalf. General impression that corruption is widespread is a very good ex-
cuse for managers to get involved into supposedly corruption–related deals, 
i.e. to increase the information asymmetry, deteriorating the corporate gov-
ernance issue. Therefore, in this case, reduction of the level of corruption, i.e. 
elimination of extortion in a country, shall lead to improved level of corporate 
governance even if all other, otherwise more important factors of corporate 
governance, remain the same. In other words, corruption undoubtedly affects 
the corporate governance issues.
CLDS studies in the least several years have shown substantial recession 
in the spread of extortion as a form of corruption particularly in some areas 
of public administration, such as customs administration. Therefore, in this 
area extortion-wise information asymmetry between owners and managers is 
fairly low. It has also been shown, however, that administrative corruption, i.e. 
extortion, has not been substantially improved in some other areas, such as 
building land and construction permits. Moreover, since implementation of 
urban planning regulations is under the competence of local government, it is 
quite probable that major differences are present among areas in Serbia, imply-
ing different impact of corruption on corporate governance.  
It may, nevertheless, happen that reduction, i.e. complete elimination of 
extortion was associated with intensification of other forms of corruption in 
the public sector, i.e. other form of administrative corruption, which is cor-
ruption in collusion – the type of corruption with voluntary corruption agree-
ment. Interests of company managers and owners coincide to a certain extent. 
If a corporation, based on realized corruption agreement, reduces its expenses 
or increases the income, the amount of profit that may be appropriated is also 
increased. These coinciding interests make this type of corruption persist, and 
it is not very likely that promotion of corporate governance will curb this type 
of corruption to any major degree. The problems of information asymmetry 
may, like in the case of extortion, occur with specification of the true amount 
of bribe that should be paid, but the quality of corporate governance simply 
has no effect to this type of corruption. Indirectly, this is substantiated by the 
fact that on the occasion of breakdown of corruption deals within the Customs 
Administration in the fall 2006 in Serbia, where the main deals were based on 
corruption in collusion, all corruptors were limited liability companies, with a 
single owner, who is also the company manager. So, the corruptors were com-
panies where the issue of corporate governance was not applicable.  
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 The corporate governance issue is not an important factor of corrup-
tion as a method of state overpowering, since in this case interests of company 
owners and managers again coincide. Both have an interest in adjusting the 
rules of business to the needs of their company, i.e. branch in which the com-
pany conducts business. Increased customs protection, for example, results in 
increased overall income of the company (due to increase of the adjusted price 
on the local market), opening the field for concomitant increase of managers’ 
remuneration and owner’s profit. Although the information on this type of 
corruption is very scarce, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which not 
the manager, but the company owner plays the role of a corruptor.
A special type of corruption related to corporate governance is associated 
with establishment, i.e. change of ownership structure, primarily in the stage 
of company takeover, i.e. the role of state owned-shares in this process. Name-
ly, in Serbia various privatization models were in place, and implementation of 
the 1997 privatization model led to the fact that in many cases ownership of the 
company capital was on the one hand dispersed among a large number of com-
pany employees (former and current), and on the other, substantial amount of 
the company capital was allocated to the state, the shares being assigned to the 
Share Fund. Such ownership structure was simply not stable enough, i.e. was 
not sustainable. The current minority shareholders were strongly motivated to 
dispose of the shares they got for free, and the state policy relating to the sale of 
shares from the state portfolio, held by the Share Fund, was neither clear, nor 
consistent. Moreover, the takeover rules, and other rules of trade in securities, 
before enactment of the 2006 laws, were not quite precise, and favored those 
that take the company over, providing relatively low level of protection to the 
current (small) shareholders. All this opened the field for abuse, i.e. corrup-
tion, in the process of corporation takeover and consolidation. Namely, cor-
ruption of officials making pertinent decisions, or corruptive insider informa-
tion was conductive to lucrative profits in the process of takeover of companies 
privatized before 2001, where the amounts paid per share were lower than they 
should have been. Although the substantiating evidence is not available, major 
scandals relating to privatization are mainly associated with cases of takeover 
of companies privatized pursuant to the procedure in force before 2001, such 
as Knjaz Milos, Vital, et. 
Generally speaking, in Serbia the philosophy of abiding by the law has 
not taken root among owners and managers, as it is the case in many major 
corporations in developed countries. The difference in the level of compliance 
of the law probably is not so much caused by moral characteristics of one and 
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the other, but by the business climate: in Serbia, reputation of management 
and company is much less important than in developed countries, and the rule 
of law and power of institutions (investigating and judiciary alike) are much 
weaker. To put it simply, in Serbia it is more cost-effective to breach the laws, 
including the anti-corruption ones. This is partially compounded by lower 
transparency of business deals and decision making, which makes it easier to 
pursue corruption.
Similarly, in Serbia, anti-money laundering regulations are in place; they 
are on the level of European ones in the parts relating to collection of data on 
suspicious transactions, but the there are practically no analyses let alone pos-
sible investigations on the basis of these data. Weaknesses in the anti-money 
laundering activities undoubtedly facilitate, even enable corruption in the cor-
porate sector.
REQUIRED CHANGES
In order to impair any possibility for corruption in the takeover process, 
i.e. in the process of corporate governance consolidation, but not only because 
of that, it is necessary that the state disposes of its share, i.e. its ownership 
of privatized companies, and to do that as soon as possible. Accelerated and 
transparent sale of these shares will enable not only removal of any breeding 
ground for corruption, but also will increase the predominance of majority 
owners of these companies, even eventual closure of the companies, i.e. their 
transformation from open/public public companies to limited liability compa-
nies, leading to improved corporate governance. Unfortunately, in the Govern-
ment of Serbia itself, i.e. in some if its ministries, some voices have been heard 
advocating the idea of merging the shares currently held by the Share Fund 
with the portfolio of shares that will be distributed to the citizens of Serbia free 
of charge. Since about 5 million people have been registered for distribution of 
free shares, the procedure will, regardless of corruption, deteriorate the situa-
tion in terms of corporate governance. Not only the ownership dispersion would 
be increased, but closing of corporations will be more difficult, i.e. their trans-
formation from open/public public companies into the forms of companies 
predisposed to better corporate governance (closed/private public company 
and limited liability companies). Namely, the Takeover Law stipulates the pos-
sibility of compulsory sale of shares if one of shareholders has taken over at 
least 95% of shares, providing the conditions to squeeze out small shareholders, 
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i.e. closure of such company and its withdrawal from the stock market. By such 
inclusion of the shares owned by the state and held by the Share Fund, a large 
number of companies would be further away from this cutoff point, which will 
hinder the process of corporate governance development in Serbia.     
Accordingly, accelerated privatization should be supported, i.e. sale of 
shares that are still owned by the state, and the state should disclose its perti-
nent decision to the general public so that all interested stakeholders are in-
formed. The current takeover legislation enables the whole process to be con-
ducted transparently, leading to ownership consolidation. In this way, not only 
the more appropriate ownership structure will be provided from the corporate 
governance point of view, but all future takeovers will be effectuated within the 
private sector, impairing the risk of corruption. 
As it has already been said, reduced intensity and spread of corruption in 
the public sector undoubtedly provide prerequisites for improvement of cor-
porate governance, but this will not play a decisive role. Nevertheless, it still 
remains to identify the current key elements in anti-corruption activities in 
Serbia, i.e. the key elements that should be in place. There are four crucial ones. 
The rent appropriated by the corrupted person is always the source of 
corruption. By adoption of the state policies eliminating the rent, the motives 
of corruptors are also eliminated – nobody is motivated to corrupt, unless he 
is rewarded by the pertinent rent. Analyses of such rent in Serbia or any other 
country for that matter, have clearly shown – corruption decreases with the 
level of state involvement. Accordingly, liberalization and deregulation are an 
effective response to corruption that yields high rent for the corruptors, i.e. 
they are the first line of anti-corruption activities in Serbia, although liberal-
ization and deregulation do not affect corruption in the private sector. After 
2000, a lot has been achieved in terms of liberalization in Serbia (prices, for-
eign trade, foreign exchange market, market of capital, etc.) and deregulation 
(again, foreign trade, registration of businesses, etc.), but it still remains a lot 
to be done. Further foreign trade liberalization is related to ratification and 
implementation of Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), establish-
ing the area of free trade between Serbia and its main foreign trade partners 
in the EU.
Reform of the public sector is another element of anti-corruption 
activities. The reform pertains to substantial change of behavior, i.e. conduct 
of public officials, implying their different selection, training, downsizing, 
and empowerment for effective work, definition and implementation of strict 
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ethical standards (code of conduct), and increased salaries of civil servants. The 
last item on the list of anti-corruption activities may be controversial. While 
the public believes that the proposed salaries are too high, i.e. that the increase 
is too steep, civil servants generally insist that their salaries are too low. Can 
this controversy be resolved? The only way to resolve it is to set the salaries in 
public administration at the level somewhat above the one set in the private 
sector (labor market), but to have also an effective oversight system of civil 
servants, and make sure that all those involved in corruption are fired and, 
accordingly, left without pay. Thus, the salary, i.e. risk of losing it, will stimulate 
civil servants to perform their duties effectively and impartially. 
Providing the prerequisites for establishment of the rule of law is another 
important element of anti-corruption activities. Effects of full rule of law are 
twofold. On the one hand, effective judiciary enables legal processing of cor-
ruption cases; accordingly, only with such judiciary is it possible to enforce 
effective punitive measures against the corruption-related offences. Serbia lags 
behind substantially in this particular area, i.e. the reform that is supposed to 
result in proper rule of law. Besides, in recent years, Serbia has wandered try-
ing to find a proper institutional framework to curb corruption. Special bodies 
have been set up, ad hoc teams, even the Anti-corruption Council has been es-
tablished which, according to many, failed to fulfill its purpose. Only recently 
the focus is redirected to its proper place: regular institutions, i.e. competent 
governmental bodies: police, prosecutor’s office, etc. By the end of this year, 
we expect adoption of the pertinent laws to enable establishment of Anti-cor-
ruption Agency which will, primarily, focus political corruption, the one that 
may hinder operation of regular institutions, which may be influenced by the 
executive or legislative power, the parts of the power where political corrup-
tion may occur. 
Finally, harsher punitive measures, i.e. strict, consistent and effective 
implementation of stipulated sanctions are among the strategies of anti-cor-
ruption activities. High fines, i.e., drastic criminal legal sanctions as well as 
high risk of discovery of perpetrators of the criminal offence of corruption and 
valid judgments for the crime have important deterrent function. This element 
of the strategy in corruption curbing activities is inevitably related to the pre-
vious one – establishment of the rule of law. Namely, punitive policy may be 
harsh; the sanctions stipulated very strict, but without implementation thereof, 
i.e. low probability of the verdict becoming a valid one, they do not play the 
intended preventive role. Initial cases of valid judgments pronounced against 
high governmental officials recorded in 2007, such as one against a Supreme 
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Court Judge, illustrate higher probability of punishment for those practicing 
corruption, regardless of the position they hold. A large number of detected 
corruption networks in the last two years, relating to various areas of public 
administration (Customs Administration, Commercial Court, toll collection, 
etc.) also illustrate that in Serbia, the times in which one could enjoy the fruits 
of corruption revenue in a carefree manner are definitely behind us. The infor-
mation in itself is a warning to people to stay off corruption. 
The link of corporate governance issue and corruption is fairly potent in 
case of corruption in the private sector. The sources may be perceived in poor 
corporate governance. In case of corruption in the public sector, the link of 
corporate governance issue and corruption is not salient. This may explain the 
situation in Serbia where, on the one hand, there is a fairly widespread cor-
ruption in the public sector, and on the other, relatively favorable ownership 
structure from the corporate governance point of view.
Concluding remarks
INTRODUCTION 
In five years, from the previous CLDS survey on corporate governance in 
Serbia,142 major changes have taken place. In 2003 the predominant form of 
ownership was the socialist one, i.e. social property, with all associated defects. 
Corporate governance was one of the greatest weaknesses of Serbian economy: 
unqualified management usually reported to the state or ruling party, or em-
ployees or nobody but themselves, and the private property had only begun to 
take roots with onset of privatization. Consequences on success of companies 
and responsibility to society were dire. 
The first survey conducted by CLDS identified the very poor situation, 
although it was hardly a surprise, but it nevertheless suggested a path to take. It 
promoted and advocated extensive reform of the overall environment – from 
efforts to establish the rule of law and institution strengthening (particularly 
the judiciary), via important amendments to the company and finance leg-
islation all the way to changes of regulations in various aspects of economic 
life (ownership, accounting and audit, competition, anti-corruption activities, 
etc.). As many as three CLDS team members who wrote the study had the 
opportunity of promoting their ideas in the working group that prepared the 
draft Company Law in 2003-2004. 
CHANGES IN THE COURSE OF 2003-2008
In the last five years, as we have seen in the previous chapters, a lot has 
been done in relation to corporate governance.
First of all, most of the so-called socially owned capital was privatized in 
the commercial sector of the economy, together with the financial and banking 
sector. Most of the state sector covering infrastructure, telecommunications, 
energy and the like has remained unprivatized. Many large companies have 
been taken over by foreign capital. Privatization has, undoubtedly, brought 
about essential changes in corporate governance, since the private owners have 
replaced social/socialist ones and introduced healthier commercial motives. 
142  Unapređenje korporativnog upravljanja (Improving Corporate Governance), CLDS, 2003
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Second, privatization has mainly been accomplished by sale of 70% pack-
age of shares to a single investor, which has decisively formulated the owner-
ship structure and management model, benefiting the majority owner who has 
both the ways and interests to control the company management firmly. Thus, 
instead of the conventional principal –agent issue, the principal-principal is-
sue emerged as the predominant one, i.e. how to protect a minority owner 
from expropriation.
Third, company privatization automatically meant its transformation into 
an public company, meaning that small companies (e.g. local hairdressing par-
lor) also had the same form. This was, needless to say, strange and unsustain-
able for a longer term.  
Fourth, in the post-privatization period, further concentration of own-
ership in Serbia has continued: both due to insufficient protection of small 
shareholders, and due to aspiration of controlling owners to increase their 
package and desire of most employees to dispose of their shares since they are 
not genuine investors. 
Fifth, in these five years, substantial regulatory innovations have been 
introduced, that have greatly changed the nature of corporate governance in 
Serbia. In 2004 the new Company Law was enacted, regulating the issues of 
company law, including corporate governance, in a much better way. It has 
been harmonized with OECD corporate governance principles and EU Direc-
tives. In the course of 2006 new laws in the area of finances were adopted (on 
market of securities, takeover, investment funds) that have generally improved 
the market of capital and financial area as a whole. 
Sixth, an attempt has been made with voluntary codes of corporate gov-
ernance, which were promoted by the Serbian Chamber of Commerce (2006). 
They were supposed, following the role model of western countries, to com-
pound statutory regulations with voluntary self-regulation, in the interest of 
investors. This attempt has not, at least not yet, yielded desired outcome.
Seventh, the main reason of not only the poor launch of the voluntary 
codes, but even more importantly, insufficient transparency of operations and 
insufficient (even from the statutory point of view) publication of information 
by public companies may be explained by the state of corporate governance. 
Namely, many companies have the public structure not by intention, but by 
the force of law (originating from privatization), so that they do not raise new 
capital on the market. Instead, they trade in their shares primarily aiming at 
the change of status form – from open/public public company to limited liability 
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company, for simplification and reduction of cost of operations of relatively 
small companies. When new capital is not raised at the market, the strongest 
motive for proper behavior and maximum transparency to improve the 
reputation and rating is not even present.
Thus, corporate governance in Serbia at this point of time experiences a 
transitional phase with partial normalization of ownership and status struc-
ture. Shares change hands from employees to proper investors, and owners 
of most public companies want their status changed, i.e. they want to become 
limited liability companies. These circumstances undoubtedly affect the nature, 
as well as weaknesses of corporate governance in Serbia. Others are related to 
institutional weaknesses, certain immaturity of sharehodership,  intentional 
abuse by controlling owners, and the like.
FURTHER PROMOTION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
There is no doubt that the aim of corporate governance should be  to 
maximize long-term value of the shares by improvement of decision-making 
processes and performance of public companies through good structure of re-
lationship between investors, management and other stakeholders (creditors, 
clients, employees). It implies establishment of rules and incentives that serve 
the company’s interests best, and at the same time respect all duties to other 
participants. 
The mentioned normalization of ownership and status structure is a nec-
essary requirement for further promotion of corporate governance in Serbia. 
The final transfer of shares from the hands of employees to the hands of in-
vestors will end the conflicts between the group of employees that are also 
shareholders and the controlling owner, i.e. management of issues that are not 
directly related to operations, but to the salaries, employment security and the 
like, which are all trade union issues. Further, conversion of public companies, 
particularly the small ones, into limited liability companies will simplify the 
managerial structure by getting the owner closer to the operational manage-
ment, and accordingly, narrow down the areas of corporate governance 
problems.  
Upon completion of normalization, the role of the market of capital and 
banks will be greater as a source of new capital. Alongside, the reputation of 
public companies will be increasingly important for those that hold the capital 
196 Corporate governance
they count on. First, many of the remaining public companies will search for 
additional capital, but other new public companies will be set up, either ab ovo, 
or when prosperous limited liability companies go public.  The importance of 
corporate governance will rise in parallel, since it is a major if not the decisive 
factor of the investment, i.e. credit rating. 
We have, thus, mentioned the first and the foremost motive of corpo-
rate governance promotion in mature economies – own interest. This is not, 
therefore, a legal obligation or the business ethics issue, but the key aspect of 
good understanding of interests of company and shareholders. Well organized 
corporate governance contributes substantially to improved company perfor-
mance and its image in the outside world.  
The greatest progress may be achieved by the effort of public companies 
themselves. While corporate governance in Serbia is on a decent level in com-
panies that are owned by foreign reputable companies, there is much room for 
improvement in the locally owned companies. As substantiated by the sur-
vey conducted for this study, as well as anecdotal evidence, many members of 
company managements have either insufficient knowledge on corporate gov-
ernance and associated issues, or have no pertinent knowledge whatsoever. 
Accordingly, the system of current company management cannot be organized 
well, regardless of the level of compliance with the pertinent legislation. 
Additional motivation for proper understanding of ownership interests 
may be provided by the environment, private and state, alike.  
Within the private sector, various programs may be initiates, such as:
 Activation of voluntary codes of corporate governance that have been 
proven successful in some countries; the current ones may be revitalized, 
compiled by the Chamber of Commerce, and new may be formulated 
in proper cooperation of public companies; the principle “obey or ex-
plain” could be very powerful in this respect, where aberration from the 
rules stipulated in the code is quite acceptable as an expression of volun-
tarism and autonomous right of a company, but the aberration needs to 
be explained,
 Establishment of the rating system to measure the quality of corporate 
governance, to try to really measure the level of corporate governance in 
certain companies; the rating could become quite influential in the busi-
ness community, with rating agencies and among investors,
 Training of owners and managers on corporate governance, where good 
technologies and good practices could be explained to those who could 
then implement them in real life,
•
•
•
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 Public advocacy and promotion of the need to promote corporate gover-
nance and good ways to do so, etc.
The first activities that a state should undertake are undoubtedly the legis-
lative ones. In the last five years, legislation that regulates corporate governance 
has been thoroughly changes – new laws have been enacted on companies, 
market of securities, takeover, etc. In comparison with the previous regula-
tions, they have mainly brought about progress, but they are still not perfect 
and the system of corporate governance could be improved further. Therefore, 
in the previous chapters of this study an effort has been made to suggest pos-
sible legislative improvements not only in the mentioned laws, but in others 
directly relating to corporate governance, as well.
The company law stipulates acceptable concepts, although alternative 
ones, relying more on Anglo-Saxon principle may be contemplated as well. 
This time, we focused practical issues, so that the proposals for improvement 
of the law were dominated by operational solutions that should remove some 
of the shortcomings and imprecisions recognized in the law over the four years 
of its application. The only “conceptual” issue is the composition of the Manag-
ing Board, where we suggested complete personal separation from the Execu-
tive Board, which would be more in line with the underlying philosophy of 
this piece of legislation. We also believe that the proposals relating to mutual 
harmonization of this and other laws (on accounting and audit, market of se-
curities etc.) are also important.  
More important amendments were suggested in the financial laws. The 
Law on Securities should be corrected in at least two important segments: the 
first is the issue of poor quality securities originating from privatization, and 
the second is better organization of the Securities Commission. We also sug-
gest adoption of the new Takeover Law, since the current is not satisfactory. 
Another line of activity of the public sector could focus strengthened im-
plementation of the law (judiciary) and other rules (Belgrade Stock Exchange 
and other regulatory agencies). As it has already been said, in Serbia the 
greatest weaknesses are identified in this area, and they endanger operation 
of the law and private rules of these institutions and prevent the system of 
corporate governance from peaking. For example, the law prohibited the use of 
insider information long ago, but nobody has ever been sanctioned for doing 
so, and it is a common knowledge that huge capitals have been made on the 
basis of insider information. These and similar cases clearly support the notion 
that “crime pays”, i.e. they demotivate law abiding and socially responsible 
•
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behavior. Instead, they direct the actors to the dubious road of success at all 
cost, including violations of the law and other rules. 
We shall refrain from discussing the issue of how to provide for more 
effective judiciary, but we shall remind you that the problem of insufficiently 
solid judiciary has been identified long ago, and on the state level the strategy 
of comprehensive judiciary reform was adopted in 2004, but practically noth-
ing has been done on implementation of this strategy since.
The study highlights recommendations for legislative amendments, al-
though the main problems are actually not there, but are in implementation 
of the law and companies themselves. Nevertheless, we have opted for the leg-
islative direction of recommendations, since we believe that this is the area in 
which rapid progress can be achieved more easily than in other mentioned and 
unmentioned areas.  


